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1 Executive	  Summary	  
1.1 Background	  and	  Research	  Aims	  
• A	  recent	  review	  of	  literature	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  for	  gambling-­‐related	  harm	  
concluded	  that	  of	  the	  few	  available	  empirical	  studies,	  the	  majority	  had	  substantial	  
methodological	  flaws,	  making	  it	  unsafe	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  from	  such	  a	  literature	  base.	  	  It	  
was	  recommended	  that	  for	  research	  to	  be	  valuable	  in	  helping	  to	  understand	  the	  link	  
between	  stake	  size	  and	  gambling-­‐related	  harm,	  participants	  must	  be	  able	  to	  win	  and	  lose	  
significant	  monetary	  sums,	  and	  that	  the	  findings	  are	  gambling	  activity	  specific	  (i.e.	  EGM	  or	  
Lottery	  specific).	  
• Problem	  gambling	  and	  gambling-­‐related	  harm	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  control	  and	  
impaired	  decision-­‐making	  performance,	  with	  a	  disregard	  for	  future	  negative	  consequences	  
of	  gambling.	  	  Research	  tends	  to	  represent	  such	  lack	  of	  control	  and	  decision-­‐making	  
impairments	  in	  problem	  gamblers	  as	  being	  a	  result	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  individual	  vulnerabilities.	  	  
The	  current	  study	  evaluates	  whether	  stake	  size	  can	  temporarily	  affect	  an	  individual’s	  
decision-­‐making	  performance	  and	  behavioural	  control	  within	  a	  gambling	  context.	  
• Cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  control	  is	  organised	  and	  maintained	  by	  an	  individual’s	  executive	  
functions,	  which	  are	  primarily	  represented	  in	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (PFC)	  area	  of	  the	  brain.	  	  
Executive	  function	  represents	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  mental	  processes,	  such	  as	  attention,	  working	  
memory	  and	  planning,	  that	  enables	  an	  individual	  to	  engage	  in	  goal-­‐orientated	  behaviour.	  
• Simplistic	  and	  frequent	  behaviours,	  such	  as	  remembering	  one’s	  route	  home,	  often	  do	  not	  
require	  executive	  control	  because,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  brain	  processes	  and	  executes	  such	  
behaviour	  automatically.	  	  However,	  when	  the	  behaviour	  becomes	  more	  complex,	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  event	  rapidly	  updating	  and	  changing,	  or	  the	  need	  to	  make	  multiple	  fast	  decisions	  under	  
uncertainty,	  then	  executive	  control	  is	  required	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims	  and	  
minimise	  potential	  negative	  consequences	  of	  specific	  events.	  	  	  
• It	  is	  argued	  that	  deterioration	  in	  control	  within	  gambling	  sessions	  (where	  participants	  
engage	  in	  loss	  chasing	  and	  lose	  sums	  that	  create	  substantial	  negative	  consequences)	  can	  be	  
explained	  by	  a	  temporary	  reduction	  in	  executive	  function	  performance.	  
• Executive	  control	  in	  electronic	  machine	  (EGM)	  gambling	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  the	  PFC	  
organising	  brain	  activity	  to	  favour	  processes,	  such	  as	  attention	  and	  task-­‐switching,	  that	  will	  
assist	  the	  individual	  in	  maintaining	  their	  predetermined	  goals	  of	  enjoying	  gambling	  as	  a	  
leisure	  pursuit	  while	  simultaneously	  minimising	  any	  potential	  harm.	  	  	  However,	  executive	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control	  can	  be	  jeopardised	  by	  interfering	  signals	  and	  stimulation	  during	  the	  gambling	  
session.	  	  
• 	  Interference	  can	  come	  from	  negative	  internal	  states	  in	  response	  to	  losing,	  and	  from	  
conditioned	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  where	  gamblers	  are	  motivated	  to	  continue	  to	  play	  
because	  of	  the	  rewarding	  experience	  of	  gambling.	  	  Often	  the	  urge	  to	  persist	  in	  gambling	  
despite	  the	  negative	  consequences	  (i.e.	  the	  interference)	  is	  stronger	  than	  the	  existing	  goal	  of	  
gambling	  in	  a	  controlled	  manner,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  gambler	  may	  update	  their	  ‘goal’	  during	  
the	  session	  from	  controlled	  gambling	  to	  gambling	  to	  recoup	  recent	  losses	  and	  remove	  
negative	  mood	  states.	  	  
• A	  multitude	  of	  executive	  function	  deficits	  have	  been	  linked	  to	  addictive	  disorders	  and	  
problem	  gambling.	  	  In	  the	  current	  study,	  three	  constructs	  were	  identified	  as	  being	  keys	  in	  
understanding	  the	  loss	  of	  control	  within	  EGM	  gambling	  sessions:	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  
behavioural	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  response.	  	  The	  causal	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  each	  of	  these	  
three	  constructs	  was	  measured	  within	  the	  current	  study.	  
• 	  Reflection	  impulsivity	  refers	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  gather	  and	  evaluate	  information	  prior	  to	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  make	  an	  impulsive	  decision.	  	  There	  are	  three	  
outcome	  measures	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  including	  speed	  of	  decision,	  amount	  of	  
information	  gathered,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  the	  quality	  of	  decision	  made	  based	  on	  the	  
available	  evidence	  at	  the	  time	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  (i.e.	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  correct).	  
• Reflection	  Impulsivity	  in	  gambling	  is	  argued	  to	  cause	  poorly	  conceived,	  maladaptive	  
behaviour	  that	  will	  create	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  individual.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  rather	  
than	  making	  controlled,	  rational	  gambling	  decisions,	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  lead	  to	  more	  
reckless,	  emotional	  and	  short-­‐term	  focused	  behaviour.	  
• Problem	  gamblers	  have	  been	  observed	  to	  display	  greater	  reflection	  impulsivity	  in	  
comparison	  to	  normal	  populations,	  suggesting	  it	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  individual	  differences	  
(i.e.	  pre-­‐existing	  vulnerabilities	  in	  some	  individuals).	  	  The	  current	  study	  will	  measure	  
whether	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stake	  size	  has	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  players’	  level	  of	  reflection	  
impulsivity.	  
• Response	  Inhibition	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  either	  cancel	  or	  withhold	  a	  prepotent	  response	  when	  the	  
response	  is	  inappropriate	  or	  disadvantageous	  to	  the	  individual.	  	  A	  prepotent	  response	  refers	  
to	  an	  action	  that	  has	  been	  previously	  and	  repeatedly	  associated	  with	  a	  positive	  outcome	  for	  
the	  individual.	  	  The	  urge	  to	  continue	  to	  gambling	  on	  EGMs	  and	  to	  keep	  pressing	  the	  button	  
could	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  prepotent	  response	  because	  of	  the	  excitement	  associated	  with	  
every	  spin,	  independent	  of	  whether	  the	  result	  is	  a	  win	  or	  loss.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  pressing	  of	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the	  button	  and	  the	  excitement	  from	  the	  risk	  are	  being	  repeatedly	  paired,	  and	  therefore	  
creating	  a	  conditioned	  response	  in	  the	  individual	  to	  continue	  gambling	  to	  receive	  further	  
stimulation.	  
• Response	  inhibition	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  show	  restraint	  and	  ‘override’	  interference	  from	  strong	  
urges	  to	  complete	  a	  behaviour	  that	  has	  been	  conditioned,	  because	  ultimately	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  
beneficial	  for	  the	  individual.	  	  Problem	  gamblers	  have	  been	  observed	  to	  have	  deficits	  in	  
response	  inhibition	  in	  comparison	  to	  normal	  populations,	  suggesting	  it	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  
individual	  differences.	  The	  current	  study	  will	  measure	  whether	  gambling	  at	  a	  higher	  stake	  
size	  has	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  players’	  response	  inhibition	  performance.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  does	  
ability	  to	  withhold	  responses	  (i.e.	  urges)	  change	  in	  different	  gambling	  contexts?	  
• Arousal	  is	  a	  proposed	  factor	  that	  may	  contribute,	  in	  multiple	  ways,	  to	  loss	  of	  control	  within	  
EGM	  gambling	  sessions.	  	  First,	  evidence	  demonstrates	  that	  some	  individuals	  are	  motivated	  
to	  gamble	  to	  achieve	  rewarding	  states	  of	  arousal,	  and	  that	  gamblers	  may	  be	  motivated	  to	  
continue	  gambling	  despite	  incurring	  losses	  because	  they	  find	  the	  experience	  rewarding.	  
• Research	  has	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  problem	  gamblers	  have	  a	  heightened	  arousal	  
experience	  when	  gambling	  in	  comparison	  to	  non-­‐problem	  gamblers.	  	  This	  heightened	  
arousal	  experience	  may	  explain	  discounting	  of	  losses	  and	  perseverance	  within	  gambling	  
sessions.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  any	  factor	  that	  increases	  the	  arousal	  experience	  may	  in	  
turn	  increase	  a	  gambler’s	  motivation	  to	  continue	  gambling	  in	  spite	  of	  negative	  longer-­‐term	  
consequences.	  The	  current	  study	  will	  assess	  whether	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  creates	  an	  
‘enhanced’	  arousal	  experience	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  in	  comparison	  to	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  
• Arousal	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  to	  loss	  of	  control	  within	  EGM	  gambling	  sessions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
learning	  experience	  of	  the	  gambler	  in	  response	  to	  wins	  and	  losses.	  	  The	  somatic	  marker	  
hypothesis	  argues	  that	  various	  physiological	  responses	  to	  events,	  such	  as	  arousal,	  help	  the	  
individual	  to	  associate	  specific	  events	  with	  either	  positive	  or	  negative	  outcomes.	  	  The	  value	  
of	  this	  positive	  or	  negative	  feeling	  in	  response	  to	  specific	  events,	  such	  as	  EGM	  gambling,	  is	  
that	  these	  evoked	  emotions	  help	  guide	  decision-­‐making	  when	  such	  situations	  are	  
encountered	  in	  the	  future.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  emotional	  bias	  is	  beneficial	  as	  it	  enables	  the	  
individual	  to	  appropriately	  weigh	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  a	  decision.	  
• Within	  the	  gambling	  context,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  effective	  decision-­‐making	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  
associated	  learning,	  gamblers	  are	  able	  to	  somatically	  mark	  both	  wins	  and	  losses	  
appropriately.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  if	  there	  is	  an	  absence	  of	  markers	  in	  relation	  to	  wins	  (labelling	  
the	  event	  as	  positive)	  or	  losses	  (labelling	  the	  event	  as	  negative),	  then	  the	  gambler	  will	  have	  
an	  unbalanced	  conceptualisation	  of	  EGM	  gambling	  and	  this	  may	  impair	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐
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making.	  	  Put	  simply,	  a	  lack	  of	  somatic	  markers	  in	  response	  to	  losses	  may	  make	  the	  gambler	  
biased	  towards	  potential	  wins	  when	  making	  decisions	  and	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  risky	  gambling	  
behaviour	  and	  gambling-­‐related	  harm.	  	  The	  current	  study	  will	  measure	  whether	  gambling	  at	  
higher	  stakes	  on	  EGMs	  negatively	  affects	  the	  somatic	  marking	  of	  wins	  and	  losses	  in	  
comparison	  to	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  
1.2 Research	  Hypotheses	  
1. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling	  (i.e.	  control	  condition).	  
2. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  losing	  bets	  in	  comparison	  to	  
either	  winning	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
3. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
4. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
5. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  
in	  comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling	  (i.e.	  control	  condition).	  
6. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  losing	  bets	  in	  comparison	  
to	  either	  winning	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
7. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
8. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  
in	  comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
9. The	  percentage	  increase	  in	  arousal	  level	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling	  (i.e.	  control	  condition).	  
10. The	  percentage	  increase	  in	  arousal	  level	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
11. The	  percentage	  increase	  in	  arousal	  level	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
12. Players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  response	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
13. Players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  response	  when	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	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14. Players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  response	  when	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
1.3 Research	  Approach	  and	  Design	  
• The	  research	  design	  consisted	  of	  a	  repeated	  measures	  experiment,	  where	  each	  participant	  
was	  required	  to	  undertake	  four	  separate	  gambling	  conditions	  and	  a	  control	  condition.	  	  In	  
summary,	  the	  five	  experimental	  conditions	  were:	  £20	  per	  spin	  winning	  condition,	  £20	  per	  
spin	  losing	  condition,	  £2	  per	  spin	  winning	  condition,	  £2	  per	  spin	  losing	  condition	  and	  a	  
control	  condition	  where	  participants	  made	  a	  roulette	  betting	  choice	  and	  subsequently	  
observed	  the	  spinning	  of	  the	  roulette	  wheel.	  	  The	  experimental	  conditions	  were	  
counterbalanced	  to	  control	  for	  order	  effects.	  
• A	  sample	  of	  32	  regular	  adult	  gamblers	  (30	  were	  male)	  was	  recruited	  through	  a	  range	  of	  
public	  and	  private	  advertisements	  in	  the	  local	  area	  surrounding	  the	  University	  of	  Lincoln.	  	  
Inclusion	  criteria	  required	  participants	  to	  have	  experience	  of	  playing	  a	  B2	  gambling	  machine,	  
and	  to	  not	  be	  experiencing	  any	  gambling-­‐related	  problems.	  
• At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  experiment	  participants	  were	  provided	  with	  £132,	  and	  they	  were	  
informed	  that	  the	  money	  was	  now	  theirs	  and	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  any	  money	  
remaining	  and	  any	  money	  won	  was	  theirs	  to	  keep.	  	  In	  each	  experimental	  condition	  there	  
were	  three	  separate	  bets	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation,	  where	  the	  participants	  were	  told	  
at	  what	  stake	  to	  bet	  by	  the	  experimenter;	  with	  participants	  believing	  that	  the	  ensuing	  wins	  
and	  losses	  were	  determined	  randomly.	  In	  order	  to	  standardise	  the	  experience	  in	  each	  
condition	  participants	  were	  only	  permitted	  to	  make	  an	  outside	  bet	  with	  a	  0.5	  probability	  (i.e.	  
choose	  whether	  the	  result	  would	  be	  red	  or	  black).	  
• Immediately	  after	  the	  result	  of	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  game,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  report	  
their	  level	  of	  arousal	  by	  partially	  completing	  the	  Self-­‐Assessment	  Manikan	  (SAM).	  After	  
doing	  so,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  a	  Go/No	  Go	  Task,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  response	  
inhibition.	  	  This	  process	  was	  repeated	  three	  times	  in	  each	  condition.	  	  After	  the	  third	  Go/No	  
Go	  Task	  ended,	  participants	  were	  visually	  reminded	  how	  much	  money	  they	  had	  won	  or	  lost	  
in	  the	  condition,	  and	  then	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  an	  Information	  Sampling	  Task	  (IST)	  as	  a	  
measure	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity.	  
• 	  During	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants’	  electrodermal	  activity	  was	  recorded	  
using	  a	  non-­‐invasive	  technique,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  arousal	  change	  and	  arousal	  response	  to	  
various	  gambling	  outcomes	  (i.e.	  production	  of	  somatic	  markers).	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• Data	  was	  subsequently	  analysed	  (using	  SPSS	  for	  Windows	  v.	  21)	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  
stake	  size	  on	  players’	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  response.	  
1.4 Findings:	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  
• In	  the	  high	  stake	  condition	  participants	  used	  less	  information	  and	  tolerated	  more	  
uncertainty	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  However,	  there	  
was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  between	  the	  high	  stake	  and	  
low	  stake	  condition.	  	  In	  general,	  when	  losing,	  participants	  also	  sampled	  less	  information	  in	  
comparison	  to	  the	  neutral	  control	  condition.	  	  When	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  comparison	  
to	  the	  control	  condition,	  participants	  used	  less	  information	  when	  decision-­‐making.	  
• There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  decision-­‐making	  latency	  across	  the	  various	  stake	  size	  
conditions.	  	  Put	  simply,	  the	  length	  of	  time	  taken	  to	  evaluate	  decisions	  did	  not	  significantly	  
differ	  after	  winning	  or	  losing	  at	  high	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  low	  stakes	  or	  the	  control	  
condition.	  
• However,	  after	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  lower	  stakes,	  participants	  
performed	  worse	  in	  decision-­‐making	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  their	  decisions	  being	  
correct.	  	  Impairment	  in	  decision-­‐making	  was	  also	  observed	  after	  gambling	  at	  the	  £2	  stake	  
condition	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition.	  
• This	  impairment	  in	  decision-­‐making	  after	  higher	  stake	  betting	  was	  observed	  regardless	  of	  
whether	  participants	  were	  winning	  or	  losing	  the	  bets.	  	  In	  general,	  participants	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  make	  predictions	  with	  lower	  probability	  of	  being	  correct	  after	  losing	  bets	  than	  after	  
the	  control	  condition	  where	  there	  was	  no	  opportunity	  to	  win	  or	  lose	  money.	  
1.5 Findings:	  Response	  Inhibition	  
• When	  either	  winning	  or	  losing,	  participants	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stake	  sizes	  did	  not	  experience	  
any	  deterioration	  in	  response	  inhibition	  in	  comparison	  to	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  	  It	  was	  
evident	  that	  the	  response	  inhibition	  executive	  function	  was	  not	  negatively	  affected	  by	  stake	  
size	  in	  isolation.	  
1.6 Findings:	  Arousal	  Experience	  
• There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  short-­‐term	  arousal	  change	  from	  baseline	  when	  
gambling	  at	  different	  stake	  sizes,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  participants	  were	  winning	  or	  losing.	  
• In	  terms	  of	  self-­‐reported	  levels	  of	  arousal,	  participants	  reported	  experiencing	  higher	  levels	  of	  
arousal	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  lower	  stakes	  or	  the	  control	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condition.	  	  	  Participants	  also	  reported	  experiencing	  more	  arousal	  even	  when	  gambling	  at	  
lower	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition.	  
• As	  one	  would	  expect,	  participants	  reported	  more	  arousal	  when	  winning	  versus	  not	  winning,	  
but	  they	  also	  found	  losing	  more	  arousing	  than	  the	  control	  condition	  where	  there	  was	  no	  
opportunity	  to	  win	  or	  lose	  money.	  	  Winning	  at	  higher	  stakes	  was	  found	  to	  be	  more	  arousing	  
than	  winning	  at	  lower	  stakes;	  however,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  arousal	  when	  losing	  at	  
higher	  stakes	  in	  contrast	  to	  losing	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  
1.7 Findings:	  Arousal	  as	  Somatic	  Marker	  	  
• Participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  elicit	  a	  somatic	  marker,	  i.e.	  a	  skin	  conductance	  response	  
(ER-­‐SCR)	  in	  response	  to	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  lower	  stakes,	  as	  one	  
would	  expect	  given	  the	  added	  significance	  of	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes.	  
• In	  general,	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  marker	  after	  winning	  bets	  
than	  after	  losing	  bets	  or	  after	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  
difference	  in	  somatic	  markers	  produced	  between	  the	  losing	  and	  control	  conditions.	  
• More	  specifically,	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  have	  a	  somatic	  marker	  in	  response	  to	  
winning	  bets	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  contrast	  to	  winning	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  	  	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  
significant	  difference	  in	  somatic	  markers	  in	  response	  to	  losing	  at	  higher	  stakes,	  lower	  stakes	  
or	  the	  control	  condition.	  
1.8 Discussion,	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations:	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  
• It	  was	  observed	  that	  after	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  an	  individual	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  
decisions	  of	  reduced	  quality	  in	  terms	  of	  probability	  of	  being	  correct,	  than	  after	  gambling	  at	  
lower	  stakes	  or	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  Ultimately,	  while	  controlling	  for	  alternative	  causal	  
factors,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  after	  betting	  at	  either	  the	  £20	  or	  £2	  per	  spin	  level,	  participants	  
made	  more	  impaired	  judgements	  in	  a	  decision-­‐making	  task.	  	  	  
• In	  this	  experiment,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  change	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity	  was	  caused	  by	  
individual	  differences,	  as	  the	  effect	  was	  shown	  within	  individuals	  across	  a	  single	  day.	  	  It	  is	  
much	  more	  probable	  that	  the	  impact	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  is	  explained	  by	  short-­‐term	  
changes	  in	  internal	  state	  such	  as	  valence	  (i.e.	  level	  of	  positivity)	  and	  emotion.	  
• With	  respect	  to	  oscillations	  in	  internal	  state,	  the	  impairment	  in	  decision-­‐making	  was	  still	  
observed	  at	  the	  £20	  stake	  level	  when	  the	  participant	  was	  winning	  and	  being	  successful.	  	  This	  
suggests	  that	  the	  deficit	  in	  performance	  is	  not	  related	  to	  a	  negative	  valence	  component.	  	  In	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turn	  this	  may	  mean	  that	  intensity	  of	  emotion,	  i.e.	  arousal	  rather	  than	  positivity,	  may	  be	  a	  
key	  explanatory	  factor	  to	  consider.	  
• Participants	  did	  not	  experience	  a	  significant	  short-­‐term	  change	  in	  arousal	  in	  response	  to	  
betting	  in	  any	  experimental	  condition.	  	  However,	  prior	  to	  the	  IST	  commencing,	  participants	  
were	  provided	  with	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  total	  monetary	  outcome	  of	  that	  condition.	  Therefore	  
it	  is	  possible	  that	  although	  participants	  did	  not	  experience	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  arousal	  
after	  a	  singular	  high	  stake	  bet,	  they	  may	  have	  experienced	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  arousal	  in	  
response	  to	  seeing	  the	  larger	  cumulative	  sums	  won	  and	  lost.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  change	  in	  
arousal	  experienced	  in	  response	  to	  the	  cumulative	  total	  may	  account	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  
reflection	  impulsivity	  observed	  in	  the	  study.	  
• It	  cannot	  be	  stressed	  strongly	  enough	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  experimental	  work	  must	  be	  
applied	  with	  caution.	  	  It	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  consider	  that	  singular	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  
EGMs,	  such	  as	  size	  of	  stake	  playable,	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  gambling	  behaviour	  without	  
influence	  from	  other	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  game	  such	  as	  event	  frequency.	  Therefore,	  in	  
order	  to	  inform	  policy	  regarding	  stake	  size	  limits	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  stake	  
size	  when	  integrated	  with	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  characteristics	  of	  EGM	  
gambling	  within	  various	  gambling	  environments.	  	  	  
1.9 Discussion,	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations:	  Response	  Inhibition	  
• Stake	  size,	  independent	  of	  other	  structural	  or	  environmental	  characteristics	  related	  to	  
virtual	  roulette	  gambling,	  does	  not	  cause	  a	  temporary	  deficit	  in	  participant’s	  response	  
inhibition.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  if	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  gambling	  behaviour	  is	  indeed	  caused	  by	  
poor	  response	  inhibition	  then	  it	  is	  a	  result	  of:	  a)	  pre-­‐existing	  neuropsychological	  
vulnerabilities,	  b)	  different	  structural	  characteristics	  other	  than	  stake	  size,	  or	  c)	  an	  
interaction	  of	  multiple	  structural	  and	  situational	  characteristics	  alongside	  stake	  size.	  	  
• It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  potential	  relationship	  between	  stake	  size	  and	  response	  
inhibition	  is	  explored	  in	  more	  detail,	  specifically	  to	  examine	  if	  the	  null	  effect	  of	  stake	  remains	  
when	  gamblers	  are:	  a)	  able	  to	  re-­‐bet	  rapidly	  as	  one	  can	  in	  EGM	  gambling,	  b)	  losing	  their	  own	  
money	  that	  they	  have	  personally	  acquired	  rather	  than	  ‘house	  money’,	  and	  c)	  exposed	  to	  
gambling	  related	  cues	  in	  the	  betting	  shop,	  casino	  or	  online	  environment	  that	  may	  be	  






1.10 Discussion,	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations:	  Arousal	  Experience	  
• Gambling	  at	  larger	  stakes	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation,	  independent	  of	  other	  variables,	  
appears	  not	  to	  significantly	  increase	  percentage	  change	  in	  arousal	  between	  pre-­‐betting	  and	  
post-­‐betting	  levels.	  	  	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  arousal	  experienced	  when	  
gambling	  on	  EGMs	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  multiple	  interacting	  environmental	  and	  structural	  
factors	  rather	  than	  dependent	  on	  stake	  size	  alone.	  
• In	  terms	  of	  self-­‐reported	  arousal	  experience,	  participants	  were	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  effects	  
of	  winning	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  sums	  when	  winning,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  losing	  and	  
size	  of	  loss.	  	  This	  may	  cause	  individuals	  to	  bias	  decision-­‐making	  towards	  previous	  and	  
potential	  wins	  when	  determining	  whether	  to	  continue	  or	  cease	  gambling.	  
• Self-­‐reported	  arousal	  levels	  appear	  to	  change	  significantly	  when	  winning	  and	  losing,	  and	  also	  
when	  winning	  at	  different	  stakes.	  	  As	  arousal	  is	  one	  of	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  emotion,	  it	  is	  
probable	  emotional	  experience	  may	  also	  change	  significantly	  when	  winning	  at	  different	  
stake	  sizes.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  recommended	  that	  further	  research	  is	  conducted	  to	  explore	  the	  
impact	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  gambling	  outcome	  on	  valence,	  the	  second	  dimension	  of	  emotion,	  
and	  emotion	  collectively.	  
• With	  respect	  to	  understanding	  the	  experience	  of	  arousal	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  in	  loss	  of	  
control	  when	  gambling,	  it	  is	  recommended	  in	  future	  research	  designs	  to	  explore	  the	  impact	  
of	  stake	  size	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  features	  rather	  than	  in	  
isolation.	  
1.11 Discussion,	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations:	  Arousal	  as	  Somatic	  Marker	  
• In	  general,	  participants	  appeared	  to	  show	  deficits	  in	  somatic	  responding	  to	  negative	  
gambling	  outcomes	  when	  gambling	  on	  a	  simulated	  virtual	  roulette	  activity,	  and	  this	  may	  
have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  future	  gambling	  decision-­‐making.	  
• When	  winning,	  participants	  produced	  more	  somatic	  markers	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  
stakes.	  	  This	  is	  interpreted	  to	  be	  an	  adaptive	  response	  as	  it	  is	  of	  benefit	  to	  the	  individual	  to	  
signal	  larger	  rewards	  in	  comparison	  to	  smaller	  rewards.	  	  However,	  this	  strong	  somatic	  
response	  to	  rewards,	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  more	  muted	  response	  to	  punishment,	  may	  bias	  
decision-­‐making	  and	  create	  a	  preference	  for	  risk-­‐taking	  when	  gambling.	  
• The	  potential	  maladaptive	  physiological	  response	  to	  losing	  in	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  gambling	  
simulation	  observed	  here	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  data	  
previously	  discussed.	  	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  rationale	  for	  studying	  the	  differential	  
physiological	  and	  somatic	  responses	  of	  individuals	  in	  EGM	  gambling,	  when	  losing	  and	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winning	  at	  higher	  and	  lower	  stakes.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  monetary	  loss	  when	  gambling	  
may	  assist	  in	  understanding	  decision-­‐making	  deficits	  and	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  within-­‐session	  
EGM	  gambling.	  
1.12 Final	  Statement	  
• This	  study	  finds	  initial	  support	  for	  a	  new	  stake-­‐related	  risk	  factor	  for	  gambling-­‐related	  harm,	  
other	  than	  rate	  of	  loss,	  as	  it	  was	  demonstrated	  that	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  impairs	  
decision-­‐making,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  reduce	  self-­‐control	  when	  gambling.	  
• One	  of	  the	  key	  questions	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  addressed	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  event	  frequency	  (i.e.	  
opportunity	  to	  re-­‐bet	  at	  different	  speeds)	  on	  players’	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  
inhibition	  and	  arousal	  response	  when	  gambling.	  	  More	  specifically,	  how	  the	  observed	  
impacts	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  player	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  
response	  are	  affected	  by	  differing	  event	  frequency	  levels.	  	  	  
• Of	  all	  the	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  EGMs,	  it	  is	  most	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  
interaction	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  event	  frequency	  on	  gambling	  cognition	  and	  behaviour,	  because	  
in	  Great	  Britain	  gambling	  machines	  are	  to	  an	  extent	  categorised	  primarily	  across	  these	  two	  
dimensions.	  For	  example,	  although	  a	  B2	  has	  a	  higher	  theoretical	  loss	  per	  hour	  in	  comparison	  
with	  a	  B3,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  faster	  rate	  of	  play	  on	  B3	  machines	  may	  have	  a	  more	  
significant	  and	  negative	  effect	  on	  executive	  control	  in	  machine	  gambling	  than	  rate	  of	  loss.	  	  	  
• The	  gambling	  task	  used	  in	  this	  experimental	  design	  was	  developed	  to	  represent	  a	  simplified	  
version	  of	  virtual	  roulette.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  determine	  how	  stake	  size	  may	  interact	  
specifically	  with	  other	  electronic	  gambling	  formats	  such	  as	  blackjack	  and	  slot	  content.	  It	  is	  
possible	  that	  differences	  in	  game	  structure	  of	  content	  of	  commercial	  forms	  of	  virtual	  
roulette,	  or	  indeed	  any	  other	  form	  of	  gambling,	  may	  also	  affect	  a	  player’s	  executive	  control,	  
either	  directly	  or	  indirectly.	  
• Because	  of	  the	  need	  to	  standardise	  the	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  bet	  size,	  type	  and	  result	  in	  the	  
experiment,	  to	  enable	  any	  difference	  in	  dependent	  variable	  to	  be	  concluded	  as	  being	  
caused	  by	  stake	  size,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  conduct	  the	  study	  within	  a	  laboratory	  setting.	  	  
However,	  there	  is	  now	  justification	  to	  fund	  more	  expansive	  research	  and	  explore	  the	  
relationship	  between	  stake	  size	  and	  executive	  control	  within	  a	  range	  of	  real	  gambling	  
environments.	  This	  would	  improve	  internal	  and	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  study	  by:	  a)	  looking	  
at	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  in	  combination	  with	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  
characteristics,	  and	  b)	  observing	  the	  effect	  of	  participants	  losing	  their	  own	  personally	  
acquired	  funds	  rather	  than	  money	  provided	  by	  the	  research	  team.	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• In	  the	  current	  study,	  for	  practical	  and	  ethical	  reasons	  it	  was	  only	  possible	  to	  observe	  the	  
effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  at	  £20	  per	  spin,	  £2	  per	  spin	  and	  a	  control	  
condition	  where	  there	  was	  no	  opportunity	  to	  win	  or	  lose	  money.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
determine	  whether	  higher	  stake	  gambling	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  in	  
participants	  in	  contrast	  to	  lower	  stake	  gambling,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  fully	  understand	  and	  
explain	  the	  precise	  relationship	  between	  stake	  size	  and	  reflection	  impulsivity	  deficits.	  	  It	  is	  
important	  for	  future	  research	  to	  employ	  a	  design	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  on	  reflection	  
impulsivity	  when	  participants	  are	  winning	  and	  losing	  at	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  stake	  sizes,	  ranging	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2 Purpose	  of	  the	  Research	  
This	  research	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  series	  of	  research	  projects	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Responsible	  Gambling	  
Trust	  to	  consider	  two	  questions	  set	  out	  by	  the	  Responsible	  Gambling	  Strategy	  Board	  (RGSB).	  These	  
two	  questions	  were:	  
a) Can	  we	  distinguish	  between	  harmful	  and	  non-­‐harmful	  gaming	  machine	  play?	  
b) If	  we	  can,	  what	  measures	  might	  limit	  harmful	  play	  without	  impacting	  on	  those	  who	  do	  not	  
exhibit	  	  harmful	  behaviours?	  	  
A	  series	  of	  core	  research	  reports	  specifically	  attempts	  to	  identify	  the	  types	  of	  patterns	  that	  could	  
plausibly	  indicate	  risk	  of	  harm	  using	  industry	  held-­‐data	  for	  Category	  B2	  gaming.	  	  	  
This	  particular	  research	  project	  (one	  of	  four	  contextual	  projects	  in	  the	  broader	  research	  programme)	  
contributes	  to	  our	  understanding	  regarding	  both	  objectives	  by	  examining	  the	  potential	  causal	  





3 Theoretical	  Context	  and	  Paradigmatic	  Approach	  
3.1 The	  Relationship	  between	  Executive	  Control	  and	  Gambling-­‐related	  Harm	  
Goudriaan	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  emphasised	  the	  overt	  dysfunctional	  nature	  of	  problem	  gambling	  by	  noting	  
the	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  disorder	  is	  characterised	  by	  impaired	  decision-­‐making	  that	  leads	  to	  
negative	  consequences.	  	  At	  face	  value,	  it	  appears	  that	  problem	  gamblers	  are	  acting	  impulsively,	  and	  
gambling	  recklessly	  with	  a	  disregard	  for	  the	  negative	  outcomes	  that	  may	  result	  in	  over-­‐spending.	  	  
Indeed,	  impulsivity	  has	  been	  studied	  extensively	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  understanding	  addictive	  
disorders	  in	  general	  (Bickel,	  Jarmolowicz,	  Mueller,	  Gatchalian	  &	  McClure,	  2012).	  
‘Impulsivity’	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  actions	  that	  are	  prematurely	  expressed,	  unduly	  risky,	  poorly	  
conceived	  and	  result	  in	  undesirable	  consequences	  (Durana	  &	  Barnes,	  1993),	  and	  this	  definition	  is	  
also	  a	  reasonable	  description	  of	  the	  pattern	  of	  problem	  gambling	  behaviour.	  	  However,	  the	  majority	  
of	  research	  studies	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  impulsivity	  and	  problem	  gambling	  investigate	  
impulsivity	  as	  an	  enduring	  trait	  rather	  than	  a	  temporal	  ‘state’	  (Bickel	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  therefore	  limiting	  
understanding	  of	  how	  structural	  or	  situational	  characteristics	  may	  create	  short-­‐term	  or	  temporary	  
impulsivity	  that	  may	  help	  explain	  loss	  of	  control	  when	  gambling.	  	  Bickel	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  contends	  that	  
given	  the	  overlap	  between	  impulsivity	  and	  executive	  functions,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  fundamentally	  
antipodes,	  progress	  in	  understanding	  multiple	  psychological	  disorders,	  including	  problem	  gambling,	  
can	  be	  made	  by	  studying	  executive	  functions.	  
‘Executive	  functions’	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  categories	  of	  self-­‐directed	  behaviour	  to	  change	  one’s	  future	  
reinforcement	  (Barkley,	  2004).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  executive	  functions	  consist	  of	  a	  range	  of	  cognitive	  
processes	  (e.g.,	  attention,	  planning)	  that	  enable	  an	  individual	  to	  engage	  and	  benefit	  from	  goal-­‐
orientated	  behaviour.	  	  Control,	  via	  executive	  functions,	  is	  required	  when	  tasks	  are	  unfamiliar	  and	  
complex,	  either	  through	  lack	  of	  previous	  experience	  or	  because	  the	  task	  relates	  to	  rapidly	  updating	  
and	  changing	  circumstances	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001).	  	  Simplistic	  behaviour	  that	  is	  well	  established	  
becomes	  autonomic	  in	  its	  execution	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  require	  ‘top	  down’	  control,	  i.e.	  control	  
processes	  of	  evaluation	  and	  decision-­‐making	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001).	  	  	  
It	  is	  argued	  that	  gambling	  behaviour	  on	  EGMs	  requires	  executive	  control	  because	  a	  multitude	  of	  
interacting	  factors	  must	  be	  considered	  before	  an	  appropriate	  response	  or	  advantageous	  goal	  can	  be	  
determined.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  the	  gambler	  has	  a	  predetermined	  amount	  of	  money	  
that	  they	  can	  afford	  to	  lose	  without	  negative	  consequences,	  and	  equally	  an	  amount	  of	  time	  they	  can	  
afford	  to	  spend	  gambling.	  	  However,	  once	  gambling,	  they	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  experience	  positive	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reinforcement	  from	  the	  emotional	  states	  created	  when	  gambling.	  	  Moreover,	  and	  particularly	  
relevant	  to	  EGM	  gambling,	  they	  will	  be	  required	  to	  make	  rapid	  and	  continually	  changing	  estimations	  
of	  net	  spend.	  	  It	  is	  also	  probable	  that	  such	  predetermined	  spending	  and	  time	  limits	  are	  not	  inflexible,	  
meaning	  the	  player	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  re-­‐evaluating	  such	  targets,	  and	  retrieving	  memories	  from	  past	  
experience	  to	  inform	  such	  re-­‐evaluations.	  	  It	  is	  proposed	  that	  when	  gambling	  on	  EGMs,	  players	  will	  
be	  required	  to	  cognate	  large	  amounts	  of	  competing	  information	  within	  short	  periods	  of	  time.	  
In	  this	  report,	  a	  clear	  argument	  will	  be	  presented	  regarding	  the	  central	  role	  of	  executive	  functioning	  
in	  problem	  gambling,	  presenting	  loss-­‐chasing	  and	  over-­‐expenditure	  in	  EGM	  gambling	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
within-­‐session	  deterioration	  in	  executive	  control.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  executive	  
control	  will	  be	  directly	  investigated	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  gambling	  activity.	  
3.2 Maintaining	  Executive	  Control:	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  PreFrontal	  Cortex	  
The	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (PFC)	  is	  the	  area	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  is	  central	  to	  maintaining	  self-­‐regulation	  
through	  executive	  control	  (Goldstein	  &	  Volkow,	  2002;	  Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001).	  	  Essentially,	  the	  PFC	  is	  
the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  individuals	  can	  coordinate	  and	  organise	  the	  multitude	  of	  information	  
available	  (from	  sensory	  modalities,	  memories	  and	  internal	  states	  such	  as	  affect)	  into	  a	  coherent	  
‘representation’	  and	  enable	  goal-­‐orientated	  behaviour	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001).	  	  Underlying	  this	  
concept	  of	  executive	  function	  are	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Biased	  Competition	  Model	  (Desimone	  &	  
Duncan,	  1995),	  emphasising	  the	  competitive	  nature	  of	  neural	  activity	  in	  the	  brain.	  	  More	  specifically,	  
there	  will	  be	  a	  mass	  of	  sensory	  input	  presenting	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  behavioural	  responses,	  and	  
there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  ‘top	  down’	  organisation	  to	  identify	  task-­‐relevant	  signals	  and	  thus	  promote	  a	  
biased	  favourability	  for	  such	  signals	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001).	  	  The	  PFC	  biases	  the	  flow	  of	  neural	  
activity	  that	  is	  task-­‐relevant	  and	  effectively	  applies	  selective	  ‘attentional	  plates’	  that	  are	  determined	  
to	  be	  effective	  guidelines	  for	  achieving	  the	  specified	  goal.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  PFC	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  
an	  individual	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals	  by	  prioritising	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  that	  is	  goal-­‐related	  while	  
inhibiting	  less	  relevant	  information.	  	  The	  appropriate	  attentional	  plate	  may	  be	  readily	  available	  
based	  on	  inferences	  of	  what	  worked	  effectively	  in	  previous	  similar	  situations,	  or	  it	  may	  be	  less	  
established	  and	  guided	  more	  tentatively	  by	  general	  principles,	  or	  cognitive	  rules	  of	  thumb	  (Miller	  &	  
Cohen,	  2001).	  
Once	  an	  attentional	  plate	  or	  mapping	  has	  been	  determined,	  the	  PFC	  must	  actively	  maintain	  this	  ‘set	  
of	  rules’	  until	  the	  task	  is	  completed	  or	  at	  least	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  objective.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  of	  the	  
fundamental	  requirements	  of	  the	  PFC	  in	  establishing	  executive	  control	  is	  being	  capable	  of	  updating	  
the	  mapping	  in	  response	  to	  new	  task-­‐relevant	  information	  while	  simultaneously	  being	  resilient	  to	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interfering	  and	  irrelevant	  stimuli.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  such	  interference	  signals	  are	  
more	  established	  than	  the	  current	  task	  mapping	  and	  therefore	  provide	  strong	  interference	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  more	  weakly	  established	  current	  mapping.	  	  
The	  PFC	  “favours	  task-­‐relevant	  sensory	  inputs	  (attention),	  memories	  (recall)	  and	  motor	  outputs	  
(response	  selection)	  and	  thus	  guides	  activity	  along	  the	  pathways	  that	  connect	  them	  (conditional	  
association),”	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001,	  p.178).	  	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  EGM	  gambling	  in	  general,	  it	  is	  
understood	  that	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  motivating	  factors	  for	  participation	  is	  the	  search	  for	  excitement	  
(McCormick,	  Delfabbro	  &	  Denson,	  2012;	  Moodie	  &	  Finnigan,	  2005).	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  
infer	  that	  experienced	  EGM	  gamblers	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  negative	  financial	  consequences	  that	  can	  
emerge	  from	  participation.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  player	  is	  likely	  to	  resolve	  this	  motivation	  to	  gamble	  and	  
their	  awareness	  of	  risk	  with	  a	  ‘mapping’	  of	  a	  decision	  to	  gamble	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  will	  enable	  them	  to	  
experience	  the	  positive	  reinforcement	  of	  gambling,	  while	  minimising	  the	  potential	  negative	  
consequences	  such	  as	  spending	  more	  than	  they	  can	  afford.	  	  If	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  non-­‐problem	  
gambler	  is	  to	  gamble	  in	  a	  controlled	  manner	  as	  a	  leisure	  pursuit,	  the	  key	  question	  to	  address	  is	  how	  
and	  why	  the	  mapping	  of	  ‘controlled	  gambling’	  in	  the	  PFC	  deteriorates	  and	  executive	  control	  
diminishes.	  	  More	  specifically,	  does	  stake	  size	  play	  a	  causal	  role,	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  in	  the	  
loss	  of	  executive	  control	  in	  EGM	  gambling?	  
3.3 Deterioration	  of	  Executive	  Control	  in	  EGM	  Gambling	  
The	  transition	  from	  controlled	  gambling	  to	  patterns	  of	  gambling	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  harm	  can	  be	  
characterised	  by	  the	  chasing	  of	  incurred	  losses,	  i.e.	  the	  pursuit	  of	  higher	  risk	  or	  higher	  yield	  betting	  
to	  recover	  past	  losses	  (Lesieur,	  1979;	  Walker,	  1992).	  	  Loss	  chasing	  is	  a	  common	  behavioural	  pattern	  
among	  gamblers	  (Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn,	  Woolrich,	  Passingham	  &	  Rogers,	  2008;	  Dickerson,	  Hinchy	  &	  
Fabre,	  1987).	  	  Loss	  chasing	  is	  recognised	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  accelerate	  participation	  in	  gambling	  
with	  significant	  negative	  consequences	  (Corless	  &	  Dickerson,	  1989),	  including	  social	  and	  health	  
implications	  for	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  community	  (Korn	  &	  Shaffer,	  1999;	  Neal,	  Delfabbro	  &	  O’Neil,	  
2005).	  
Considering	  over-­‐spending	  and	  chasing	  of	  losses	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  gambling-­‐related	  harm	  
further,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  loss	  chasing	  within	  a	  gambling	  session	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  
developmental	  forerunner	  to	  between-­‐session	  loss	  chasing	  (O’Connor	  &	  Dickerson,	  2003),	  where	  
substantial	  debts	  can	  be	  accumulated	  and	  the	  individual	  progresses	  towards	  problem	  gambling	  
(Lesieur	  &	  Rosenthal,	  1991).	  	  This	  process	  can	  also	  be	  explained	  via	  executive	  functioning	  and	  the	  
PFC;	  as	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  pattern	  of	  losing	  control	  when	  gambling	  increases,	  the	  stronger	  the	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pathway	  will	  become	  because	  of	  associated	  learning.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  repeated	  pairing	  of	  a	  goal	  
(machine	  gambling)	  with	  a	  response	  (over-­‐spending	  and	  loss	  chasing)	  will	  create	  an	  attentional	  plate	  
or	  mapping	  that	  is	  strongly	  established	  and	  therefore	  reduces	  the	  need	  for	  executive	  control	  during	  
the	  task,	  and	  therefore	  less	  PFC	  activation	  will	  occur	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001)	  when	  gambling	  on	  EGMs	  
in	  future.	  	  
Kreusch,	  Vilienne	  and	  Quertermont	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  loss	  of	  control	  of	  alcohol	  
consumption,	  repetitive	  and	  chronic	  disordered	  alcohol	  use	  leads	  not	  only	  to	  impaired	  executive	  
functioning	  but	  also	  to	  an	  automatic	  tendency	  to	  over-­‐consume	  when	  presented	  with	  alcohol	  cues.	  	  
From	  an	  EGM	  gambling	  perspective,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  loss	  chasing	  and	  experiencing	  gambling-­‐related	  
harm	  can	  become	  a	  habitual	  pattern	  of	  behaviour.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  more	  often	  the	  pattern	  is	  
repeated,	  the	  more	  automatic	  it	  becomes,	  with	  the	  player	  less	  sensitive	  to	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  
executive	  control.	  	  It	  is	  concluded	  that	  as	  the	  chasing	  of	  losses	  is	  the	  most	  significant	  step	  towards	  
problem	  gambling	  (Lesieur,	  1979),	  that	  understanding	  the	  mechanism	  of	  how	  a	  non-­‐problem	  
gambler	  loses	  control	  within	  an	  EGM	  gambling	  session	  is	  fundamental	  to	  developing	  harm-­‐
minimisation	  strategies	  to	  reduce	  gambling-­‐related	  harm.	  
3.4 Potential	  Factors	  in	  Loss	  of	  Control	  in	  EGM	  Gambling	  
The	  most	  probable	  explanatory	  factor	  to	  account	  for	  deterioration	  of	  controlled	  EGM	  gambling	  is	  
that	  through	  interference	  from	  strong	  signals	  such	  as	  internal	  states	  (e.g.,	  emotion	  and	  reward	  
circuitry),	  the	  goal	  of	  controlled	  gambling	  is	  replaced,	  or	  at	  least	  is	  no	  longer	  actively	  maintained.	  	  	  
Research	  indicates	  that	  a	  motivation	  to	  chase	  losses	  is	  often	  the	  removal	  of	  ‘bad	  feelings’	  or	  negative	  
affect	  (Corless	  &Dickerson,	  Demaree	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  
loss	  of	  control	  and	  loss	  chasing	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  mixture	  of	  strong	  emotions.	  	  Lesieur	  (1984)	  
characterises	  this	  emotional	  experience	  as	  a	  balance	  between	  anxiety	  and	  distress	  associated	  with	  
already	  accumulated	  losses,	  and	  the	  persistent	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  recover	  losses	  with	  
continued	  gambling.	  	  These	  strongly	  experienced	  negative	  internal	  states	  are	  likely	  to	  interfere	  with	  
goals	  of	  controlled	  gambling;	  particularly	  if	  the	  relationship	  between	  negative	  affect	  and	  loss	  of	  
control	  in	  gambling	  is	  an	  established	  association,	  i.e.	  habitual.	  
Furthermore,	  beyond	  the	  eagerness	  to	  remove	  negative	  mood	  states	  such	  as	  anxiety	  and	  frustration,	  
the	  loss	  of	  control	  and	  chasing	  of	  losses	  is	  also	  motivated	  by	  uncontrollable	  urges	  to	  continue	  
gambling	  (Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  With	  reference	  to	  EGM	  gambling	  in	  general,	  given	  the	  
high	  event	  frequency	  of	  EGMs	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  this	  urge	  to	  continue	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  a	  
prepotent	  response.	  	  A	  prepotent	  response	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  response	  that	  over	  time	  has	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consistently	  provided	  immediate	  reinforcement,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  relevant	  external	  cues	  will	  create	  
an	  automatic	  response	  in	  the	  individual	  without	  conscious	  thought	  (Barkley	  &	  Murphy,	  2005).	  	  It	  is	  
widely	  accepted	  that	  the	  arousal	  and	  subjective	  excitement	  engendered	  by	  gambling	  is	  a	  primary	  
motivating	  factor	  (Boyd,	  1976),	  and	  maintenance	  of	  persistent	  gambling	  is	  best	  accounted	  for	  
through	  classical	  conditioning	  where	  the	  player	  is	  positively	  reinforced	  with	  every	  bet	  or	  spin	  
(Anderson	  &	  Brown,	  1984).	  	  Given	  the	  rapid	  speed	  of	  play	  of	  EGMs	  in	  relation	  to	  alternative	  
gambling	  activities,	  and	  the	  classically	  conditioned	  reinforcement	  of	  excitement	  with	  every	  spin,	  it	  is	  
argued	  that	  this	  urge	  to	  continue	  gambling	  could	  be	  based	  on	  the	  development	  of	  a	  prepotent	  
response.	  
Ultimately,	  it	  is	  proposed	  that	  the	  deterioration	  of	  controlled	  gambling	  in	  the	  PFC	  (i.e.	  the	  loss	  of	  
control	  when	  gambling	  on	  EGMs)	  is	  caused	  by	  interference	  from	  the	  strong	  urge	  to	  remove	  negative	  
mood	  states,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  persistent	  gambling	  as	  a	  prepotent	  response	  that	  the	  PFC	  
finds	  difficult	  to	  inhibit.	  
3.5 The	  Role	  of	  Stake	  Size	  in	  Interference	  of	  Executive	  Control	  in	  EGM	  Gambling	  
3.5.1	  Key	  Executive	  Functions	  in	  Controlled	  EGM	  Gambling	  
It	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  stake	  size,	  although	  a	  critical	  and	  central	  structural	  characteristic,	  
remains	  a	  singular	  variable,	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  varying	  impacts	  on	  gambling	  behaviour	  as	  it	  
interacts	  with	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  characteristics	  of	  each	  specific	  gambling	  product	  
(Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  other	  situational	  and	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  EGMs,	  i.e.	  high	  event	  frequency.	  
One	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  investigating	  executive	  control	  in	  appetitive	  behaviour	  is	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  
executive	  functions	  that	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  linked	  with	  addictive	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  
(Bickel	  et	  al.,	  2012);	  including	  behavioural	  inhibition	  (Barkley,	  1997,	  2004),	  attention	  (Garavan	  &	  
Hester,	  2007;	  George	  &	  Koob,	  2010),	  valuing	  future	  events	  (Bechara,	  2005),	  emotional	  activation	  
and	  self-­‐regulation	  (EASR:	  George	  &	  Koon,	  2010),	  behavioural	  flexibility	  (Robbins,	  1996)	  and	  
planning	  (Bickel,	  2012).	  	  When	  considering	  impulsivity	  as	  the	  antipode	  of	  executive	  control,	  we	  also	  
acknowledge	  that	  impulsivity	  is	  reliably	  separated	  in	  the	  literature	  into	  two	  distinct	  components,	  
namely	  response	  inhibition	  and	  impulsive	  choice	  (Congdon	  &	  Canli,	  2008;	  Fineberg,	  Potenza,	  
Chamberlain,	  Berlin,	  Menzies,	  Bechara	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Moeller,	  Barratt,	  Dougherty,	  Schmitz	  &	  Swann,	  
2010).	  	  Although	  impulsive	  action	  (behavioural	  disinhibition)	  and	  impulsive	  choice	  (cognitive	  
impulsivity)	  appear	  at	  face	  value	  to	  be	  manifestations	  of	  the	  same	  underlying	  vulnerability,	  it	  has	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been	  determined	  that	  they	  are	  indeed	  distinct	  concepts	  and	  dependent	  on	  different	  mechanisms	  
(Caswell,	  Morgan	  &	  Duka,	  2013).	  
Rather	  than	  investigate	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  impulsive	  uncontrolled	  EGM	  gambling,	  it	  seemed	  
more	  prudent	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  at	  a	  more	  fundamental	  and	  simplistic	  level	  by	  breaking	  
down	  the	  component	  mechanisms	  involved	  in	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  gambling	  into	  response	  inhibition	  
and	  reflection	  impulsivity.	  
3.5.2	  Arousal	  as	  Potential	  Mediating	  Factor	  in	  Loss	  of	  Control	  
As	  previously	  identified,	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  the	  primary	  reinforcer	  for	  gambling	  behaviour	  is	  
the	  excitement	  and	  arousal	  that	  is	  provided	  with	  each	  bet	  or	  spin	  (Anderson	  &	  Brown,	  1984;	  
McCormick	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  Anderson	  and	  Brown	  (1984)	  argued	  that	  the	  autonomic	  nervous	  system	  
plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  conditioning	  process	  of	  problem	  gambling	  because	  it	  explains	  the	  
reinstatement	  phenomenon	  (i.e.	  continuance	  of	  gambling	  despite	  significant	  negative	  
consequences).	  	  In	  simple	  terms,	  independent	  of	  winning	  or	  losing,	  a	  strong	  urge	  to	  continue	  
gambling	  may	  be	  a	  response	  to	  strong	  arousal	  cues	  experienced	  by	  the	  gambler.	  	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  
individual	  to	  modify	  mood	  states	  through	  excitation	  or	  even	  depression	  of	  the	  nervous	  system	  was	  
also	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  Jacob’s	  explanatory	  model,	  the	  General	  Theory	  of	  Addiction	  (Jacobs,	  1986).	  
Furthermore,	  when	  considering	  the	  substantial	  evidence	  available	  demonstrating	  that	  participants	  
experienced	  increased	  arousal	  when	  the	  size	  of	  the	  win	  is	  increased	  (Wulfert,	  Roland,	  Hartley,	  Wang	  
&	  Franco,	  2005;	  Wulfert,	  Franco,	  Williams,	  Roland	  &	  Mason,	  2008)	  and	  when	  a	  monetary	  win	  is	  
played	  for	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  token	  win	  (Meyer,	  Schwertfeger,	  Exton,	  Janssen	  &	  Knapp,	  2004),	  and	  
also	  the	  motivational	  drive	  to	  seek	  excitement	  via	  gambling,	  it	  appears	  important	  to	  evaluate	  the	  










4 Paradigmatic	  Approach	  to	  Evaluating	  ‘Addictiveness’	  of	  EGMs	  
First,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  misconception	  regarding	  the	  development	  and	  
maintenance	  of	  addiction	  and	  the	  misattribution	  of	  the	  term	  ‘addictiveness’.	  	  It	  is	  erroneous,	  and	  
more	  importantly	  unhelpful,	  to	  consider	  substances	  or	  behaviours	  such	  as	  gambling	  as	  being	  
inherently	  addictive.	  	  Essentially,	  an	  addictive	  disorder	  is	  a	  repeated	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  that	  that	  is	  
characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  control,	  increasing	  tolerance	  of,	  and	  experiences	  of	  withdrawal	  towards,	  
substances	  or	  behaviours	  that	  lead	  to	  significant	  negative	  consequences	  and	  deleterious	  effects	  for	  
the	  individual	  (DSM	  V:	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  2012).	  	  Fundamentally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
recognise	  that	  it	  is	  the	  individual’s	  behavioural	  and	  cognitive	  response	  to	  the	  product	  or	  substance	  
that	  is	  disordered,	  rather	  than	  the	  product	  being	  ‘addictive’.	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  specific	  types	  of	  gambling	  activities	  are	  more	  commonly	  
associated	  with	  problem	  gambling	  than	  others.	  	  Furthermore,	  research	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  one	  
of	  the	  gambling	  activities	  most	  commonly	  associated	  with	  problem	  gambling	  is	  EGMs,	  and	  category	  
B2	  machines	  in	  particular	  (GamCare,	  2012).	  	  It	  is	  accepted	  that	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  gambling-­‐
related	  harm	  is	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  losing	  significant	  sums	  of	  money	  (Blaszczynski	  et	  al.,	  
2005;	  Neal	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  and	  if	  one	  combines	  the	  rapid	  speed	  of	  play	  of	  EGMs	  with	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  risk	  high	  stakes	  (as	  with	  category	  B2	  machines	  and	  online	  slots),	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  greater	  
potential	  to	  experience	  gambling-­‐related	  harm.	  	  It	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  high	  event	  frequency	  and	  
the	  potential	  to	  risk	  high	  stakes	  per	  bet	  enabling	  a	  higher	  cost	  of	  play	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  present	  
increased	  risk	  for	  the	  public	  (Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013;	  Productivity	  Commission,	  2010;	  RGSB,	  2013).	  	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  proposed	  that	  specific	  structural	  and	  environmental	  characteristics	  of	  gambling	  
activities	  can	  impact	  the	  player	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  individual’s	  losing	  
control	  and	  subsequently	  experiencing	  gambling-­‐related	  harm.	  	  The	  current	  research	  approaches	  the	  
experiment	  from	  the	  perspective	  that	  specific	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  EGMs,	  in	  this	  case	  stake	  






5 Reflection	  Impulsivity	  and	  Problem	  Gambling	  
‘Reflection	  impulsivity’	  refers	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  make	  an	  impulsive	  decision	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
tendency	  to	  gather	  and	  evaluate	  information	  prior	  to	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Reflection	  impulsivity	  was	  
initially	  conceptualised	  as	  an	  explanatory	  factor	  in	  the	  impulsive	  and	  uninhibited	  behaviour	  in	  non-­‐
adult	  populations	  (Kagan,	  1966;	  Mitchell	  &	  Ault,	  1979);	  and	  early	  conceptualisations	  were	  focused	  
on	  the	  latency	  within	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  for	  children	  (Kagan,	  Rosman,	  Day,	  Albert	  &	  
Phillips,	  1964).	  	  Essentially,	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  “the	  Reflective	  not	  only	  spends	  more	  time	  
evaluating	  hypotheses	  but	  also	  gathers	  more	  information	  on	  which	  to	  base	  his	  decisions	  and	  he	  
gathers	  it	  more	  systematically	  than	  the	  Impulsive,”	  (Messer,	  1976,	  p.1028,	  as	  cited	  in	  Mitchell	  &	  
Ault,	  1979).	  	  However,	  more	  recently	  in	  reference	  to	  adult	  psychopathology	  more	  weighting	  has	  
been	  given	  to	  the	  dependent	  outcome	  of	  accuracy	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  response	  to	  available	  
information	  rather	  than	  being	  centrally	  focused	  on	  the	  latency	  of	  decisions	  (Block,	  Block	  &	  
Harrington,	  1974;	  Clark,	  Robins,	  Ersche	  &	  Sahakian,	  2006).	  	  	  
Clark	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  proposed	  that	  reflection	  impulsivity	  would	  lead	  to	  behaviour	  that	  was	  poorly	  
conceived,	  prematurely	  expressed,	  and	  inappropriately	  risky	  in	  response	  to	  a	  specific	  situation.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  significant	  literature	  base	  available	  demonstrating	  more	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  in	  
comparison	  to	  controls,	  in	  a	  range	  of	  substance	  abuse	  and	  dependent	  populations	  (Clark	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  
Clark	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Cohen,	  Nesci,	  Steinfeld,	  Haeri	  &	  Galynker,	  2010;	  Quednow,	  Kuhn,	  Hoppe,	  
Westheide,	  Maier,	  Daum	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
There	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  inherent	  link	  between	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  i.e.	  poor	  decision-­‐making	  
performance	  under	  uncertainty,	  and	  the	  processes	  central	  to	  gambling-­‐related	  harm,	  such	  as	  the	  
urge	  to	  chase	  losses	  to	  remove	  negative	  mood	  states	  and	  to	  recover	  past	  losses.	  	  As	  Goudriaan	  et	  al.	  
(2005)	  noted,	  despite	  this	  seemingly	  obvious	  link	  between	  reflection	  impulsivity	  and	  gambling-­‐
related	  harm	  in	  general,	  there	  are	  few	  studies	  exploring	  the	  relationship,	  and	  furthermore	  the	  
handful	  of	  existing	  studies	  have	  significant	  methodological	  limitations.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  
studies	  demonstrating	  diminished	  performance	  of	  pathological	  gamblers	  in	  a	  decision-­‐making	  task	  
(Cavedini,	  Riboldi,	  Keller,	  D’Annucci	  &	  Bellodi,	  2002)	  used	  the	  Iowa	  Gambling	  Task	  (IGT)	  as	  the	  test	  
for	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  	  Given	  the	  gambling	  cues	  present	  in	  the	  IGT	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  
confounding	  factors	  influencing	  performance,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  problem	  gamblers	  
making	  maladaptive	  decisions	  in	  response	  to	  gambling	  contexts.	  	  Another	  substantial	  
methodological	  limitation	  of	  existing	  studies	  of	  decision-­‐making	  performance	  in	  problem	  gamblers	  
was	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  gambling	  activities	  under	  assessment	  (Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  Put	  simply,	  
given	  the	  substantial	  differences	  in	  the	  structural	  and	  situational	  characteristics	  of	  gambling	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activities,	  it	  is	  probable,	  for	  example,	  that	  problem	  gamblers	  who	  primarily	  play	  EGMs	  are	  likely	  to	  
have	  different	  levels	  and	  types	  of	  decision-­‐making	  deficiencies	  than	  problem	  gamblers	  who	  are	  
primarily	  poker	  players.	  	  Finally,	  many	  of	  the	  existing	  studies	  have	  failed	  to	  control	  for	  the	  
confounding	  factor	  of	  comorbidity	  and	  medication	  use	  on	  decision-­‐making	  performance,	  making	  it	  
difficult	  to	  conclude	  that	  any	  deficiency	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  gambling	  disorder	  (Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  
Research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  on	  the	  Card	  Playing	  Task	  (CPT:	  Newman,	  Patterson	  &	  Kosson,	  
1987),	  a	  measure	  of	  response	  preservation,	  in	  comparison	  to	  controls	  problem	  gamblers	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  sub-­‐optimally	  persevere	  with	  the	  gambling	  task,	  as	  one	  would	  expect	  (Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  
2005).	  	  However,	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  in	  comparison	  
to	  controls	  problem	  gamblers	  gambled	  faster	  (reduced	  latency)	  when	  they	  were	  losing	  (Goudriaan	  et	  
al.,	  2005).	  	  Furthermore,	  with	  respect	  to	  IGT	  performance,	  problem	  gamblers	  sampled	  less	  
information	  to	  assist	  decision-­‐making,	  demonstrated	  less	  awareness	  of	  the	  most	  favourable	  
response	  and	  made	  decisions	  significantly	  more	  rapidly	  than	  the	  control	  population	  (Goudriaan	  et	  
al.,	  2005).	  	  In	  a	  similar	  study,	  Lawrence	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  also	  found	  problem	  gamblers	  displayed	  more	  
reflection	  impulsivity	  in	  comparison	  to	  control	  populations,	  sampling	  less	  information	  and	  tolerating	  
more	  uncertainty	  in	  determination	  of	  responses.	  	  Furthermore,	  using	  the	  Cambridge	  Gamble	  Task	  
(Rogers	  et	  al.,	  1999)	  as	  an	  additional	  measure	  of	  decision-­‐making	  performance	  with	  explicit	  
probabilities	  rather	  than	  uncertainty,	  problem	  gamblers	  were	  also	  shown	  to	  have	  impairments	  in	  
risky	  decision-­‐making	  in	  comparison	  to	  controls	  (Lawrence	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  	  
Goudriaan	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  argued	  that	  deterioration	  of	  self-­‐regulation,	  or	  controlled	  behaviour,	  is	  a	  
result	  of	  an	  inability	  to	  inhibit	  an	  urge	  and	  then	  select	  a	  more	  adaptive	  response.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  a	  
deficiency	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  where	  individuals	  do	  not	  actively	  attend	  to	  available	  information	  
to	  make	  an	  appropriate	  decision,	  may	  be	  a	  risk	  factor	  for	  problem	  gambling	  and	  gambling-­‐related	  
harm.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  current	  study,	  the	  impact	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  of	  gambling	  on	  a	  virtual	  
roulette	  gambling	  simulation	  at	  varying	  stake	  sizes	  will	  be	  directly	  investigated.	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6 Response	  Inhibition	  and	  Problem	  Gambling	  
	  Response	  inhibition	  is	  a	  fundamental	  component	  of	  executive	  control	  and	  therefore	  central	  to	  
serving	  future-­‐orientated	  goals	  (Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001;	  Miyake,	  Friedman,	  Emerson,	  Witzki,	  Howerter	  
&	  Wagner,	  2000).	  	  According	  to	  Wright	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  response	  inhibition	  has	  two	  forms:	  cancellation	  
or	  withholding.	  	  ‘Cancellation’	  refers	  to	  stopping	  a	  response	  after	  it	  has	  been	  initiated	  in	  the	  
individual,	  whereas	  ‘withholding’	  refers	  to	  stopping	  a	  prepotent	  response,	  i.e.	  showing	  restraint	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  strongly	  conditioned	  cue	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  Poor	  response	  inhibition	  performance,	  
often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘behavioural	  disinhibition’,	  demonstrates	  an	  inability	  to	  restrain	  a	  response	  that	  
is	  no	  longer	  adaptive,	  or	  at	  least	  no	  longer	  appropriate	  (Chamberlain	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Strakowski	  et	  al.,	  
2009;	  Winstanley,	  Eagle	  &	  Robbins,	  2006).	  	  Barkley	  (1997)	  argues	  that	  response	  inhibition	  involves	  
three	  interrelated	  responses	  including	  inhibiting	  a	  prepotent	  response,	  and	  thus	  allowing	  a	  delay	  
before	  responding,	  and	  finally	  the	  protection	  of	  this	  delay	  from	  competing	  signals,	  i.e.	  resisting	  
interference.	  
There	  is	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  evidence	  demonstrating	  deficits	  in	  response	  inhibition	  in	  
populations	  with	  substance	  abuse	  and	  addictive	  disorders	  in	  comparison	  to	  control	  populations	  
(Fillmore	  &	  Rush,	  2002;	  Lawrence	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Monterosso,	  Aron,	  Cordova,	  Xu	  &	  London,	  2005;	  
Solowij	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  unsurprising	  that	  response	  inhibition	  is	  
considered	  to	  be	  a	  central	  factor	  in	  explanatory	  models	  of	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  
addictive	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  (Goldstein	  &	  Volkow,	  2002;	  Koob	  &	  Le	  Moal,	  2001).	  	  Kreusch	  et	  al.	  
(2013)	  concludes	  that	  if	  poor	  response	  inhibition	  is	  not	  a	  developmental	  causal	  factor	  it	  is	  certainly	  a	  
maintaining	  factor	  in	  addiction.	  	  	  
There	  is	  also	  direct	  evidence	  demonstrating	  response	  inhibition	  deficits	  in	  problem	  gambling	  
populations	  in	  comparison	  to	  control	  populations	  (Carlton	  &	  Manowitz,	  1992;	  Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  
2006;	  Vitaro,	  Arsenault	  &	  Tremblay,	  1999).	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  response	  inhibition	  deficits	  
and	  problem	  gambling	  appears	  inherent	  when	  considering	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  problem	  
gambling;	  namely,	  being	  unable	  to	  resist	  urges	  to	  continue	  gambling	  despite	  incurring	  negative	  
consequences,	  alongside	  the	  strong	  urge	  to	  recoup	  losses	  to	  remove	  negative	  affect.	  	  	  It	  is	  argued	  
that	  without	  the	  suppression	  of	  such	  urges	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  and	  engage	  in	  controlled	  
responses	  to	  the	  event	  (Barkley,	  1997;	  Taylor	  &	  Jentsch,	  1999).	  	  Essentially,	  without	  pausing	  for	  
reflection	  the	  individual	  will	  have	  poor	  associative	  learning	  regarding	  the	  negative	  consequences	  and	  




Goudriaan	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  argued	  that	  given	  the	  centrality	  of	  response	  inhibition	  in	  addiction	  models,	  
and	  the	  observed	  deficits	  in	  response	  inhibition	  across	  problem	  gamblers,	  research	  that	  could	  
provide	  more	  insight	  into	  the	  influence	  of	  reward,	  punishments	  and	  cues	  on	  response	  inhibition	  in	  
problem	  gambling	  is	  required.	  	  The	  current	  study	  will	  achieve	  this	  by	  exploring	  the	  impact	  of	  winning	  
and	  losing	  various	  stake	  sizes	  in	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  gambling	  simulation	  on	  performance	  in	  a	  response	  




7 Arousal	  and	  Problem	  Gambling	  
7.1 Arousal	  as	  a	  Motivating	  Factor	  in	  Problem	  Gambling	  
As	  discussed	  previously,	  problem	  gamblers	  can	  experience	  significant	  changes	  in	  mood	  state	  when	  
immersed	  in	  gambling,	  similar	  to	  states	  of	  intoxication	  or	  ‘highs’	  found	  in	  those	  who	  are	  addicted	  to	  
substances	  (Blum	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  	  Such	  states	  of	  arousal	  and	  excitement	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  primary	  
motivation	  for	  gambling	  (Bruce	  &	  Johnson,	  1986;	  Gilovich	  &	  Douglas,	  1986,	  Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  
Therefore,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  arousal	  states	  may	  also	  be	  a	  central	  component	  in	  explaining	  loss	  of	  
executive	  control	  when	  gambling	  on	  EGMs.	  
Arousal	  is	  a	  complex	  physiological	  system	  that	  still	  is	  not	  fully	  understood;	  therefore	  it	  is	  not	  
surprising	  that	  a	  review	  of	  literature	  looking	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  arousal	  and	  problem	  
gambling	  does	  not	  provide	  clear	  cut	  definitive	  answers	  (Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  However,	  there	  are	  
some	  reliable	  trends	  in	  the	  literature;	  principally	  that	  when	  gambling,	  and	  in	  response	  to	  gambling	  
cues,	  frequent	  gamblers	  (Leary	  &	  Dickerson,	  1985;	  Moodie	  &	  Finnegan,	  2005;	  Pascual-­‐Leone,	  
Campeau	  &	  Harrington,	  2012)	  and	  problem	  gamblers	  (Sharpe	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Brown	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  
experience	  higher	  arousal	  in	  comparison	  to	  less	  frequent	  and	  non-­‐problem	  gamblers.	  	  Furthermore,	  
although	  winning	  expectancy	  is	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  arousal	  in	  gambling	  (Ladouceur	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  
problem	  gamblers	  are	  aroused	  by	  both	  losses	  and	  wins,	  whereas	  non-­‐problem	  gambling	  populations	  
tend	  only	  to	  experience	  higher	  arousal	  in	  response	  to	  winning	  (Sharpe,	  2004).	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  
that	  problem	  gamblers	  experience	  higher	  autonomic	  arousal	  in	  response	  to	  general	  gambling	  cues	  
(Sharpe	  et	  al.,	  1995)	  and	  therefore	  that	  persistent	  gambling	  is	  classically	  conditioned,	  with	  arousal	  
being	  the	  primary	  reinforcer	  rather	  than	  monetary	  reward	  (Anderson	  &	  Brown,	  1984).	  
The	  implication	  of	  a	  conditioned	  response	  of	  increased	  arousal	  to	  gambling	  cues	  is	  that	  there	  will	  be	  
increased	  motivation	  (and	  urges)	  to	  gamble	  despite	  negative	  consequences,	  whereas	  unconditioned	  
non-­‐problem	  gamblers	  will	  respond	  more	  adaptively	  to	  losses.	  	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  Newman	  
and	  Patterson	  (1993)	  argued	  that	  ‘disinhibited’	  groups	  have	  difficulty	  in	  learning	  from	  punishment	  
because	  they	  experience	  it	  abnormally	  in	  comparison	  to	  normal	  populations.	  	  	  Goudriaan	  et	  al.	  
(2004)	  apply	  this	  principle	  to	  gambling	  contexts,	  with	  problem	  gamblers	  engaging	  in	  the	  activity	  with	  
a	  strong	  approach	  set	  when	  participating	  in	  reward-­‐related	  tasks,	  and	  effectively	  having	  a	  
hypersensitivity	  to	  reward.	  	  For	  vulnerable	  gamblers,	  alongside	  winning	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  win	  
increasing	  arousal,	  if	  the	  player	  loses	  and	  becomes	  frustrated	  this	  too	  will	  also	  increase	  arousal	  




7.2 Arousal	  as	  Somatic	  Marker	  in	  Response	  to	  Gambling	  Outcomes	  
A	  possible	  explanation	  for	  the	  observed	  maladaptive	  learning	  in	  response	  to	  rewards	  and	  
punishment	  could	  be	  the	  absence	  of	  guidance	  from	  the	  limbic	  system	  as	  proposed	  in	  the	  somatic	  
marker	  hypothesis	  (Damasio,	  1994).	  	  The	  central	  proposition	  of	  the	  somatic	  marker	  hypothesis	  is	  
that,	  in	  normal	  samples,	  emotional	  bodily	  processes	  known	  as	  somatic	  markers	  act	  essentially	  as	  
internal	  ‘preferences’	  to	  help	  guide	  decision-­‐making.	  	  These	  ‘preferences’	  are	  created	  through	  
associative	  learning,	  where	  bodily	  states	  are	  associated	  with	  positive	  and	  negative	  events,	  and	  after	  
repeated	  pairings	  this	  somatic	  response	  becomes	  established	  (Mardaga	  &	  Hansenne,	  2012).	  	  Such	  
preferences	  (somatic	  markers)	  will	  emerge	  again	  in	  anticipation	  of	  either	  the	  reward	  or	  punishment	  
in	  question,	  and	  act	  as	  a	  form	  of	  guidance	  to	  help	  weight	  more	  logical	  reasoning.	  	  	  
Essentially,	  where	  previously	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  emotion	  can	  only	  reduce	  the	  quality	  of	  rational	  
decision-­‐making,	  it	  has	  recently	  become	  widely	  accepted	  that	  emotional	  and	  arousal	  states	  can	  be	  
an	  important	  component	  in	  decision-­‐making	  (Mardaga	  &	  Hansenne,	  2012).	  	  Somatic	  markers	  are	  
also	  argued	  to	  improve	  decision-­‐making	  by	  enabling	  the	  individual	  to	  consider	  long-­‐term	  
consequences	  based	  on	  the	  stimulated	  emotional	  states.	  	  Damasio	  (1994;	  1999)	  argues	  that	  somatic	  
markers	  assist	  decision-­‐making	  by	  enabling	  individuals	  to	  generate	  a	  range	  of	  options	  and	  avoid	  
inactivity	  that	  could	  arise	  by	  not	  being	  able	  to	  conclude	  from	  extensive,	  complex	  evaluation.	  	  As	  
Tranel	  et	  al.	  (2000,	  as	  cited	  by	  Colombetti,	  2008,	  p.57)	  summarised:	  “In	  the	  absence	  of	  somatic	  
markers,	  response	  options	  and	  outcomes	  become	  more	  or	  less	  equalised.	  	  Subjects	  may	  then	  resort	  to	  
a	  strategy	  of	  deciding	  on	  an	  option	  based	  on	  extremely	  slow	  and	  laborious	  logic	  operations	  over	  
many	  potential	  alternatives	  …	  and	  hence	  fail	  to	  be	  timely,	  accurate	  and	  propitious.	  	  Another	  possible	  
consequence	  of	  missing	  somatic	  markers	  is	  that	  decision-­‐making	  may	  become	  random	  or	  impulsive.”	  
It	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  somatic	  marker	  after	  an	  outcome	  that	  provides	  negative	  
feedback	  is	  a	  predictor	  of	  future	  poor	  decisions	  (Suzuki,	  Hirota,	  Takasawa	  &	  Shigemasu,	  2003),	  
suggesting	  therefore	  that	  decision-­‐making	  deficits	  can	  be	  a	  result	  of	  dysfunctional	  emotion-­‐based	  
associative	  learning.	  	  It	  could	  therefore	  be	  argued	  that	  consistent	  loss	  of	  control	  when	  gambling	  on	  
EGMs	  may,	  to	  some	  extent,	  be	  based	  on	  dysfunctional	  somatic	  responses	  to	  gambling	  wins	  and	  
losses.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  propose	  with	  authority	  the	  specific	  role	  of	  arousal	  (as	  somatic	  markers)	  in	  the	  
loss	  of	  control	  in	  EGM	  gambling,	  because	  the	  specific	  impact	  of	  somatic	  markers	  in	  decision-­‐making	  
is	  not	  fully	  established	  in	  the	  literature	  (Colombetti,	  2008).	  	  In	  short,	  the	  somatic	  marker	  hypothesis	  
requires	  further	  exploration	  to	  isolate	  which	  element	  of	  decision-­‐making	  it	  specifically	  affects	  (e.g.,	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attention,	  working	  memory)	  and	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  other	  somatic	  markers	  beyond	  skin	  
conductance	  responses	  (Colombetti,	  2008;	  Dunn,	  Dalgleish	  &	  Andrew,	  2006).	  
	  
Given	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  experimental	  work	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  as	  a	  
potential	  risk	  factor	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  EGM	  gambling,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  
stake	  size	  on	  arousal	  in	  terms	  of	  evoking	  somatic	  markers,	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  role	  as	  a	  primary	  
motivation	  to	  gamble.	  	  By	  observing	  whether	  gambling	  on	  virtual	  roulette	  at	  larger	  stake	  sizes	  
evokes	  a	  different	  somatic	  response	  pattern	  than	  lower	  stake	  sizes,	  the	  probable	  value	  of	  future	  
research	  into	  exploring	  this	  complex	  and	  under-­‐developed	  explanatory	  model	  can	  be	  evaluated.	  	  If	  
there	  is	  no	  variation	  in	  somatic	  response	  across	  stake	  size,	  it	  would	  indicate	  that	  any	  impact	  of	  stake	  
size	  on	  loss	  of	  control	  cannot	  be	  explained	  via	  the	  somatic	  marker	  hypothesis.	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8 Overview	  of	  Research	  Aims	  and	  Objectives	  
Despite	  the	  intuitive	  relationship	  between	  loss	  of	  control,	  problem	  gambling,	  arousal	  and	  executive	  
functioning,	  there	  remain	  relatively	  few	  studies	  available	  that	  develop	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
deterioration	  of	  executive	  control	  as	  a	  causal	  factor	  in	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  problem	  
gambling	  (Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  2006).	  	  Furthermore,	  within	  the	  existing	  studies	  there	  are	  a	  range	  
of	  significant	  methodological	  limitations	  that	  restrict	  understanding,	  including	  a	  lack	  of	  observation	  
of	  differential	  effects	  across	  different	  gambling	  products	  or	  across	  different	  gambling	  outcomes,	  i.e.	  
winning	  and	  losing.	  	  	  
Another	  limiting	  factor	  of	  existing	  research	  is	  that	  the	  comparison	  of	  executive	  functioning	  and	  
psychophysiological	  responses	  has	  been	  performed	  between	  clinical	  and	  non-­‐clinical	  populations.	  	  
This	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  deficits	  in	  executive	  functioning	  were	  pre-­‐existing	  
individual	  vulnerabilities,	  or	  whether	  the	  neurocognitive	  deficits	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  repeated	  
gambling	  behaviour.	  	  The	  current	  study	  aims	  to	  investigate	  whether	  stake	  size	  has	  a	  causal	  effect	  on	  
executive	  functioning,	  and	  therefore	  whether	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stake	  sizes	  is	  a	  risk	  factor	  for	  losing	  
control	  when	  gambling.	  
In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  requisite	  experimental	  control	  necessary	  to	  make	  conclusions	  regarding	  
causal	  effects,	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  virtual	  roulette	  was	  utilised.	  	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  gambling	  
behaviour	  will	  not	  solely	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  single	  structural	  characteristic	  in	  isolation,	  but	  rather	  the	  
collective	  interaction	  of	  a	  range	  of	  environmental	  and	  structural	  characteristics	  (Parke	  &	  Parke,	  
2013).	  	  However,	  given	  that	  there	  is	  a	  minimal	  amount	  of	  knowledge	  available	  regarding	  the	  specific	  
impact	  of	  stake	  size	  in	  EGM	  gambling,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  attempt	  to	  isolate	  the	  specific	  effect	  of	  
stake	  size	  on	  executive	  control	  as	  a	  foundational	  starting	  point.	  	  Naturally,	  as	  the	  research	  base	  
develops,	  the	  aim	  will	  progress	  to	  exploring	  how	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  is	  influenced	  and	  mediated	  
by	  other	  game	  features	  and	  environmental	  cues.	  
In	  the	  current	  study	  we	  investigated	  two	  executive	  functions,	  reflection	  impulsivity	  and	  response	  
inhibition,	  that	  have	  been	  strongly	  implicated	  as	  developmental	  and	  maintaining	  factors	  in	  addiction	  
in	  general,	  and	  problem	  gambling	  specifically.	  	  The	  study	  will	  observed	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  
in	  virtual	  roulette	  on	  players’	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  and	  response	  inhibition	  performance.	  	  
The	  study	  will	  also	  observe	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  arousal,	  and	  more	  
specifically	  whether	  winning	  and	  losing	  at	  higher	  and	  lower	  stakes	  produce	  distinct	  experiences	  of	  
arousal	  for	  the	  participant.	  	  By	  determining	  whether	  the	  experience	  of	  gambling	  on	  virtual	  roulette	  
at	  high	  stakes	  is	  physiologically	  different	  to	  low	  stakes,	  insight	  will	  be	  provided	  into	  the	  relative	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importance	  of	  arousal	  in	  understanding	  the	  relationship	  between	  stake	  and	  deterioration	  of	  
executive	  functions,	  and	  potentially	  the	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  gambling.	  
8.1 Research	  Hypotheses	  
1. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling	  (i.e.	  control	  condition).	  
2. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  losing	  bets	  in	  comparison	  to	  
either	  winning	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
3. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
4. A	  player’s	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  will	  be	  higher	  after	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
5. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  
in	  comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling	  (i.e.	  control	  condition).	  
6. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  losing	  bets	  in	  comparison	  
to	  either	  winning	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
7. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
8. A	  player’s	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  will	  be	  lower	  after	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  
in	  comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
9. The	  percentage	  increase	  in	  arousal	  level	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling	  (i.e.	  control	  condition).	  
10. The	  percentage	  increase	  in	  arousal	  level	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
11. The	  percentage	  increase	  in	  arousal	  level	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
12. Players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  response	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
13. Players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  response	  when	  losing	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  
comparison	  to	  either	  losing	  lower	  stake	  bets	  or	  not	  gambling.	  
14. Players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  somatic	  response	  when	  winning	  higher	  stake	  bets	  in	  




9 Research	  Methodology	  
9.1 Participants	  
A	  sample	  size	  of	  N=32	  (30	  males,	  2	  females)	  was	  recruited	  for	  the	  repeated-­‐measures	  experiment.	  	  
Participant	  ages	  ranged	  from	  19–36	  with	  a	  mean	  age	  of	  25.8	  (SD=4.46).	  The	  study	  was	  advertised	  
through	  a	  range	  of	  avenues	  including	  popular	  internet	  sports	  networking	  sites	  used	  by	  those	  in	  the	  
Lincolnshire	  area.	  	  In	  addition,	  local	  adult	  sports	  clubs	  were	  contacted	  directly,	  where	  the	  research	  
was	  advertised	  as	  an	  investigation	  into	  gambling	  behaviour	  on	  category	  B2	  machines.	  	  This	  
recruitment	  strategy	  was	  used	  as	  an	  efficient	  way	  to	  target	  a	  sample	  predominantly	  consisting	  of	  
young	  adult	  males;	  a	  cohort	  that	  has	  been	  consistently	  shown	  to	  make	  up	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  EGM	  
gamblers	  (British	  Gambling	  Prevalence	  Survey,	  2007;	  2010).	  	  Local	  betting	  shops	  also	  advertised	  the	  
study	  through	  their	  list	  of	  registered	  players	  from	  the	  surrounding	  Lincolnshire	  area.	  	  	  
The	  study	  inclusion	  criteria	  required	  participants	  to	  have	  experience	  of	  participating	  in	  gambling	  
activities	  within	  the	  last	  six	  months,	  and	  to	  be	  frequent	  gamblers	  in	  terms	  of	  participating	  in	  sports	  
betting,	  casino	  gambling	  (online	  or	  offline)	  and/or	  category	  B2/B3	  gambling	  at	  least	  once	  every	  14	  
days.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  category	  B2	  experience	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  electronic	  gambling	  was	  not	  a	  
novel	  concept	  to	  participants	  and	  that	  they	  understood	  how	  to	  operate	  electronic	  gambling	  
machines	  and	  how	  they	  worked.	  	  Participants	  all	  had	  normal	  or	  corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	  vision	  and	  
hearing.	  	  
Information	  about	  the	  participants’	  gambling	  behaviour,	  in	  terms	  of	  preferred	  gambling	  activities	  
and	  level	  of	  stake	  they	  typically	  gambled	  with,	  was	  obtained	  via	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  
conducted	  by	  the	  experimenter	  prior	  to	  participation.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  category	  B2	  participation,	  last	  
six	  month	  gambling	  participation	  included:	  sports	  betting;	  live	  and	  online	  poker;	  online	  slots	  and	  
casino	  table	  games;	  scratch	  cards;	  and	  national	  lottery.	  	  Information	  obtained	  from	  the	  brief	  
interview	  revealed	  that	  participants	  on	  average	  took	  part	  in	  2.1	  different	  gambling	  activities	  in	  
addition	  to	  category	  B2	  machines.	  	  See	  Appendix	  1	  for	  summary	  of	  participant	  gambling	  activities	  
and	  their	  stake	  size	  preferences.	  	  	  
An	  additional	  purpose	  of	  the	  interview	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  participant	  was	  currently	  under	  any	  
gambling	  self-­‐exclusion	  programme,	  or	  currently	  seeking	  help	  regarding	  problems	  with	  their	  
gambling.	  	  Fundamentally,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  experiment	  does	  not	  support	  between	  group	  analysis,	  
therefore	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  attempt	  to	  extrapolate	  any	  differences	  in	  performance	  based	  
on	  whether	  participants	  were	  problem	  or	  non-­‐problem	  gamblers,	  and	  therefore	  no	  problem	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gamblers	  were	  included	  within	  this	  study.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  would	  be	  ethically	  unsound	  to	  provide	  
problem	  gamblers	  with	  a	  monetary	  stake	  and	  make	  them	  risk	  the	  provided	  stake.	  	  However,	  any	  
impact	  of	  individual	  differences	  would	  be	  controlled	  for	  within	  a	  repeated	  measures	  design.	  	  	  
Participants	  were	  all	  informed	  prior	  to	  commencement	  of	  the	  experiment	  that	  they	  would	  not	  have	  
to	  use	  any	  of	  their	  own	  money	  and	  that	  any	  stake	  remaining	  and	  money	  won	  during	  the	  experiment	  
could	  be	  retained.	  	  Participants	  who	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  same	  sporting	  club	  were	  all	  tested	  
separately	  on	  the	  same	  day	  to	  minimise	  communication	  with	  other	  participants.	  
9.2 Procedure	  and	  Apparatus	  












Figure	  1	  Experimental	  Overview	  	  
In	  each	  condition	  participants	  made	  three	  bets	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  task.	  Following	  each	  bet	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  
level	  before	  completing	  a	  Go/No	  Go	  task.	  This	  process	  was	  repeated	  three	  times.	  After	  the	  third	  Go/No	  Go	  task	  participants	  were	  
reminded	  of	  their	  monetary	  wins	  and	  losses	  of	  their	  last	  three	  bets	  before	  completing	  five	  trials	  of	  the	  IST.	  Participants’	  electrodermal	  
activity	  was	  being	  recorded	  throughout	  the	  session	  to	  measure	  arousal.	  	  Participants	  were	  given	  a	  15-­‐minute	  rest	  between	  each	  condition.	  
	  
Upon	  arrival	  at	  the	  laboratory,	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  stack	  of	  betting	  chips	  that	  had	  a	  total	  
monetary	  value	  of	  £132.	  	  They	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  chips	  were	  now	  theirs	  and	  that	  any	  money	  
won	  or	  retained	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  would	  be	  converted	  into	  cash	  and	  would	  be	  theirs	  to	  




Go/	  No	  Go	  Task	  
(Response	  Inhibition)	  




Information	  Sampling	  Task	  
(Reflection	  Impulsivity)	  
Repeat	  x	  3	  
Repeat	  process	  for	  all	  conditions	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An	  outline	  of	  the	  experimental	  process,	  what	  was	  required	  of	  the	  participant,	  and	  their	  rights	  within	  
the	  study	  were	  discussed	  before	  signed	  consent	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  experiment	  was	  obtained.	  	  The	  
experimenter	  then	  read	  a	  detailed	  outline	  of	  the	  experiment	  to	  the	  participant,	  stopping	  regularly	  to	  
check	  for	  understanding	  and	  allow	  questions	  to	  be	  asked.	  	  	  
Participants	  were	  briefed	  that	  the	  research	  was	  looking	  into	  the	  physiological	  and	  cognitive	  effects	  
of	  gambling	  at	  different	  stake	  levels	  on	  virtual	  roulette.	  	  The	  experiment	  comprised	  of	  five	  parts,	  
with	  each	  part	  requiring	  participants	  to	  make	  three	  separate	  bets	  on	  a	  game	  of	  virtual	  roulette.	  	  The	  
bets	  consisted	  of	  participants	  selecting	  whether	  the	  result	  of	  the	  roulette	  spin	  would	  land	  on	  red	  or	  
black.	  	  In	  two	  of	  the	  five	  parts	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  made	  three	  £2	  bets;	  in	  another	  two	  
parts	  they	  made	  three	  £20	  bets.	  	  In	  one	  section,	  to	  provide	  a	  control	  condition	  the	  participants	  made	  
virtual	  roulette	  decisions	  and	  observed	  the	  roulette	  wheel	  revolving	  similar	  to	  the	  other	  betting	  
conditions,	  however	  no	  money	  was	  staked.	  
Each	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  represented	  the	  five	  experimental	  conditions	  assessing	  two	  
independent	  variables:	  stake	  size	  (no	  bet,	  £2	  and	  £20)	  and	  outcome	  (win/loss).	  	  	  The	  conditions	  
comprised:	  	  £2	  stake	  losing	  condition;	  £2	  stake	  winning	  condition;	  £20	  stake	  losing	  condition;	  £20	  
stake	  winning	  condition;	  and	  a	  control	  condition	  with	  no	  opportunity	  to	  win	  or	  lose	  money	  and	  no	  
feedback	  as	  to	  correct/incorrect	  selections.	  Outcome	  was	  manipulated	  by	  the	  experimenter	  to	  
produce	  three	  wins	  in	  both	  the	  high	  (£20)	  and	  low	  (£2)	  stake	  	  winning	  conditions	  and	  three	  losses	  in	  
both	  the	  high	  and	  low	  stake	  losing	  conditions.	  	  This	  allowed	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  both	  
losing	  at	  lower	  and	  higher	  stakes	  as	  well	  as	  winning	  at	  lower	  and	  higher	  stakes;	  an	  important	  
distinction	  given	  the	  often	  asymmetrical	  impact	  outcome	  has	  on	  EGM	  behaviour	  (Harris	  &	  Parke,	  
under	  review),	  physiological	  arousal	  (Hochman	  &	  Yechiam,	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  affect	  and	  decision-­‐
making	  (Leith	  &	  Baumeister,	  1996).	  	  The	  order	  in	  which	  the	  different	  conditions	  were	  presented	  was	  
counterbalanced	  across	  all	  participants.	  	  This	  was	  to	  prevent	  confounding	  variables,	  such	  as	  the	  
impact	  of	  early	  big	  wins	  or	  extended	  losing	  streaks	  for	  example,	  affecting	  results	  in	  the	  physiological	  
and	  executive	  control	  assessments.	  
The	  control	  condition	  was	  designed	  to	  represent	  the	  act	  of	  selecting	  red	  or	  black	  on	  a	  roulette	  
simulation	  with	  no	  result	  being	  provided,	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  direct	  replication	  of	  the	  high	  stake	  or	  
low	  stake	  roulette	  betting	  conditions.	  	  The	  objective	  was	  to	  control	  for	  the	  arousal	  associated	  with	  
making	  roulette	  predictions	  (i.e.	  the	  selection	  of	  red	  or	  black)	  and	  the	  potentially	  conditioned	  
arousal	  response	  stimulated	  by	  a	  spinning	  virtual	  roulette	  wheel.	  	  Each	  participant	  had	  experience	  of	  
playing	  B2	  machines,	  and	  many	  had	  experience	  of	  casino	  games	  both	  online	  and	  offline,	  therefore	  it	  
was	  probable	  for	  several	  participants	  that	  roulette	  cues	  such	  as	  selecting	  a	  prediction	  and	  the	  sight	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and	  sound	  of	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  wheel	  may	  stimulate	  an	  arousal	  response,	  conditioned	  from	  previous	  
pairings	  of	  virtual	  roulette	  and	  excitement.	  	  Put	  simply,	  the	  control	  condition	  was	  designed	  to	  
control	  the	  ‘learned	  stimulation’	  that	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  engaging	  in	  associated	  roulette	  
activities	  without	  specifically	  simulating	  a	  zero	  stake	  bet.	  
There	  was	  potential	  to	  provide	  control	  conditions	  to	  replicate	  the	  experience	  of	  both	  winning	  and	  
losing	  zero	  stake	  virtual	  roulette	  bets;	  however	  this	  would	  have	  required	  a	  sixth	  experimental	  
condition	  to	  replicate	  the	  experience	  of	  three	  sequential	  wins	  and	  three	  sequential	  losses.	  	  This	  
proposition	  was	  considered	  in	  detail,	  but	  ultimately	  rejected	  because	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  sixth	  
experimental	  condition	  would	  have	  extended	  an	  already	  protracted	  experimental	  design	  by	  at	  least	  
30	  minutes	  per	  participant.	  	  There	  would	  inevitably	  be	  effects	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  data	  collected,	  as	  
participants	  during	  the	  experimental	  trials	  became	  fatigued	  (Healy,	  Kole,	  Buck-­‐Gengler&	  Bourne,	  
2004).	  	  Furthermore,	  given	  that	  the	  proposed	  zero	  stake	  conditions	  with	  winning	  and	  losing	  
outcomes	  would	  need	  to	  provide	  a	  series	  of	  three	  sequential	  wins	  followed	  by	  three	  sequential	  
losses,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  more	  challenging	  to	  suspend	  disbelief	  in	  the	  participants	  that	  the	  results	  
were	  randomised	  rather	  than	  predetermined.	  	  With	  the	  aforementioned	  negative	  consequences	  of	  
extending	  the	  control	  condition	  to	  include	  the	  impact	  of	  wins	  and	  losses	  at	  zero	  stake	  in	  mind,	  and	  
considering	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  control	  condition	  was	  simply	  to	  control	  for	  conditioned	  arousal	  
associated	  with	  virtual	  roulette	  stimuli,	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  two	  control	  conditions	  that	  simulated	  
results	  of	  the	  zero	  stake	  bets	  was	  not	  appropriate	  in	  this	  experiment.	  
9.2.1	   Virtual	  Roulette	  Simulation	  
The	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation	  was	  created	  using	  Superlab	  ®	  version	  4.5	  software.	  	  The	  game	  was	  
viewed	  from	  a	  wall-­‐mounted	  46-­‐inch	  flat	  screen	  television	  that	  was	  connected	  to	  a	  PC	  that	  ran	  the	  
game	  software.	  	  Participants	  operated	  the	  game	  using	  a	  standard	  QWERTY	  keypad.	  	  Initially,	  
participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  green	  screen	  containing	  a	  roulette	  wheel	  and	  text	  that	  identified	  
the	  required	  stake	  size,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  red	  and	  black	  box	  that	  represented	  their	  options	  to	  choose	  to	  










Once	  participants	  made	  their	  selection	  by	  pressing	  either	  ‘R’	  or	  ‘B’	  on	  the	  keypad	  for	  red	  or	  black,	  
the	  roulette	  wheel	  spun	  for	  a	  duration	  of	  13	  seconds,	  followed	  by	  a	  seven-­‐	  second	  graphic	  informing	  
participants	  of	  the	  result,	  win	  or	  loss	  (or	  a	  seven-­‐	  second	  blank	  screen	  for	  the	  control	  condition).	  	  	  





Figure	  3.	  	  Gambling	  Section	  Schematic.	  	  Once	  participants	  were	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  stake	  size	  
to	  be	  gambled,	  they	  made	  their	  selection	  of	  red	  or	  black	  on	  the	  roulette	  wheel.	  	  The	  wheel	  spun	  
for	  13	  seconds	  before	  participants	  were	  informed	  of	  their	  win/loss.	  	  Three	  bets	  were	  made	  in	  each	  
experimental	  condition,	  each	  bet	  being	  partitioned	  by	  a	  self-­‐report	  rating	  of	  arousal,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
Go/	  No	  Go	  task.	  
Figure	  2.	  	  Roulette	  Wagering	  Screen.	  	  Participants	  made	  their	  selection	  of	  red	  or	  black	  by	  
pressing	  ‘R’	  or	  ‘B’	  on	  the	  keypad	  respectively.	  Once	  the	  participant	  made	  their	  decision	  of	  red	  
or	  black,	  the	  experimenter	  placed	  the	  appropriate	  value	  chip	  from	  the	  participant’s	  stack	  to	  a	  
wagering	  area	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  desk	  in	  front	  of	  the	  participant.	  	  The	  experimenter	  moved	  
the	  chips	  to	  limit	  participant	  movements	  to	  prevent	  contamination	  of	  arousal	  readings,	  as	  the	  
participant’s	   non-­‐keypad	   operating	   hand	   was	   connected	   to	   sensitive	   EDA	   electrodes.	   Upon	  
selection,	  a	  screen	  appeared	  with	  a	  spinning	  roulette	  wheel,	  which	  spun	  for	  13	  seconds.	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9.2.2	   Self-­‐Report	  Arousal	  
Once	  outcome	  was	  revealed	  after	  each	  betting	  event,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  partial	  
version	  of	  the	  computer-­‐based	  SAM	  (SAM;	  Lang,	  1980;	  Hodes,	  Cook,	  &	  Lang,	  1985).	  Immediately	  
after	  the	  result	  of	  the	  bet	  was	  revealed,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  self-­‐report	  their	  subjective	  level	  
of	  arousal	  in	  response	  to	  the	  betting	  experience.	  	  In	  addition,	  taking	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  ratings	  
allowed	  data	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  direct	  measures	  of	  physiological	  arousal	  taken	  from	  EDA	  
recordings.	  	  The	  SAM	  to	  record	  arousal	  experience	  was	  presented	  in	  a	  nine-­‐point	  scale	  version,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  five-­‐point	  alternative,	  to	  increase	  sensitivity	  in	  detecting	  event-­‐by-­‐event	  changes	  in	  
subjective	  experience.	  	  Participants	  were	  familiarised	  with	  the	  scales	  during	  the	  experimental	  brief	  
and	  the	  experimenter	  checked	  that	  participants	  understood	  what	  the	  scale	  intended	  to	  measure.	  	  	  







The	  SAM	  was	  chosen	  to	  assess	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  as	  the	  method	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  as	  an	  easy	  
to	  administer,	  non-­‐verbal	  method	  for	  quickly	  assessing	  the	  arousal	  associated	  with	  a	  person’s	  
emotional	  reaction	  to	  an	  event,	  and	  SAM	  scores	  regarding	  experiences	  of	  arousal	  correlate	  highly	  
with	  ratings	  obtained	  using	  verbal	  and	  more	  lengthy	  semantic	  differential	  scales	  (Bradley	  &	  Lang,	  
1994).	  	  The	  SAM	  hasve	  been	  used	  to	  effectively	  measure	  an	  individual’s	  emotional	  responses	  to	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  stimuli,	  including	  both	  pictures	  (e.g.	  Lang,	  Greenwald,	  Bradley,	  &	  Hamm,	  1993)	  and	  
sounds	  (e.g.	  Bradley,	  1994).	  	  The	  method	  has	  also	  been	  used	  successfully	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
clinical	  populations,	  as	  well	  as	  children	  and	  non-­‐English	  speaking	  citizens	  (Bradley	  &	  Lang,	  1994).	  
	  
	  
Figure	   4.	   	   SAM	   Scale.	   Immediately	   following	   results	   of	   the	   previous	   bet,	   participants	   were	  
asked	  to	  indicate	  on	  a	  nine-­‐point	  scale	  how	  aroused	  they	  felt.	   	  Participants	  were	  briefed	  that	  9	  
indicated	  maximum	  level	  of	  excitement,	  and	  1	  completely	  calm.	  	  Participants	  made	  their	  choices	  
using	  the	  top	  row	  of	  numbers	  on	  a	  standard	  keypad,	  and	  data	  was	  recorded	  automatically	  by	  the	  
Superlab	  ®	  4.5	  software.	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9.2.3	   Go/No	  Go	  Task	  as	  a	  Measure	  of	  Response	  Inhibition	  
Immediately	  after	  the	  participants	  completed	  the	  arousal	  SAM,	  they	  were	  given	  a	  Go/No	  Go	  test,	  
which	  was	  administered	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  gambling	  outcome	  on	  participants’	  
ability	  to	  withhold	  a	  prepotent	  response	  (response	  inhibition)	  as	  well	  as	  attention,	  vigilance,	  and	  
reaction	  time.	  	  Participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  series	  of	  arrows	  one	  at	  a	  time,	  which	  either	  
pointed	  to	  the	  left	  or	  the	  right.	  	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  respond	  as	  quickly	  and	  as	  accurately	  
as	  possible	  to	  the	  arrows	  by	  pressing	  the	  left	  arrow	  key	  when	  presented	  with	  left	  facing	  arrows	  and	  
the	  right	  arrow	  key	  when	  presented	  with	  right	  facing	  arrows.	  	  Each	  arrow	  was	  presented	  on	  screen	  
for	  a	  maximum	  duration	  of	  1500ms,	  or	  until	  a	  correct	  or	  incorrect	  response	  was	  made.	  	  Arrow	  
stimuli	  were	  partitioned	  by	  a	  fixation	  point	  for	  a	  duration	  of	  500ms.	  	  All	  responses	  were	  made	  using	  
a	  standard	  keypad.	  	  Participants	  were	  informed	  that	  on	  some	  trials	  the	  arrow	  would	  be	  presented	  
simultaneously	  with	  a	  short	  sharp	  audio	  ‘beep’.	  	  The	  start	  of	  the	  beep	  was	  delivered	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  as	  the	  arrow,	  and	  the	  beep	  ran	  for	  a	  duration	  of	  150ms.	  On	  such	  trials,	  participants	  were	  
instructed	  not	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  arrow	  and	  to	  not	  press	  any	  key.	  A	  practice	  trial	  was	  provided	  during	  
the	  experimental	  brief.	  	  	  
The	  order	  of	  the	  arrow	  and	  auditory	  stimuli	  were	  randomised	  and	  the	  participant	  was	  never	  
presented	  with	  the	  same	  Go/No	  Go	  task	  twice	  to	  avoid	  learning	  effects.	  
The	  Go/No	  Go	  task	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  consistent	  measure	  of	  impulse	  control	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  
instigated	  prepotent	  responses	  (Fillmore,	  2003).	  	  Evidence	  for	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  Go/No	  Go	  task	  
comes	  from	  empirical	  data	  that	  shows	  clinical	  populations	  such	  as	  children	  and	  young	  adults	  with	  
ADHD,	  a	  disorder	  characterised	  by	  poor	  impulse	  control,	  show	  more	  commission	  errors	  (i.e.	  an	  
ability	  to	  withhold	  a	  developed	  prepotent	  response),	  compared	  with	  healthy	  controls	  (Derefinko	  et	  
al.,	  2008).	  	  
As	  well	  as	  measuring	  the	  participants’	  ability	  to	  withhold	  a	  prepotent	  response	  on	  No	  Go	  trials,	  the	  
test	  also	  measured	  the	  number	  of	  omission	  errors	  made	  (i.e.	  providing	  the	  incorrect	  response	  on	  the	  
Go	  trials),	  which	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  attention	  and	  vigilance	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  	  Mean	  reaction	  time	  
was	  also	  measured,	  which	  is	  the	  average	  amount	  of	  time	  participants	  took	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  Go	  
trials,	  and	  it	  is	  used	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  range	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  including	  preparedness	  and	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Figure	  5.	   	  Example	  Go/No	  Go	  Trial.	   	  There	  were	  90	  trials	  presented	   in	  each	  Go/No	  Go	  task.	  	  
The	  first	  30	  trials	  all	  required	  a	  Go	  response	  from	  the	  participant	  by	  pressing	  the	  corresponding	  
left	  or	  right	  arrow	  key.	  The	  last	  60	  contained	  15	  No	  Go	  trials	  (arrows	  accompanied	  by	  an	  audio	  
beep),	   which	   required	   participants	   to	   withhold	   any	   response.	   	   Duration	   of	   the	   task	   was	  
approximately	  two	  minutes.	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9.2.4	   Information	  Sampling	  Task	  (IST)	  as	  a	  Measure	  of	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  
To	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  outcome	  on	  the	  participant’s	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  an	  
adapted	  IST	  was	  administered.	  	  The	  test	  design	  was	  adapted	  from	  that	  of	  Clark,	  Robbins,	  Ersche	  and	  
Sahakian	  (2006),	  who	  presented	  participants	  with	  a	  5x5	  grid	  of	  grey	  boxes.	  In	  their	  study,	  touching	  
one	  of	  the	  computerised	  grey	  boxes	  revealed	  one	  of	  two	  colours	  and	  remained	  revealed	  for	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  trial.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  task	  was	  to	  decide	  the	  majority	  box	  colour	  on	  the	  grid.	  	  Participants	  were	  
rewarded	  with	  points	  for	  making	  correct	  decisions,	  with	  the	  total	  points	  awarded	  being	  reduced	  by	  
ten	  for	  every	  box	  ‘opened’.	  	  Incorrect	  decisions	  resulted	  in	  a	  point	  deduction.	  	  	  
The	  IST	  used	  in	  the	  current	  study	  used	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  those	  used	  by	  Clark,	  Robbins,	  Ersche	  
and	  Sahakian	  (2006),	  but	  the	  format	  was	  adapted	  for	  several	  key	  reasons.	  	  First,	  the	  task	  had	  to	  be	  
integrated	  with	  the	  Superlab	  ®	  4.5	  software	  that	  was	  running	  the	  roulette	  simulation	  and	  Go/No	  Go	  
task	  to	  allow	  a	  smooth	  transition	  and	  data	  recording	  from	  one	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  to	  another.	  	  
Also,	  no	  feedback	  regarding	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  decisions	  was	  provided,	  to	  ensure	  that	  each	  
participant	  had	  a	  standardised	  experience,	  rather	  than	  decisions	  being	  influenced	  by	  different	  
patterns	  of	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  outcomes.	  	  This	  then	  allowed	  a	  clean	  assessment	  of	  the	  
impact	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  gambling	  outcome	  on	  participants’	  reflection	  impulsivity.	  	  
The	  current	  IST	  design	  resembled	  an	  Urn	  Problem,	  which	  is	  a	  widely	  used	  paradigm	  in	  probability	  
and	  statistical	  exercises.	  	  More	  specifically,	  a	  hypergeometric	  distribution	  design	  was	  created,	  where	  
balls	  are	  taken	  out	  from	  the	  urn	  and	  not	  replaced	  once	  extracted.	  	  This	  format	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  
‘drawing	  without	  replacement’,	  which	  fits	  the	  principle	  of	  traditional	  ISTs.	  
During	  the	  experimental	  brief,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  three	  walk-­‐through	  talk-­‐through	  
examples	  of	  the	  IST.	  	  They	  were	  instructed	  that	  they	  would	  complete	  five	  urn	  tasks	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
every	  three	  bets.	  	  Points	  were	  available	  during	  this	  game	  and	  it	  was	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  participant	  
with	  the	  most	  points	  after	  the	  testing	  phase	  of	  the	  research	  would	  win	  a	  £100	  prize	  in	  addition	  to	  
any	  money	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  been	  won	  during	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  task.	  	  This	  was	  to	  create	  
increased	  involvement	  and	  motivation	  for	  performing	  well	  in	  the	  IST	  trials.	  
Participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  green	  urn	  on	  screen	  and	  informed	  that	  it	  contained	  19	  balls,	  with	  
each	  individual	  ball	  either	  being	  coloured	  red	  or	  black.	  	  Participants	  were	  told	  they	  had	  to	  decide	  if	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  19	  balls	  originally	  in	  the	  urn	  were	  red	  or	  black.	  	  They	  could	  remove	  a	  ball	  from	  
the	  urn	  to	  check	  its	  colour,	  i.e.	  sample	  information,	  and	  inform	  their	  decision-­‐making	  further.	  	  A	  ball	  
could	  be	  removed	  by	  pressing	  ‘space	  bar’	  on	  the	  keypad,	  and	  once	  removed,	  the	  ball	  stayed	  out	  of	  
the	  jar	  and	  visible	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  trial.	  	  Participants	  were	  informed,	  however,	  that	  every	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time	  a	  ball	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  urn	  five	  points	  would	  be	  deducted	  from	  their	  points	  total.	  	  Each	  
game	  began	  with	  95	  points,	  so	  for	  example,	  removing	  ten	  balls	  left	  a	  remaining	  45	  points	  available.	  	  
Participants	  were	  instructed	  that	  they	  could	  decide	  to	  propose	  a	  judgement	  of	  a	  majority	  of	  red	  or	  
black	  balls	  in	  the	  urn	  by	  pressing	  ‘R’	  or	  ‘B’	  on	  the	  keypad	  respectively	  (see	  Figure	  6).	  	  Making	  a	  
correct	  decision	  would	  result	  in	  the	  remaining	  points	  on	  the	  board	  being	  added	  to	  their	  overall	  
score,	  but	  an	  incorrect	  guess	  would	  result	  in	  all	  available	  points	  for	  the	  trial	  being	  lost.	  	  Participants	  
were	  instructed	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  receiving	  feedback	  on	  correct/incorrect	  decisions,	  and	  that	  
the	  winner	  would	  be	  contacted	  after	  all	  32	  participants	  completed	  the	  study.	  
	  












Figure	  6.	  Example	  IST	  trial.	  	  Participants	  could	  select	  if	  they	  thought	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  19	  
balls	  in	  the	  urn	  were	  red	  or	  black	  at	  any	  time	  by	  pressing	  ‘R’	  or	  ‘B’	  on	  the	  keypad.	  	  Choosing	  to	  
press	   the	   ‘space	  bar’	   resulted	   in	   a	   ball	   being	   removed	   from	   the	  urn.	   	   The	   test	   had	  no	   time	  
limit,	  and	  participants	  were	  allowed	  to	  remove	  as	  many	  balls	  as	  they	  chose,	  up	  to	  the	  full	  19.	  	  
Five	  IST	  trials	  were	  administered	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  experimental	  phase	  with	  each	  test	  being	  
partitioned	  by	  a	  five-­‐second	  screen	  instructing	  participants	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  next	  trial.	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The	  order	  in	  which	  the	  balls	  would	  appear	  from	  each	  urn	  was	  randomly	  predetermined	  by	  the	  
experimenter	  using	  a	  random	  number	  generator.	  	  Five	  sequences	  of	  balls	  were	  created	  to	  produce	  
five	  separate	  urn	  trials.	  	  The	  sequence	  of	  colours	  was	  also	  inverted,	  therefore	  creating	  five	  new	  trials	  
in	  terms	  of	  sequence	  of	  colours	  while	  retaining	  the	  same	  probability	  structure	  as	  its	  counterpart.	  	  To	  
control	  for	  urn	  favourability,	  i.e.	  the	  sequence	  of	  balls	  that	  appeared,	  participants	  were	  always	  
presented	  with	  the	  same	  five	  urns	  in	  each	  experimental	  condition.	  	  However,	  to	  prevent	  learning	  
effects,	  the	  urns	  could	  also	  be	  presented	  with	  the	  colours	  inverted,	  and	  the	  combination	  of	  original	  






The	  IST	  measured	  three	  dependent	  variables.	  	  First,	  Mean	  Information	  Sampled,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  
average	  amount	  of	  balls	  removed	  from	  the	  urn	  before	  a	  decision	  is	  made.	  Second,	  Mean	  Response	  
Latency,	  which	  is	  the	  mean	  amount	  of	  time	  spent	  making	  decisions	  upon	  extraction	  of	  new	  
information	  and	  is	  calculated	  by	  total	  time	  spent	  on	  each	  urn	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  balls	  
removed.	  	  	  
Finally,	  Probability	  of	  Making	  Correct	  Decisions	  (P(correct)),	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  odds	  of	  a	  
participant’s	  choice	  of	  red	  or	  black	  being	  correct	  based	  on	  the	  ratio	  of	  red	  to	  black	  balls	  removed	  
from	  the	  urn	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  balls	  remaining	  in	  the	  urn.	  	  P(correct)	  is	  calculated	  with	  the	  
following	  formula:	  
	   Order	  of	  Urn	  Trials	  Presented	  
Participant	   Control	  
Condition	  
£20	  Stake	  	  	  
Loss	  
Condition	  
£2	  	  Stake	  
Win	  
Condition	  
£2	  	  Stake	  Loss	  
Condition	  
£20	  	  Stake	  Win	  
Condition	  
1	   1-­‐3-­‐2R-­‐	  4R-­‐	  5R.	   2R-­‐5-­‐3-­‐1R-­‐4	   1-­‐4-­‐3-­‐5-­‐2	   4R-­‐	  5-­‐	  2-­‐	  3R-­‐	  1	   5R-­‐4R-­‐3R-­‐	  2R-­‐	  1R	  
Table	  1.	  	  Example	  Order	  of	  Urn	  Presentation.	  	  The	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  same	  five	  
urns	   in	   each	   condition,	   but	   the	   sequence	   in	   which	   the	   urn	   was	   presented,	   i.e.	   original	   or	   inverted	  





where	  Z	  =	  19	  –	  (number	  of	  balls	  removed	  from	  urn),	  and	  A=	  10	  –	  (number	  of	  balls	  removed	  of	  
chosen	  colour).	  
9.2.5	   Psychophysiological	  Measurement	  of	  Change	  in	  Arousal	  
Arousal	  measurements	  were	  taken	  using	  the	  AcqKnowledge	  Biopac	  System,	  consisting	  of	  the	  MP150	  
base	  module	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  BioNomadix	  EDA	  and	  PPG	  amplifier.	  	  Five	  minutes	  before	  each	  
phase	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  had	  disposable	  pre-­‐gelled	  EL507-­‐10	  EDA	  electrodes	  attached	  
to	  the	  fingertips	  of	  their	  index	  and	  middle	  finger	  on	  their	  non-­‐dominant	  hand	  to	  enable	  time	  for	  the	  
gel	  to	  absorb	  into	  the	  skin	  and	  provide	  a	  strong	  electrical	  signal.	  	  Non-­‐dominant	  hands	  were	  used	  to	  
allow	  participants	  use	  of	  the	  keypad	  with	  their	  dominant	  hand.	  	  Prior	  to	  commencement	  of	  each	  
experimental	  phase,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  take	  deep	  sharp	  breaths	  to	  check	  for	  SCRs	  and	  that	  
the	  equipment	  was	  working	  correctly.	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  rest	  the	  hand	  with	  the	  
electrodes	  on	  the	  table	  at	  a	  90-­‐degree	  angle.	  	  This	  placed	  less	  strain	  on	  the	  hand	  and	  arm	  and	  
enabled	  stillness,	  and	  was	  therefore	  suitable	  for	  minimising	  signal	  interference	  caused	  by	  
movement.	  	  
The	  AcqKnowledge	  software	  provided	  with	  the	  Biopac	  System	  was	  operated	  on	  a	  laptop	  separate	  to	  
the	  computer	  operating	  the	  EGM	  and	  executive	  control	  tasks.	  The	  software	  allows	  set-­‐up	  of	  
acquisition	  parameters,	  real-­‐time	  observation	  of	  the	  signal	  measurement,	  records	  data	  to	  a	  hard	  
drive,	  and	  is	  used	  for	  data	  filtering	  and	  analysis.	  The	  software	  was	  synchronised	  with	  Superlab	  4.5	  to	  
enable	  accurate	  analysis	  of	  the	  skin	  conductance	  data	  in	  response	  to	  specific	  events.	  The	  laptop	  
running	  the	  AcqKnowledge	  software	  was	  kept	  out	  of	  sight	  of	  participants	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  live	  bio-­‐
feedback	  data	  did	  not	  cause	  distraction	  from	  the	  EGM	  and	  cognitive	  tasks.	  	  	  
After	  each	  experimental	  phase,	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  15-­‐minute	  break	  to	  allow	  arousal	  levels	  to	  
return	  to	  baseline.	  	  During	  the	  intervals	  participants	  were	  brought	  to	  a	  quiet	  seating	  area	  outside	  of	  
the	  laboratory	  environment.	  	  The	  intervals	  were	  also	  necessary	  to	  afford	  participants	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  rest	  and	  drink	  water.	  
9.2.5.1	  	  	  	  	  Skin	  Conductance	  Level	  (SCL)	  Measurement	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When	  analysing	  arousal	  levels	  and	  change	  in	  response	  to	  gambling	  on	  virtual	  roulette,	  behaviour	  
was	  separated	  into	  three	  measurement	  periods,	  Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline,	  Placing	  Bet,	  and	  Observing	  
Outcome	  of	  Bet.	  	  ‘Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline’	  refers	  to	  a	  measurement	  period	  with	  a	  duration	  of	  5000	  
milliseconds,	  that	  occurs	  when	  the	  participant	  is	  either	  waiting	  for	  a	  new	  experimental	  condition	  to	  
commence	  or	  is	  resting	  after	  completion	  of	  a	  previous	  test	  of	  executive	  control.	  	  The	  Pre-­‐Event	  
Baseline	  is	  observed	  with	  a	  blank	  screen	  with	  no	  gambling	  images	  or	  stimuli	  present	  onscreen;	  this	  
measurement	  of	  EDA	  ceased	  5000	  milliseconds	  before	  the	  participant	  was	  invited	  to	  place	  a	  bet.	  	  
The	  ‘Placing	  Bet’	  measurement	  period	  refers	  to	  a	  8000	  millisecond	  observation	  occurring	  after	  the	  
participant	  makes	  a	  betting	  selection;	  recording	  as	  the	  participant	  observes	  the	  roulette	  wheel	  
spinning	  on	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  game	  and	  measurement	  ceases	  5000	  milliseconds	  before	  the	  result	  
of	  the	  bet	  is	  revealed.	  Finally,	  ‘Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bet’	  is	  a	  measurement	  of	  electrodermal	  
activity,	  with	  a	  duration	  of	  7000	  milliseconds,	  which	  commences	  1000	  milliseconds	  after	  the	  result	  








Figure	   7.	   Phases	   of	   SCL	   Measurement.	   SCL	   readings	   taken	   at	   baseline	   5000ms	   prior	   to	  
participants	  being	  invited	  to	  place	  a	  bet.	  	  SCL	  was	  then	  recorded	  for	  a	  8000ms	  period	  during	  the	  
roulette	   wheel	   spin	   initiated	   by	   the	   placing	   of	   the	   bet.	   	   Finally,	   SCL	   was	   taken	   for	   a	   7000ms	  






9.2.5.2	   	  	  	  	  Observation	  of	  Skin	  Conductance	  Responses	  (SCRs)	  during	  Gambling	  Behaviour	  
In	   the	   current	   study,	   the	   two	   experimental	   stimuli	   markers	   used	   to	   create	   an	   SCR	   were	   the	  
Placement	   of	   Bet	   and	   Bet	   Outcome.	   	   Placement	   of	   Bet	   was	   marked	   as	   the	   time	   the	   participant	  
selected	  red	  or	  black	  as	  their	  bet	  on	  the	  roulette	  gambling	  simulation,	  and	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
standardised	  measurement	  principles	  put	  forward	  by	  Boucsein	  et	  al.	  (2012),	   if	  an	  SCR	  was	  initiated	  
within	  a	  1-­‐3	  second	  latency	  period	  it	  was	  recorded	  as	  an	  Event	  Related	  Skin	  Conductance	  Response	  
(ER-­‐SCR),	   and	   if	   the	  SCR	  was	   initiated	  outside	  of	   this	  window	   it	  was	   recorded	  as	  a	  Non-­‐Significant	  
Skin	   Conductance	   Response	   (NS-­‐SCR).	   	   Bet	   Outcome	   was	   marked	   as	   the	   visual	   presentation	   of	  
whether	  the	  bet	  was	  won	  or	   lost	  and,	  retaining	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  before,	   if	  an	  SCR	  onset	  was	  
initiated	   within	   the	   1-­‐3	   second	   latency	   period	   it	   was	   recorded	   as	   an	   ER-­‐SCR,	   otherwise	   it	   was	  












Figure	  8.	  	  Phases	  of	  SCR	  Measurement.	  	  Participant	  ER-­‐SCR	  was	  first	  measured	  upon	  placing	  
their	  bet,	  at	  either	  high	  or	   low	  stakes.	   	  Placement	  of	  bet	   in	  the	  control	  condition	  consisted	  of	  
simply	  selecting	  red	  or	  black	  with	  no	  stake	  at	  risk.	  	  ER-­‐SCR	  was	  also	  measured	  when	  participants	  




10.1 Response	  Inhibition	  
10.1.1	  Commission	  Errors	  Committed	  in	  Go/No	  Go	  Task	  after	  Different	  Stake	  Size	  Gambling	  Events	  
‘Commission	  Errors’	  refers	  to	  an	  inability	  to	  withhold	  a	  developed	  prepotent	  response	  within	  the	  
Go/No	  Go	  Task.	  	  There	  was	  relatively	  little	  difference	  in	  mean	  percentage	  of	  commission	  errors,	  
however,	  mean	  commission	  error	  percentage	  in	  the	  high	  stake	  condition	  was	  higher	  (M=10.765,	  
SD=8.9)	  than	  the	  low	  stake	  condition	  (M=9.523,	  SD=6.094)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=9.166,	  
SD=7.483).	  	  This	  difference	  in	  mean	  commission	  error	  percentage	  across	  stake	  size	  was	  not	  
statistically	  significant,	  F(2,62)=1.48,	  p>0.05,	  meaning	  that	  gambling	  at	  £20	  per	  bet	  did	  not	  affect	  
participants’	  ability	  to	  inhibit	  prepotent	  responses	  in	  comparison	  to	  betting	  £2	  per	  event	  or	  the	  
control	  condition.	  
Mean	  percentage	  of	  commission	  errors	  was	  relatively	  similar	  after	  winning	  bets	  (M=10.561,	  
SD=8.249),	  after	  losing	  bets	  (M=9.762,	  SD=6.669),	  and	  after	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=9.166,	  
SD=7.483).	  	  Therefore,	  as	  one	  would	  expect,	  there	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  for	  betting	  outcome	  on	  
commission	  error	  rate,	  F(2,	  62)=1.189,	  p>0.05,	  meaning	  ability	  to	  withhold	  prepotent	  response	  does	  
not	  differ	  whether	  the	  outcome	  of	  one’s	  bet	  wins	  or	  loses.	  	  
Exploring	  the	  relationship	  further,	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  percentage	  of	  
commission	  errors	  when	  winning	  £20	  bets	  (M=11.042,	  SD=10.167),	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (M=10.08,	  
SD=8.095)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=9.166,	  SD=7.483),	  F(2,62)=1.078,	  p>0.05.	  
Finally,	  there	  is	  also	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  percentage	  of	  commission	  errors	  when	  
losing	  bets	  of	  various	  stake	  sizes	  F(1.583,	  49.07)=1.089,	  p>0.05.	  	  Although	  mean	  percentage	  of	  
commission	  errors	  was	  higher	  after	  losing	  £20	  bets	  (M=10.486,	  SD=8.784)	  in	  comparison	  to	  losing	  £2	  
bets	  (M=8.967,	  SD=6.342)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=9.166,	  SD=7.483).	  	  	  
10.1.2	  Omission	  Errors	  Committed	  in	  Go/No	  Go	  Task	  Different	  Stake	  Size	  Gambling	  Events	  
‘Omission	  errors’	  refers	  to	  providing	  the	  incorrect	  response	  on	  the	  Go	  trials,	  which	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  
poor	  attention	  and	  vigilance	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  The	  mean	  percentage	  of	  omission	  errors	  after	  
participants	  were	  betting	  in	  the	  high	  stake	  condition	  (M=3.236,	  SD=3.041)	  was	  higher	  than	  after	  
betting	  in	  the	  low	  stake	  (M=2.908,	  SD=2.692)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=2.902,	  SD=2.747).	  	  
However,	  this	  difference	  in	  means	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  as	  there	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  for	  
stake	  size	  observed	  F(2,	  62)=0.986,	  p>0.05.	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The	  mean	  percentage	  of	  omission	  errors	  after	  winning	  conditions	  (M=3.262,	  SD=2.943)	  was	  not	  
statistically	  significantly	  different	  in	  comparison	  to	  post-­‐losing	  conditions	  (M=2.882,	  SD=2.725)	  and	  
the	  control	  condition	  (M=2.902,	  SD=2.747),	  F(2,62)=1.489,	  p>0.05.	  
Further	  analysis	  also	  reveals	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  percentage	  of	  omission	  errors	  
after	  winning	  £20	  bets	  (M=3.291,	  SD=3.092),	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (M=3.233,	  SD=3.097)	  or	  the	  control	  
condition	  (M=2.902,	  SD=2.747),	  F(2,62)=0.830,	  p>0.05.	  	  
Equally,	  there	  was	  also	  no	  statistically	  significant	  main	  effect	  observed	  for	  stake	  size	  when	  losing,	  on	  
percentage	  of	  omission	  errors	  F(1.676,	  51.943)=1.806,	  p>0.05	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  
correction).	  	  This	  means	  that	  despite	  participants	  committing	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  omission	  errors	  
after	  losing	  £20	  bets	  (M=3.181,	  SD=3.276)	  in	  comparison	  to	  losing	  £2	  bets	  (M=2.582,	  SD=2.435)	  and	  
the	  control	  condition	  (M=2.902,	  SD=2.747),	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  state	  that	  losing	  at	  higher	  stakes	  
causes	  participants	  subsequently	  to	  make	  more	  omission	  errors	  in	  comparison	  to	  losing	  at	  lower	  
stakes.	  
10.1.3	  Mean	  Reaction	  Time	  in	  Go/No	  Go	  Task	  after	  Different	  Stake	  Size	  Gambling	  Events	  
Mean	  response	  time	  in	  the	  Go/No	  Go	  task	  refers	  to	  the	  average	  amount	  of	  time	  participants	  use	  to	  
respond	  to	  the	  Go	  trials	  and	  it	  is	  used	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  range	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  including	  
preparedness	  and	  vigilance	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  a	  very	  strong	  and	  
significant	  correlation	  has	  been	  observed	  between	  mean	  reaction	  time	  and	  mean	  reaction	  time	  for	  
correct	  responses	  (r=0.987,	  p<0.001).	  
The	  results	  show	  that	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  mean	  response	  time	  to	  Go	  
trials	  after	  betting	  in	  high	  stake	  conditions	  in	  comparison	  to	  post-­‐low	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  
conditions	  F(2,	  62)=1.978,	  p>0.05.	  	  A	  non-­‐statistically	  significant	  difference	  was	  also	  observed	  in	  
mean	  response	  time	  after	  betting	  in	  winning	  conditions,	  in	  comparison	  to	  post-­‐losing	  and	  post-­‐	  
control	  conditions,	  F(2,	  62)=2.225,	  p>0.05.	  	  	  
Further	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  no	  statistically	  significant	  main	  effect	  was	  observed	  for	  stake	  size	  when	  
winning	  F(2,	  62)=1.977,	  p>0.05,	  or	  stake	  size	  when	  losing	  F(2,	  62)=1.593,	  p>0.05.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  
participants	  did	  not	  on	  average	  differ	  in	  responding	  time	  in	  completing	  the	  Go/No	  Go	  task	  in	  any	  





Table	  2:	  Differences	  in	  outcome	  variables	  of	  visual	  Go/No	  Go	  Task	  
Comparison	   F	  ratio	   Statistically	  
Significant	  
	  
Commission	  Errors	  (withholding	  prepotent	  response)	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.480	   x	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.189	   x	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
1.078	   x	  
Losing	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Losing	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.089	   x	  
	  
Omission	  Errors	  (attention	  and	  vigilance)	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   0.986	   x	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.489	   x	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
0.830	   x	  
Losing	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Losing	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.806	   x	  
	  
Mean	  Reaction	  Time	  (vigilance	  and	  preparedness)	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.978	   x	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   2.225	   x	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
1.977	   x	  







10.2 Reflection	  Impulsivity	  
10.2.1	  Mean	  Information	  Sampled	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  upon	  which	  to	  make	  predictions	  of	  uncertain	  
outcomes,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  participants	  sampled	  less	  information	  (M=3.111,	  SD=2.05)	  in	  the	  high	  
stake	  condition,	  i.e.	  removed	  fewer	  balls	  from	  the	  urn,	  than	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  low	  stake	  
condition	  (M=3.373,	  SD=1.957)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=3.713,	  SD=2.127).	  	  This	  difference	  was	  
statistically	  significant,	  F(1.64,	  50.854)=3.882,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.111	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  
correction).	  	  When	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  with	  post	  hoc	  tests,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  only	  
significant	  difference	  between	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  stake	  is	  between	  the	  control	  and	  the	  £20	  stake	  
conditions	  (p=0.012),	  meaning	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  information	  sampled	  




A	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  has	  also	  been	  observed	  
between	  the	  losing	  condition	  (M=3.13,	  SD=2.037),	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=3.713,	  SD=2.127)	  and	  
the	  winning	  condition	  (M=3.354,	  SD=1.983),	  F(2,	  62)=3.565,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =0.103.	  	  
52	  
	  
Furthermore,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  10,	  the	  trend	  is	  quadratic	  (F(1,31)=4.726,	  p<0.05)	  rather	  
than	  linear	  (F(1,	  31)=2.517,	  p>0.05),	  showing	  that	  both	  winning	  and	  losing	  bets	  relate	  to	  lower	  mean	  
amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition	  where	  there	  was	  no	  
opportunity	  to	  win	  or	  lose	  money.	  Results	  of	  Fisher	  LSD	  post	  hoc	  tests	  suggest	  that	  the	  significant	  
difference	  in	  mean	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  was	  between	  the	  losing	  and	  the	  control	  





The	  difference	  in	  mean	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  after	  winning	  £20	  bets	  (M=3.346,	  SD=2.19)	  
and	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (M=3.363,	  SD=1.974)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=3.713,	  SD=2.127)	  was	  not	  
statistically	  significantly	  different	  F(2,62)=1.432,	  p>0.05.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  
in	  mean	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  after	  losing	  £20	  bets	  (M=2.875,	  SD=2.157),	  losing	  £2	  bets	  
(M=3.384,	  SD=2.108),	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=3.713,	  SD=2.127),	  F(2,62)=5.652,	  p<0.05,	  partial	  
2η 	  =0.154.	  	  Post	  hoc	  analyses	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  revealed	  that	  the	  significant	  difference	  
lay	  between	  mean	  amount	  of	  information	  sampled	  after	  losing	  £20	  bets	  and	  amount	  sampled	  after	  






10.2.2	  Latency	  of	  Response	  
Average	  ball	  removal	  latency,	  measured	  in	  seconds,	  did	  not	  significantly	  differ	  statistically	  across	  
high	  stake	  (M=3.359,	  SD=3.27),	  low	  stake	  (M=2.639,	  SD=1.947)	  and	  control	  conditions	  (M=2.302,	  
SD=0.821),	  F(1.472,	  39.735)=2.274,	  p>0.05	  using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction.	  	  Furthermore,	  
there	  was	  also	  no	  significant	  difference	  observed	  in	  average	  ball	  removal	  latency	  after	  winning	  
outcomes	  (M=3.120,	  SD=3.022),	  losing	  outcomes	  (M=2.877,	  SD=1.860)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  
(M=2.303,	  SD=0.821),	  F(1.127,	  30.429)=1.866,	  p>0.05	  using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction.	  
	  
Exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  stake	  size,	  betting	  outcomes	  and	  average	  ball	  removal	  latency	  
further,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  there	  was	  also	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  between	  
participants’	  average	  latency	  per	  ball	  removed	  after	  winning	  £20	  bets	  (M=3.717,	  SD=4.798),	  winning	  
£2	  bets	  (M=2.589,	  SD=1.627)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=2.302,	  SD=0.821),	  F(1.151,	  32.236)=2.29,	  
p>0.05	  using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction.	  	  This	  trend	  was	  continued	  when	  looking	  at	  mean	  ball	  
removal	  latency	  after	  losing	  £20	  bets	  (M=3.559,	  SD=3.765),	  losing	  £2	  bets	  (M=3.010,	  SD=2.705)	  and	  
the	  control	  condition	  (M=2.302,	  SD=0.821),	  which	  also	  demonstrated	  no	  statistically	  significant	  




In	  other	  words,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  12,	  there	  was	  too	  much	  variance	  observed	  across	  stake	  
size	  and	  bet	  outcome	  conditions,	  regarding	  the	  duration	  of	  time	  participants	  spent	  evaluating	  the	  
information	  they	  sampled	  before	  making	  predictions	  about	  uncertain	  outcomes,	  meaning	  that	  a	  




10.2.3	  Probability	  of	  Making	  Correct	  Predictions	  	  	  
Participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  less	  accurate	  predictions,	  i.e.	  predictions	  with	  a	  lower	  
probability	  of	  being	  correct,	  after	  betting	  in	  the	  high	  stake	  condition	  (M=0.591,	  SD=0.081)	  than	  in	  
the	  low	  stake	  condition	  (M=0.614,	  SD=0.078)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=0.629,	  SD=0.075).	  	  This	  
difference	  in	  probability	  of	  making	  accurate	  predictions	  was	  observed	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  
F(2,	  62)=11.246,	  p<0.001,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.266.	  Post	  hoc	  tests	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  identified	  
significant	  differences	  in	  probability	  of	  making	  accurate	  predictions	  between	  gambling	  at	  £20	  per	  







There	  was	  also	  a	  statistically	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  betting	  outcome	  on	  probability	  of	  making	  
accurate	  predictions	  F(2,	  62)=6.836,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.329.	  	  Essentially,	  on	  average,	  participants	  
were	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  predictions	  with	  lower	  probability	  of	  being	  correct	  after	  losing	  bets	  
(M=0.598,	  SD=0.078),	  than	  after	  winning	  bets	  (M=0.607,	  SD=0.083)	  or	  after	  the	  control	  condition	  
(M=0.629,	  SD=0.075).	  	  Post	  hoc	  tests	  using	  Bonferroni	  Corrections	  have	  demonstrated	  the	  significant	  
difference	  in	  probability	  of	  making	  accurate	  predictions	  lay	  between	  predictions	  made	  after	  the	  
control	  condition	  and	  losing	  condition	  (p=0.002).	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  14,	  the	  trend	  is	  
quadratic	  (F(1,31)=12.325,	  p<0.01,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.284)	  rather	  than	  linear	  (F(1,	  31)=1.209,	  p>0.05),	  
suggesting	  that	  both	  losing	  and	  winning	  bets	  leads	  to	  making	  less	  probable	  predictions	  than	  after	  the	  







Participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  less	  probable	  predictions	  about	  uncertain	  outcomes	  after	  
winning	  high	  stake	  bets	  (M=0.595,	  SD=0.093)	  than	  after	  winning	  lower	  stake	  bets	  (M=0.619,	  
SD=0.08)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=0.629,	  SD=0.075).	  	  This	  difference	  in	  means	  was	  observed	  to	  
be	  statistically	  significant	  F(2,	  62)=6.047,	  p<0.01	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.163.	  	  	  
	  
Post	  hoc	  analyses	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  revealed	  that	  significant	  differences	  were	  observed	  
between	  £20	  winning	  condition	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (p=0.023)	  and	  also	  between	  £20	  winning	  
condition	  and	  £2	  winning	  condition	  (p=0.042).	  No	  significant	  difference	  was	  observed	  between	  £2	  








There	  was	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  observed	  between	  participants	  making	  lower	  
probability	  predictions	  of	  uncertain	  outcomes	  after	  losing	  £20	  bets	  (M=0.588,	  SD=0.083),	  after	  losing	  
£2	  bets	  (M=0.608,	  SD=0.085)	  and	  after	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=0.629,	  SD=0.075),	  F(6,	  62)=8.533,	  
p<0.01,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.216.	  	  
	  
Post	  hoc	  analyses	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  revealed	  that	  significant	  difference	  was	  observed	  















Table	  3	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  across	  the	  various	  outcome	  variables	  of	  
the	  adapted	  IST	  observed	  in	  differing	  stake	  size	  and	  betting	  outcome	  conditions.	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Differences	  in	  Information	  Sampling	  Task	  Outcome	  Variables	  
Comparison	   F	  ratio	   Statistically	  
Significant	  
Mean	  Information	  Sampled	  before	  making	  Prediction	  
	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   3.882	   ü 	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   3.565	   ü 	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
1.432	   x	  
Losing	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Losing	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   5.652	   ü 	  
Mean	  Latency	  of	  Ball	  Removal	  (Reflection)	  
	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   2.274	   x	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.866	   x	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
2.290	   x	  
Losing	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Losing	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   1.996	   x	  
Mean	  Probability	  of	  Making	  Correct	  Predictions	  
	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   11.246	   ü 	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   6.836	   ü 	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
6.047	   ü 	  





10.3 Psychophysiological	  Measurements	  of	  Arousal	  Change	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  SCL	  (also	  known	  as	  tonic	  skin	  conductance)	  is	  constantly	  changing	  within	  
the	  individual;	  furthermore,	  there	  is	  wide	  variation	  between	  individuals	  regarding	  normal	  skin	  
conductance	  levels	  and	  range	  of	  variation	  of	  SCL	  (Braithwaite,	  Watson,	  Jones	  &	  Rowe,	  2013).	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  comparison	  and	  reporting	  of	  raw	  SCL	  between	  individuals	  and	  within	  individuals	  in	  
different	  experimental	  conditions	  would	  not	  yield	  meaningful	  information.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  changes	  in	  
SCL	  within	  participants	  over	  various	  gambling	  conditions	  were	  reported	  as	  a	  percentage	  change	  from	  
Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline	  SCL	  to	  both	  Placing	  Bet	  SCL	  and	  Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bet	  SCL.	  	  Ultimately,	  given	  
intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐individual	  variation	  there	  is	  little	  value	  in	  reporting	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  in	  
relation	  to	  SCL.	  	  
Moreover,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  further	  correct	  for	  inter-­‐individual	  variance,	  skin	  conductance	  
measurements	  were	  transformed	  into	  standardised	  scores,	  first	  computing	  Z	  scores	  and	  
subsequently	  transforming	  Z	  scores	  into	  T-­‐scores	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
10.3.1.	  Change	  in	  SCL	  when	  Placing	  Bets	  
It	  was	  observed	  that	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  percentage	  change	  in	  SCL	  from	  the	  Pre-­‐
Event	  Baseline	  to	  Placing	  Bet	  specified	  epochs	  when	  placing	  bets	  at	  different	  stake	  sizes	  
F(2,62)=0.424,	  p>0.05.	  	  Put	  simply,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  percentage	  changes	  of	  
tonic	  arousal	  level	  from	  baseline	  to	  placing	  £2	  stake	  bets,	  £20	  stake	  bets	  or	  the	  control	  condition.	  
10.3.2	  Observation	  of	  ER-­‐SCRs	  after	  Placement	  of	  Bets	  	  
The	  mean	  amount	  of	  ER-­‐SCRs	  observed	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  was	  0.25	  (SD	  =0.662).	  	  The	  mean	  
amount	  of	  ER-­‐SCRs	  observed	  in	  conditions	  where	  participants	  were	  placing	  £20	  bets	  (M=1.218,	  SD	  =	  
1.56)	  was	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  and	  the	  £2	  stake	  condition	  (M=0.906,	  SD	  =1.4).	  	  There	  
was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  size	  of	  stake	  on	  whether	  the	  participant	  would	  experience	  an	  ER-­‐SCR	  
when	  placing	  bets	  on	  virtual	  roulette	  F(2,62)=7.384,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.192.	  	  Post	  hoc	  analyses	  
using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  identified	  that	  the	  significant	  difference	  in	  mean	  ER-­‐SCR	  frequency	  was	  
observed	  between	  high	  stake	  betting	  and	  low	  stake	  betting	  (p=0.028),	  with	  no	  other	  significant	  
differences	  observed.	  	  In	  simple	  terms,	  a	  participant	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  experience	  a	  significant	  








10.3.3	  Change	  in	  SCL	  when	  Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bet	  
Mean	  levels	  of	  SCL	  were	  not	  significantly	  different	  between	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=4.121,	  
SD=4.574),	  and	  when	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  £2	  stake	  bets	  (M=4.666)	  and	  £20	  stake	  bets	  (M=4.399,	  
SD=4.832)	  with	  the	  main	  effect	  not	  reaching	  statistical	  significance	  F(2,62)=0.354,	  p>0.05.	  	  	  
It	  is	  also	  of	  note	  that	  independent	  of	  stake	  size	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  percentage	  
change	  in	  Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline	  to	  Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bet	  SCL,	  when	  observing	  winning	  outcomes	  
(M=0.641,	  SD=4.289),	  losing	  outcomes	  (M=0.231,	  SD=4.583)	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=0.173,	  
SD=3.326),	  F(2,	  62)=0.141,	  p>0.05.	  
Extending	  the	  analysis	  further,	  it	  was	  also	  observed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  
percentage	  change	  in	  SCL	  between	  Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline	  to	  Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bet	  when	  
participants	  lost	  £20	  bets	  (M=0.134,	  SD=4.266),	  £2	  bets	  (M=0.328,	  SD=5.901)	  or	  the	  control	  
condition	  where	  no	  money	  could	  be	  won	  or	  lost	  F(1.499,	  46.475)=0.024,	  p>0.05	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐
Geisser	  correction).	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When	  comparing	  percentage	  change	  in	  SCL	  between	  Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline	  to	  Observing	  Outcome	  of	  
Bet	  when	  participants	  won	  £20	  bets	  (M=0.799,	  SD=6.111),	  won	  £2	  bets	  (M=0.482,	  SD=5.205)	  and	  the	  
control	  condition,	  it	  was	  observed	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  F(2,62)=0.134,	  p>0.05.	  
	  
Table	  4:	  Change	  in	  SCL	  from	  Pre-­‐Event	  Baseline	  across	  Gambling	  Events	  and	  Conditions	  
Placing	  Bets	   F	  ratio	   Statistically	  
Significant?	  
Difference	  in	  %	  change	  in	  SCL	  across	  £20	  and	  £2	  stake	  conditions	  
and	  the	  control	  condition	  
0.424	   X	  
Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bets	   F	  ratio	   Statistically	  
Significant?	  
	  
Difference	  in	  %	  change	  in	  SCL	  across	  winning	  and	  losing	  £20	  bets	  	   0.354	   X	  
Difference	  in	  %	  change	  in	  SCL	  across	  winning	  and	  losing	  £2	  bets	   0.037	   X	  
Difference	  in	  %	  change	  in	  SCL	  across	  winning	  £20	  bets	  and	  £2	  bets	   0.134	   X	  








10.3.4	  Observation	  of	  ER-­‐SCRs	  after	  Observing	  Outcome	  of	  Bets	  	  
The	  mean	  amount	  of	  ER-­‐SCRs	  observed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  control	  condition	  was	  0.312	  (SD	  =0.693).	  	  
The	  mean	  amount	  of	  ER-­‐SCRs	  observed	  in	  conditions	  where	  participants	  were	  observing	  outcomes	  
of	  bets	  at	  £20	  stakes	  (M=0.75,	  SD	  =	  0.959)	  was	  higher	  than	  in	  both	  the	  control	  condition	  and	  the	  £2	  
stake	  condition	  (M=0.391,	  SD	  =0.632).	  This	  main	  effect	  of	  size	  of	  stake	  on	  whether	  the	  participant	  
would	  experience	  an	  ER-­‐SCR	  when	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  bets	  on	  virtual	  roulette	  was	  statistically	  
significant	  F(1.667,	  51.668)=4.982,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.138	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  
correction).	  	  The	  trend	  was	  linear,	  with	  post	  hoc	  tests	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  revealing	  that	  it	  
was	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  experience	  an	  ER-­‐SCR	  when	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  £20	  bets	  versus	  
£2	  bets	  (p=0.028);	  however	  the	  difference	  between	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  £20	  stake	  bets	  and	  the	  
control	  condition	  did	  not	  quite	  meet	  statistical	  significance	  (p=0.059).	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  difference	  







Furthermore,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  linear	  main	  effect	  on	  whether	  participants	  would	  experience	  an	  
ER-­‐SCR	  when	  observing	  winning	  bets	  (M=1.594,	  SD=2.138)	  or	  losing	  bets	  (M=0.688,	  SD=0.965),	  
F(1.33,	  41.221)=10.912,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.260	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction).	  	  Post	  hoc	  
tests	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  observed	  
between	  winning	  bets	  and	  losing	  bets	  (p=0.01),	  and	  between	  winning	  outcomes	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  (p<0.01);	  however,	  there	  was	  no	  significance	  difference	  in	  ER-­‐SCRs	  observed	  between	  




There	  was	  a	  significant	  linear	  main	  effect	  on	  whether	  participants	  would	  experience	  an	  ER-­‐SCR	  when	  
observing	  outcomes	  of	  winning	  £20	  bets	  (M=1.031,	  SD=1.307),	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (M=0.563,	  SD=1.014)	  
and	  the	  control	  condition,	  F(1.658,	  51.390)=7.048,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.185	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐
Geisser	  correction).	  Post	  hoc	  tests	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  was	  a	  
significant	  difference	  observed	  between	  winning	  £20	  bets	  and	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (p=0.027),	  winning	  
£20	  and	  neutral	  £0	  stake	  bets	  (p=0.013),	  but	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  control	  condition	  and	  £2	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With	  respect	  to	  losing	  bets,	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  found	  in	  observed	  mean	  ER-­‐SCR	  
occurrences	  in	  £20	  stake	  conditions	  (M=0.469,	  SD=0.761),	  £2	  stake	  conditions	  (M=0.219,	  SD=0.42)	  
and	  the	  control	  condition	  (M=0.313,	  SD=0.693),	  	  F(2,62)=1.667,	  p>0.05.	  	  	  
10.3.1.5	  Self-­‐Reported	  Levels	  of	  Arousal	  for	  Gambling	  at	  Different	  Stake	  Sizes	  
Unlike	  non-­‐reactive	  measures	  of	  arousal	  such	  as	  SCL	  and	  SCR,	  the	  possibility	  of	  determining	  change	  
in	  arousal	  through	  self-­‐report	  has	  diminished	  internal	  validity.	  	  In	  simple	  terms,	  asking	  participants	  to	  
consciously	  evaluate	  their	  level	  of	  arousal	  at	  baseline	  is	  likely	  to	  create	  either	  an	  anchoring	  effect	  on	  
future	  evaluations	  of	  arousal	  or	  make	  participants	  conscious	  of	  their	  body’s	  psychophysiological	  
response	  to	  gambling	  stimuli.	  	  Because	  of	  this	  limitation	  in	  self-­‐report	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  self-­‐report	  
measures	  of	  arousal	  would	  only	  be	  taken	  post-­‐bet	  outcome,	  and	  were	  intended	  to	  measure	  
perceived	  arousal	  level	  after	  the	  betting	  experience.	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Mean	  levels	  of	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  after	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  £20	  bets	  were	  higher	  (M=5.964,	  
SD=0.996)	  than	  self-­‐reported	  arousal	  levels	  post-­‐£2	  betting	  (M=5.343,	  SD=0.88)	  and	  post-­‐control	  
condition	  (M=4.031,	  SD=1.7).	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  difference	  was	  statistically	  significant	  F(1.441,	  
44.656)=36.076,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.538	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction).	  	  Post	  hoc	  tests	  
using	  the	  Bonferroni	  correction	  revealed	  significant	  differences	  with	  self-­‐reported	  arousal	  between	  
betting	  at	  £20	  and	  £2	  stakes	  (p=0.001),	  between	  £20	  stakes	  	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (p=0.0001)	  





Mean	  levels	  of	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  after	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  winning	  bets	  were	  higher	  (M=6.771,	  
SD=0.729)	  than	  after	  observing	  losing	  bets	  (M=5.781,	  SD=0.958)	  and	  after	  the	  control	  condition	  
(M=4.031,	  SD=1.7).	  	  This	  difference	  in	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  was	  statistically	  significant	  F(1.432,	  
44.384)=73.431,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.703	  (using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction).	  	  Post	  hoc	  tests	  
using	  the	  Bonferroni	  correction	  revealed	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  was	  significantly	  higher	  when	  winning	  
bets	  versus	  the	  control	  condition	  (p=0.0001)	  or	  losing	  bets	  (p=0.0001).	  	  Finally,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	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there	  was	  statistically	  significantly	  higher	  self-­‐reported	  arousal	  after	  losing	  bets	  the	  control	  condition	  




Participants	  reported	  statistically	  significant	  higher	  levels	  of	  arousal	  when	  winning	  £20	  bets	  
(M=7.208,	  SD=0.968)	  than	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (M=6.333,	  SD=0.892)	  and	  the	  control	  condition,	  F(2,	  
62)=76.812,	  p<0.05,	  partial	   2η 	  =	  0.712.	  	  
	  
Post	  hoc	  tests	  using	  Bonferroni	  corrections	  revealed	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  was	  significantly	  higher	  
when	  winning	  £20	  bets	  in	  comparison	  to	  winning	  £2	  bets	  (p=0.001)	  or	  the	  control	  condition	  




When	  looking	  at	  losing	  at	  various	  stake	  sizes,	  it	  was	  observed	  there	  was	  no	  statistically	  significant	  
difference	  in	  self-­‐reported	  arousal	  between	  losing	  £20	  bets	  (M=4.719,	  SD=1.579),	  losing	  £2	  bets	  





Table	  5:	  Self	  Report	  Levels	  of	  Arousal	  across	  various	  Stake	  Sizes	  and	  Betting	  Outcomes	  
	  
Comparison	   F	  ratio	   Statistically	  
Significant	  
£20	  stake	  vs	  £2	  stake	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   36.076	   ü 	  
Winning	  vs	  Losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition	   73.431	   ü 	  
Winning	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Winning	  £2	  bets	  and	  the	  control	  
condition	  
76.812	   ü 	  
Losing	  £20	  bets	  vs	  Losing	  £2	  bets	  and	  	  the	  control	  condition	   2.929	   x	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11 Discussion,	  Conclusion	  and	  Implications	  
Before	  discussing	  the	  experimental	  findings	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  reflection	  
impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  individually,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  global	  
limitations	  of	  the	  experimental	  design,	  to	  assist	  with	  interpreting	  and	  evaluating	  the	  validity	  and	  
reliability	  of	  the	  findings	  presented	  within	  each	  section.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  design	  
outlined	  below	  will	  also	  be	  discussed	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  specific	  
relationship	  between	  stake	  size	  and	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal.	  
Throughout	  the	  report,	  it	  is	  repeatedly	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  authors	  that	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  
simulation	  used	  in	  the	  experiment	  has	  limitations.	  	  First,	  within	  the	  experimental	  simulation	  there	  is	  
less	  choice	  available	  in	  terms	  of	  bet	  type,	  frequency	  of	  bet	  and	  the	  size	  of	  bet	  placed	  than	  a	  gambler	  
would	  have	  when	  playing	  a	  commercial	  form	  of	  virtual	  roulette.	  	  Effectively,	  in	  commercial	  roulette	  
there	  is	  scope	  for	  the	  player	  to	  adjust	  the	  volatility	  of	  bets	  in	  terms	  of	  potential	  payoffs	  and	  
probability	  of	  winning.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  current	  experimental	  design	  participants	  were	  not	  afforded	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  adjust	  the	  probability	  and	  potential	  reward	  levels,	  and	  instead	  were	  required	  to	  
make	  a	  simple	  50/50	  bet	  with	  an	  ‘even	  money’	  return.	  	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  this	  limits	  the	  
generalisability	  of	  the	  findings	  with	  regards	  to	  commercial	  forms	  of	  virtual	  roulette;	  however,	  this	  
was	  a	  necessary	  step	  in	  order	  to	  standardise	  the	  experimental	  task	  across	  all	  conditions	  and	  
participants,	  which	  in	  turn	  enables	  causal	  conclusions	  to	  be	  drawn	  regarding	  the	  specific	  effect	  of	  
stake	  size.	  	  
Second,	  the	  money	  risked	  had	  been	  provided	  by	  the	  experimenters,	  and	  therefore	  the	  monetary	  loss	  
experienced	  by	  the	  participants	  during	  the	  gambling	  task	  may	  be	  phenomenologically	  different	  to	  
the	  experience	  of	  monetary	  loss	  when	  gambling	  with	  their	  own	  funds.	  	  However,	  the	  research	  team	  
argue	  that	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation	  in	  the	  experimental	  task	  is	  still	  representative	  of	  
commercial	  gambling	  because	  participants	  must	  first	  make	  a	  betting	  selection,	  and	  based	  on	  an	  
unknown	  result	  they	  will	  either	  be	  able	  retain	  the	  monetary	  funds	  provided	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  
provided	  with	  more	  money	  when	  their	  bet	  is	  successful,	  or	  will	  lose	  money	  when	  the	  bet	  is	  
unsuccessful.	  	  Although	  the	  physiological	  and	  psychological	  impact	  of	  winning	  and	  losing	  may	  be	  
somewhat	  muted	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  experimental	  task,	  the	  monetary	  wins	  and	  losses	  within	  
the	  experiment	  remain	  significant,	  and	  this	  limitation	  was	  accepted	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  
requisite	  experimental	  control	  that	  would	  enable	  causal	  conclusions	  to	  be	  drawn.	  
Furthermore,	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  causal	  conclusions	  from	  the	  research	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  standardise	  
gambling	  outcomes	  in	  four	  of	  the	  experimental	  conditions,	  i.e.	  participants	  would	  receive	  either	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three	  wins	  or	  three	  losses	  in	  a	  sequence.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  participants	  may	  have	  interpreted	  
the	  repeated	  sequences	  of	  wins	  and	  losses	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  results	  received	  were	  not	  based	  
on	  chance,	  but	  rather	  predetermined.	  	  However,	  participants	  were	  enabled	  to	  choose	  freely	  to	  bet	  
on	  red	  or	  black,	  and	  this	  personal	  involvement	  and	  choice	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  effective	  in	  
maintaining	  the	  illusion	  of	  randomness	  within	  the	  experimental	  trials.	  	  In	  the	  intervals	  between	  
experimental	  conditions,	  the	  experimenter	  would	  informally	  engage	  the	  participant	  in	  conversation	  
regarding	  the	  outcomes	  of	  their	  bets,	  and	  monitor	  for	  any	  verbal	  indications	  of	  the	  participant’s	  
questioning	  the	  randomness	  of	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation.	  	  There	  were	  no	  instances	  of	  
participants	  questioning	  the	  randomness	  of	  the	  betting	  outcomes;	  however,	  there	  were	  multiple	  
instances	  of	  participants	  internalising	  the	  blame	  for	  making	  the	  wrong	  prediction	  in	  terms	  of	  
incorrectly	  guessing	  whether	  the	  result	  would	  be	  red	  or	  black.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  section	  9.1,	  this	  study	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  compare	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  stake	  
size	  and	  gambling	  outcome	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  across	  non-­‐
problem,	  problem	  and	  pathological	  gamblers.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  research	  was	  solely	  to	  investigate	  
impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  potential	  indicators	  of	  control	  in	  within-­‐session	  gambling	  across	  ‘normal’	  
populations.	  	  Evidence	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  individuals	  with	  a	  gambling	  disorder	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
have	  decision-­‐making	  and	  inhibition	  deficiencies	  and	  a	  different	  arousal	  response	  when	  gambling,	  in	  
comparison	  to	  non-­‐problem	  gambling	  populations	  (Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  Therefore,	  one	  would	  
anticipate	  a	  different	  performance	  on	  the	  measures	  of	  executive	  control	  and	  arousal	  from	  problem	  
gamblers;	  however,	  if	  problem	  gamblers	  were	  included	  within	  the	  current	  study	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  
to	  determine	  whether	  any	  deficiencies	  observed	  in	  high	  or	  low	  stake	  conditions	  were	  caused	  by	  the	  
independent	  variables	  or	  pre-­‐existing	  neurocognitive	  vulnerabilities.	  
It	  is	  probable	  that	  there	  would	  be	  an	  interaction	  effect	  between	  problem	  gambling	  status	  and	  stake	  
size	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal,	  and	  this	  may	  help	  develop	  
understanding	  of	  potential	  maintenance	  factors	  in	  problem	  gambling	  with	  reference	  to	  stake	  size.	  	  
However,	  this	  is	  outside	  of	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  current	  study,	  which	  focused	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  stake	  
size	  to	  affect	  executive	  control	  in	  within-­‐session	  gambling	  across	  non-­‐problem	  gamblers.	  
11.1 Effect	  of	  Stake	  Size	  on	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  
11.1.1	  Discussion	  of	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  Findings	  
The	  construct	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  individual’s	  approach	  to	  decision-­‐making,	  
and	  the	  quality	  of	  approach	  is	  constructed	  of	  three	  specific	  domains;	  namely,	  time	  taken	  to	  
deliberate	  and	  evaluate,	  amount	  of	  information	  used	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  and	  finally,	  the	  quality	  of	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decision	  being	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  probable	  accuracy	  of	  being	  correct.	  	  Research	  clearly	  shows	  that	  
individuals	  with	  addiction	  disorders,	  including	  pathological	  gambling,	  demonstrate	  poor	  
performance	  in	  tests	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  (Clark	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Lawrence	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  thus	  
implicating	  it	  as	  a	  potential	  causal	  or	  maintenance	  factor	  in	  addiction	  disorders.	  	  The	  current	  study	  
indicates	  that	  size	  of	  stake	  has	  a	  causal	  effect	  on	  an	  individual’s	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  correct	  decisions.	  	  	  
It	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  this	  experiment	  that	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stake	  sizes	  did	  not	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  
latency	  of	  decisions	  being	  made	  in	  the	  IST.	  	  Essentially,	  there	  was	  no	  trend	  to	  make	  more	  rapid	  
decisions	  at	  higher	  stakes,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  participant	  was	  winning	  or	  losing.	  
There	  was	  however	  a	  general	  trend	  where,	  as	  the	  size	  of	  betting	  stakes	  increased,	  participants	  used	  
less	  of	  the	  information	  available	  upon	  which	  to	  base	  their	  decisions.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  participants	  
had	  a	  higher	  tolerance	  for	  uncertainty	  when	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  make	  probability	  judgements	  after	  
they	  had	  been	  gambling	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  stake.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  findings	  with	  more	  detail,	  it	  was	  
observed	  that	  this	  difference	  in	  amount	  of	  information	  used	  to	  make	  decisions	  was	  only	  found	  after	  
betting	  at	  £20	  per	  spin	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  There	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  amount	  
of	  information	  used	  after	  betting	  at	  £2	  per	  spin	  and	  the	  control	  condition,	  suggesting	  that	  this	  is	  a	  
phenomenon	  that	  only	  occurs	  when	  betting	  at	  a	  threshold	  above	  £2	  per	  spin.	  	  Moreover,	  after	  losing	  
higher	  stake	  bets	  participants	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  more	  of	  the	  information	  possibly	  available	  
to	  base	  their	  decisions	  on,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition	  where	  money	  could	  not	  be	  won	  or	  
lost.	  
In	  the	  adapted	  IST	  in	  this	  experiment	  there	  was	  motivation	  to	  tolerate	  uncertainty	  because	  as	  
information	  was	  sampled	  the	  potential	  amount	  that	  could	  be	  won	  in	  that	  trial	  also	  reduced.	  	  
Fundamentally,	  the	  less	  information	  sampled	  to	  help	  make	  a	  decision	  the	  higher	  the	  potential	  
reward;	  therefore,	  the	  choice	  to	  make	  riskier	  predictions	  is	  not	  entirely	  maladaptive	  or	  a	  sign	  of	  poor	  
decision-­‐making.	  	  However,	  when	  observing	  the	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  decisions	  being	  
made	  after	  betting,	  in	  terms	  of	  probability	  of	  being	  correct	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  as	  stakes	  increase	  the	  
quality	  of	  decisions	  are	  reduced.	  
Potentially	  the	  most	  important	  finding	  of	  the	  current	  study	  was:	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  after	  an	  
individual	  has	  been	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  poorer	  probability	  
judgements	  than	  after	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  and	  after	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  There	  was	  not	  only	  
a	  reduction	  in	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  between	  the	  £20	  per	  spin	  and	  the	  £2	  per	  spin	  condition,	  
but	  also	  a	  significant	  reduction	  was	  observed	  between	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes	  (£2	  per	  spin)	  in	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comparison	  to	  the	  control	  condition,	  where	  no	  money	  could	  be	  won	  or	  risked.	  	  Exploring	  the	  findings	  
more	  closely,	  it	  was	  also	  shown	  that	  when	  both	  winning	  and	  losing	  at	  higher	  stakes,	  there	  was	  a	  
reduction	  in	  probability	  of	  making	  correct	  judgements	  in	  contrast	  to	  winning	  and	  losing	  lower	  stake	  
bets.	  
Ultimately,	  while	  controlling	  for	  alternative	  causal	  factors,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  after	  betting	  at	  
either	  the	  £20	  or	  £2	  per	  spin	  level,	  the	  participant	  made	  more	  unsound	  and	  impaired	  judgements	  in	  
a	  reflection	  impulsivity	  task.	  	  Poor	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  in	  terms	  of	  poor	  judgement	  and	  evaluation,	  
is	  proposed	  as	  an	  explanatory	  factor	  in	  addiction	  disorders	  and	  problem	  gambling:	  	  therefore,	  it	  is	  an	  
important	  finding	  that	  an	  isolated	  structural	  characteristic,	  size	  of	  stake	  risked,	  is	  shown	  to	  cause	  
impairments	  in	  this	  domain.	  	  	  
It	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  this	  deficit	  in	  decision-­‐making	  is	  not	  a	  result	  of	  making	  rapid	  decisions,	  as	  
amount	  of	  time	  spent	  making	  decisions	  did	  not	  differ	  across	  stake	  sizes.	  	  Furthermore,	  although	  less	  
information	  was	  used	  after	  higher	  stake	  betting	  than	  no	  stake	  betting,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  when	  
comparing	  information	  used	  after	  £20	  versus	  £2	  bets,	  or	  indeed	  after	  £2	  bets	  versus	  the	  control	  
condition.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  impairment	  in	  decision-­‐making	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  result	  of	  participants	  
making	  poor	  decisions	  because	  they	  were	  not	  using	  enough	  information	  to	  make	  accurate	  
judgements.	  	  
In	  the	  research	  literature,	  reflection	  impulsivity	  in	  addiction	  populations	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  
result	  of	  individual	  differences,	  where	  those	  with	  addiction	  disorders	  have	  specific	  neurological	  
vulnerabilities,	  either	  pre-­‐existing	  or	  caused	  by	  repeated	  exposure	  to	  the	  substance	  (Ersche	  et	  al.,	  
2006;	  Whitlow	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  In	  this	  experiment,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  change	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity	  
was	  caused	  by	  individual	  differences	  as	  the	  effect	  was	  shown	  within	  individuals	  across	  a	  single	  day.	  	  
It	  is	  much	  more	  probable	  that	  the	  impact	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  is	  explained	  by	  short-­‐term	  
changes	  in	  internal	  state	  such	  as	  arousal,	  valence	  and	  emotion.	  
With	  respect	  to	  oscillations	  in	  internal	  state,	  although	  participants	  made	  poorer	  decisions	  when	  
losing	  in	  comparison	  to	  winning	  bets	  or	  the	  control	  condition,	  the	  impairment	  in	  decision-­‐making	  
was	  still	  observed	  at	  the	  £20	  stake	  level	  when	  the	  participant	  was	  winning	  and	  being	  successful.	  	  This	  
suggests	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity	  is	  not	  related	  to	  a	  negative	  valence	  component	  
such	  as	  frustration	  or	  annoyance,	  which	  may	  mean	  that	  intensity	  of	  emotion,	  i.e.	  arousal	  rather	  than	  
positivity,	  may	  be	  an	  explanatory	  factor	  to	  consider	  in	  future	  research	  designs.	  
As	  outlined	  in	  the	  results	  section,	  participants	  did	  not	  experience	  a	  statistically	  significant	  change	  in	  
skin	  conductance	  level	  between	  baseline	  and	  either	  placing	  the	  bet	  or	  observing	  the	  outcome	  of	  bet	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in	  any	  experimental	  condition,	  therefore	  suggesting	  that	  the	  deficiency	  in	  decision-­‐making	  is	  not	  a	  
result	  of	  elevated	  arousal	  from	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes.	  	  However,	  prior	  to	  the	  IST	  commencing,	  
participants	  were	  provided	  with	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  total	  monetary	  outcome	  of	  the	  condition,	  i.e.	  the	  
total	  amount	  won	  or	  lost	  during	  the	  last	  15-­‐minute	  session	  (see	  section	  9).	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  although	  participants	  did	  not	  experience	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  arousal	  after	  a	  singular	  high	  
stake	  bet,	  they	  may	  have	  experienced	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  arousal	  in	  response	  to	  seeing	  the	  larger	  
cumulative	  sums	  won	  and	  lost	  in	  the	  reminder.	  	  The	  change	  in	  arousal	  experienced	  in	  response	  to	  
the	  cumulative	  total	  may	  account	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity;	  however,	  further	  
investigation	  is	  required	  to	  support	  this	  explanation.	  	  	  
11.1.2	  Limitations	  and	  Caveats	  Specific	  to	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  Findings	  
Given	  the	  aforementioned	  lack	  of	  existing	  literature,	  this	  experimental	  study	  was	  initiated	  as	  an	  
explorative	  piece,	  solely	  observing	  whether	  gambling	  with	  higher	  stakes	  reduced	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐
making,	  reducing	  one’s	  ability	  to	  withhold	  urges	  and	  affecting	  the	  physiological	  experience	  of	  
gambling.	  	  As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  explorative	  nature,	  the	  work	  was	  conceived	  not	  to	  produce	  a	  
definitive	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  these	  three	  factors,	  but	  rather	  to	  identify	  the	  
most	  dominant	  effects	  and	  outline	  key	  concerns	  regarding	  category	  B2	  machine	  gambling	  and	  
research	  priorities.	  	  Therefore,	  priority	  was	  placed	  on	  establishing	  experimental	  control	  in	  terms	  of	  
controlling	  all	  possible	  alternative	  causal	  factors	  in	  the	  design,	  to	  enable	  confident	  conclusions	  to	  be	  
made	  regarding	  whether	  stake	  size	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  these	  factors.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  it	  was	  important	  
to	  ensure	  that	  each	  participant	  experienced	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes,	  lower	  stakes	  and	  a	  control	  
condition	  where	  no	  money	  was	  won	  or	  lost;	  and	  experienced	  both	  winning	  and	  losing	  at	  high	  and	  
low	  stakes	  in	  case	  the	  impact	  differs	  across	  different	  gambling	  outcomes.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  also	  
essential	  for	  each	  participant	  to	  have	  repeated	  trials	  of	  the	  five	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  observe	  the	  
effect	  more	  reliably,	  rather	  than	  using	  a	  ‘one-­‐shot’	  measurement.	  
The	  consequence	  of	  such	  a	  controlled	  experiment	  means	  that	  there	  is	  an	  inevitable	  trade-­‐off	  with	  
respect	  to	  available	  resources;	  specifically	  that	  the	  more	  time-­‐consuming	  the	  data	  collection	  process	  
for	  each	  participant,	  the	  less	  scope	  there	  is	  to	  test	  participants	  in	  higher	  numbers.	  	  Prioritising	  the	  
observing	  of	  a	  robust	  causal	  link	  between	  stake	  size	  and	  different	  decision-­‐making	  and	  behavioural	  
outcomes	  through	  a	  counter-­‐balanced	  repeated	  measures	  design,	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  in	  
the	  current	  study	  to	  engage	  in	  statistical	  analysis	  regarding	  the	  possible	  mediating	  role	  of	  arousal	  in	  
the	  observed	  deficits	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity.	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Another	  limitation	  of	  the	  reflection	  impulsivity	  findings	  is	  the	  latency	  of	  the	  IST	  measure	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  independent	  variable,	  i.e.	  betting	  outcomes.	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  participants	  completed	  the	  
measure	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  of	  the	  five	  gambling	  conditions,	  rather	  than	  
immediately	  after	  the	  result	  of	  the	  bets.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  only	  variable	  to	  be	  manipulated	  in	  each	  
condition	  was	  the	  stake	  size	  and	  outcome	  (i.e.	  £20	  win,	  £20	  loss,	  £2	  win,	  £2	  loss	  and	  the	  control	  
condition)	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  conclude	  with	  confidence	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  reflection	  impulsivity	  
performance	  is	  attributable	  to	  stake	  size.	  	  However,	  the	  target	  of	  future	  research	  should	  seek	  to	  
simplify	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  research	  design,	  and	  measure	  the	  impact	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  of	  
gambling	  at	  various	  stake	  sizes	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  latencies	  post	  gambling.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  be	  
valuable	  to	  determine	  the	  change,	  if	  any,	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  effect	  if	  participants	  were	  tested	  
immediately	  after	  the	  betting	  trials,	  and	  also	  to	  determine	  how	  long	  the	  increase	  in	  reflection	  
impulsivity	  persists	  after	  gambling.	  	  Investigating	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  size	  
of	  stake,	  betting	  outcome	  and	  reflection	  impulsivity	  would	  be	  highly	  informative	  regarding	  
considerations	  given	  to	  potential	  harm	  minimisation	  strategies	  such	  as	  altering	  structural	  
characteristics,	  or	  the	  design	  of	  existing	  or	  new	  responsible	  gambling	  features.	  
11.1.3	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  Specific	  to	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  Findings	  
Conclusions	  	  
• While	  controlling	  all	  other	  factors,	  gambling	  on	  a	  simulated	  virtual	  roulette	  activity	  at	  higher	  
stakes	  impairs	  judgement	  and	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  comparison	  to	  gambling	  at	  £2	  
levels	  or	  not	  betting	  on	  virtual	  roulette.	  
• The	  reduction	  in	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  was	  not	  a	  result	  of	  making	  more	  rapid	  decisions,	  
as	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  decisions	  were	  being	  made	  
across	  different	  experimental	  conditions.	  	  
• In	  the	  test	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  when	  gambling	  at	  the	  £20	  per	  spin	  level	  participants	  
were	  less	  willing	  to	  retrieve	  more	  information	  to	  make	  more	  informed	  decisions	  than	  in	  the	  
control	  condition.	  	  	  As	  retrieving	  more	  information	  led	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  amount	  that	  
could	  be	  won,	  this	  finding	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  willingness	  to	  make	  less	  informed	  bets	  
with	  a	  higher	  potential	  win.	  	  There	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  level	  of	  information	  
used	  on	  which	  to	  base	  probability	  judgements	  between	  gambling	  at	  £2	  per	  spin	  levels	  and	  
the	  control	  condition,	  indicating	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  willingness	  to	  make	  less	  informed	  
decisions,	  for	  higher	  potential	  wins,	  is	  created	  when	  gambling	  at	  stakes	  higher	  than	  the	  £2	  




• It	  cannot	  be	  stressed	  strongly	  enough	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  experimental	  work	  must	  be	  
applied	  with	  caution,	  given	  that	  this	  is	  the	  first	  study	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  stake	  size	  can	  
affect	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  	  Before	  policy	  decisions	  regarding	  
stake	  size	  on	  EGMs	  can	  be	  fully	  informed,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  these	  findings	  are	  not	  only	  
replicated	  consistently	  but	  also	  expanded	  upon,	  to	  develop	  understanding	  regarding	  the	  
precise	  nature	  of	  this	  effect.	  
• Furthermore,	  as	  stated	  previously,	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  consider	  that	  singular	  structural	  
characteristics	  of	  EGMs,	  such	  as	  size	  of	  stake	  playable,	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  gambling	  
behaviour	  without	  influence	  from	  other	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  game	  such	  as	  event	  
frequency	  or	  game	  volatility	  (Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013).	  	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  policy	  
regarding	  stake	  size	  limits	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  when	  integrated	  
with	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  characteristics	  of	  EGMs	  in	  gambling	  environments.	  	  	  
• The	  next	  step	  should	  be	  to	  conduct	  in	  vivo	  experimental	  research	  into	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  
size	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  with	  all	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  different	  categories	  of	  
EGMs	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  gambling	  environments	  present,	  including	  responsible	  
gambling	  features.	  	  As	  well	  as	  potentially	  supporting	  current	  findings	  through	  replication,	  
there	  will	  be	  an	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  and	  expand	  understanding	  by	  observing	  the	  impact	  
outside	  of	  the	  limitations	  and	  rigidity	  of	  the	  laboratory.	  	  This	  in	  vivo	  research	  will	  require	  
considerably	  more	  time	  to	  conduct	  as	  there	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  experimental	  control	  
assured	  within	  a	  repeated	  measures	  design.	  	  However,	  the	  substantial	  funding	  and	  duration	  
required	  to	  complete	  such	  experimental	  work	  in	  a	  natural	  setting	  is	  certainly	  easier	  to	  justify	  
after	  the	  clear	  findings	  presented	  in	  this	  explorative	  study.	  
11.2 Effect	  of	  Stake	  Size	  on	  Response	  Inhibition	  
11.2.1	  Discussion	  of	  Response	  Inhibition	  Findings	  
Despite	  evidence	  showing	  a	  clear	  link	  between	  response	  inhibition	  deficits	  and	  addictive	  disorders	  
(Fillmore	  &	  Rush,	  2002;	  Lawrence	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Solowij	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  including	  
problem	  gambling	  (Carlton	  &	  Manowitz,	  1992;	  Goudriaan	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Vitaro,	  Arsenault	  &	  Tremblay,	  
1999)	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stake	  sizes	  in	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation	  does	  not	  
reduce	  participants’	  ability	  to	  withhold	  prepotent	  responses	  (i.e.	  behavioural	  urges).	  	  This	  lack	  of	  
causal	  effect	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  size	  of	  stake	  when	  gambling	  on	  EGMs	  does	  
not	  reduce	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  withhold	  responses	  that	  are	  inappropriate.	  	  However,	  given	  the	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exploratory	  nature	  of	  this	  research	  study	  it	  is	  fundamental	  to	  replicate	  this	  finding	  before	  asserting	  
this	  conclusion	  with	  any	  confidence.	  	  It	  could	  be	  tentatively	  inferred	  that	  deficits	  in	  response	  
inhibition	  within	  problem	  gambling	  populations	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  neuropsychological	  
vulnerabilities.	  	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  it	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  observed	  lack	  of	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  
response	  inhibition	  was	  a	  result	  of	  limitations	  within	  the	  experimental	  design	  discussed	  below.	  	  	  
11.2.2	  Limitations	  and	  Caveats	  Specific	  to	  Response	  Inhibition	  Findings	  
	  The	  importance	  of	  considering	  the	  impact	  on	  cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  outcomes	  of	  stake	  size	  in	  
EGM	  gambling	  alongside	  other	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  activity	  has	  been	  discussed	  previously	  
(Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013).	  	  In	  this	  experiment,	  to	  ensure	  a	  high	  level	  of	  experimental	  control	  to	  
determine	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  response	  inhibition,	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  gambling	  task	  
was	  simulated	  in	  a	  laboratory	  setting	  and	  multiple	  important	  structural	  characteristics	  such	  as	  event	  
frequency	  (i.e.	  the	  ability	  to	  re-­‐bet	  rapidly)	  were	  altered.	  	  Put	  simply,	  in	  the	  experiment	  participants	  
could	  only	  bet	  on	  virtual	  roulette	  approximately	  once	  every	  240-­‐300	  seconds,	  and	  therefore	  this	  
reduced	  the	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  although	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
infer	  that	  response	  inhibition	  is	  not	  negatively	  affected	  by	  size	  of	  stake	  in	  isolation,	  before	  size	  of	  
stake	  can	  be	  readily	  discounted	  as	  an	  explanatory	  factor	  in	  response	  inhibition	  deficits	  in	  problem	  
gambling,	  it	  is	  fundamental	  to	  replicate	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  experiment	  using	  live	  EGMs.	  	  By	  
replicating	  this	  research	  using	  a	  live	  EGM	  rather	  than	  a	  simulation	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  determine	  
whether	  stake	  size,	  when	  interacting	  with	  other	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  EGMs	  such	  as	  being	  able	  
to	  bet	  rapidly	  and	  continuously,	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  a	  player’s	  ability	  to	  withhold	  prepotent	  
responses	  and	  urges.	  
Another	  limitation	  of	  the	  research	  design,	  driven	  by	  ethical	  principles	  and	  the	  need	  not	  to	  cause	  
harm	  to	  research	  participants,	  is	  that	  the	  money	  the	  participants	  risked,	  and	  were	  ultimately	  forced	  
to	  lose	  through	  deception,	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  experimenters.	  	  The	  participants	  were	  given	  the	  sum	  
of	  £132	  after	  they	  consented	  to	  the	  experiment.	  	  They	  were	  clearly	  instructed	  that	  although	  they	  
were	  required	  to	  make	  forced	  betting	  choices	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  bets	  to	  be	  made,	  
ultimately	  the	  money	  was	  theirs,	  and	  they	  were	  allowed	  to	  retain	  all	  of	  the	  money	  remaining	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  including	  any	  winnings	  that	  they	  had	  acquired	  during	  the	  test.	  	  Therefore,	  
any	  bet	  that	  they	  lost	  was	  in	  real	  terms	  a	  personal	  monetary	  loss,	  similar	  to	  real	  EGM	  gambling.	  	  
However,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  although	  there	  were	  negative	  consequences	  to	  losing	  bets	  in	  terms	  
of	  reducing	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  they	  would	  have	  after	  the	  experiment	  finished,	  the	  money	  lost	  did	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not	  represent	  money	  that	  was	  earned,	  saved	  or	  allocated	  for	  essential	  costs	  such	  as	  subsistence,	  
transport	  or	  utility	  bills	  for	  example.	  	  	  Strictly	  speaking,	  the	  monetary	  loss	  in	  this	  experiment	  
represents	  loss	  of	  potential	  profit	  rather	  than	  loss	  of	  money	  that	  the	  individual	  has	  personally	  
acquired	  and	  perhaps	  is	  dependent	  upon.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  reaction	  towards	  losses	  and	  potential	  
losses	  in	  terms	  of	  money	  risked,	  whether	  stake	  size	  is	  small	  or	  large,	  may	  be	  different	  because	  of	  the	  
different	  consequences	  associated	  with	  losing	  in	  this	  experiment	  versus	  live	  EGM	  gambling.	  
Persistent	  gambling,	  or	  losing	  control	  and	  chasing	  losses,	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  motivation	  to	  remove	  
negative	  affect	  created	  by	  the	  loss	  such	  as	  anxiety	  and	  frustration,	  and	  to	  make	  financial	  reparations	  
and	  recoup	  losses	  (Campbell-­‐Meiklejohn	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  If	  the	  loss	  of	  money	  in	  this	  experiment	  
represents	  a	  loss	  of	  ‘house	  money’	  rather	  than	  losing	  money	  that	  was	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  or	  required	  
for	  subsistence,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  dull	  the	  negative	  affect	  associated	  with	  losing	  and	  the	  urge	  to	  return	  
to	  how	  things	  were	  before	  the	  session	  commenced.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  difference	  in	  meaning	  of	  
monetary	  losses	  in	  the	  experiment	  in	  comparison	  to	  live	  EGM	  gambling	  may	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  
effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  the	  individual’s	  capacity	  to	  inhibit	  inappropriate	  responses.	  
A	  further	  limitation	  of	  ecological	  validity	  to	  consider	  as	  a	  possible	  reason	  for	  observing	  no	  effect	  of	  
stake	  size	  on	  response	  inhibition	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  multiple	  gambling	  related	  cues	  in	  the	  gambling	  
environment.	  	  As	  experimental	  control	  was	  prioritised	  in	  isolating	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  stake	  size,	  
apart	  from	  the	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation	  itself	  and	  monetary	  stake	  there	  were	  no	  other	  gambling	  
situational	  characteristics	  in	  the	  laboratory.	  	  Dickerson	  (1979)	  identified	  that	  betting	  shop	  gamblers,	  
after	  a	  brief	  latency	  period,	  gradually	  began	  to	  find	  other	  characteristics	  beyond	  betting	  money	  as	  
rewarding	  and	  stimulating,	  through	  a	  process	  of	  classical	  conditioning.	  	  Repeated	  exposure	  to	  
environmental	  cues,	  such	  as	  horse	  racing	  commentary	  or	  interacting	  with	  peer	  gamblers,	  and	  
continuously	  pairing	  these	  cues	  with	  the	  excitement	  and	  arousal	  of	  gambling,	  means	  that	  over	  time	  
the	  environmental	  cues	  within	  the	  betting	  shop	  can	  elicit	  an	  excitation	  response	  independent	  of	  
betting.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  classically	  conditioned	  gambling	  related	  cues	  in	  the	  laboratory	  
environment	  that	  elicit	  aroused	  states	  for	  gamblers	  may	  also	  dull	  physiological	  and	  emotional	  
reactions	  to	  monetary	  losses.	  	  In	  turn,	  this	  may	  account	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  response	  
inhibition	  observed	  in	  the	  current	  study.	  	  	  
This	  reiterates	  the	  need	  to	  attempt	  to	  replicate	  these	  explorative	  findings	  with	  in	  vivo	  experimental	  
work	  within	  licensed	  betting	  offices	  (LBOs)	  and	  other	  machine	  gambling	  environments	  in	  order	  to	  
provide	  further	  confidence	  that	  gambling	  at	  stake	  size	  in	  isolation	  does	  not	  create	  temporary	  
response	  inhibition	  deficits	  in	  gamblers,	  and	  also	  whether	  other	  structural	  or	  environmental	  
characteristics	  affect	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  response	  inhibition.	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11.2.3	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  Specific	  to	  Response	  Inhibition	  Findings	  
Conclusions	  	  
• In	  this	  experimental	  design,	  stake	  size,	  independent	  of	  other	  structural	  or	  environmental	  
characteristics	  related	  to	  EGM	  gambling,	  did	  not	  cause	  a	  temporary	  deficit	  in	  participants’	  
response	  inhibition.	  
• This	  suggests	  that	  if	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  gambling	  behaviour	  is	  indeed	  caused	  by	  poor	  response	  
inhibition	  then	  it	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a)	  pre-­‐existing	  neuropsychological	  vulnerabilities,	  b)	  different	  
structural	  characteristics	  other	  than	  stake	  size,	  or	  c)	  an	  interaction	  of	  multiple	  structural	  and	  
situational	  characteristics	  alongside	  stake	  size.	  	  
Recommendations	  	  
• As	  with	  all	  original	  experimental	  findings,	  it	  is	  fundamental	  to	  replicate	  the	  findings	  with	  
different	  samples	  before	  concluding	  with	  any	  confidence.	  
• It	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  potential	  relationship	  between	  stake	  size	  and	  response	  
inhibition	  is	  explored	  in	  more	  detail,	  specifically	  to	  examine	  if	  the	  null	  effect	  of	  stake	  remains	  
when	  gamblers	  are:	  
o able	  to	  re-­‐bet	  every	  few	  seconds;	  
o losing	  their	  own	  money	  that	  they	  have	  personally	  acquired	  rather	  than	  ‘house	  
money’;	  and	  
o exposed	  to	  gambling	  related	  cues	  in	  the	  gambling	  environment	  that	  may	  be	  
conditioned	  in	  the	  individual	  to	  elicit	  aroused	  internal	  states.	  
11.3 Effect	  of	  Stake	  Size	  on	  Arousal	  Experience	  
11.3.1	  Discussion	  of	  SCL	  Change	  Findings	  
In	  terms	  of	  SCL,	  representing	  the	  participants’	  general	  arousal	  and	  activation	  level,	  it	  was	  observed	  
that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  arousal	  changes	  from	  baseline	  levels	  when	  placing	  and	  
observing	  the	  result	  of	  higher	  stake	  bets,	  whether	  winning	  or	  losing,	  in	  comparison	  to	  either	  lower	  
stake	  or	  no	  stake	  bets.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  observed	  effect	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  that	  SCL	  is	  a	  relatively	  slow	  
and	  non-­‐specific	  physiological	  reaction.	  	  In	  simple	  terms,	  changes	  in	  tonic	  arousal	  are	  primarily	  over	  
the	  longer	  term	  and	  are	  therefore	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  response	  to	  a	  multitude	  of	  interacting	  factors	  that	  
are	  accumulating	  over	  time	  rather	  than	  solely	  driven	  by	  one	  factor,	  i.e.	  size	  of	  stake.	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The	  lack	  of	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  change	  in	  SCL	  remains	  an	  important	  finding,	  as	  it	  emphasises	  that	  
focus	  on	  a	  singular	  variable	  to	  account	  for	  loss	  of	  behavioural	  control	  may	  be	  myopic.	  	  Again,	  this	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  size	  of	  stake	  will	  not	  create	  a	  change	  in	  excitement	  or	  stress	  level	  for	  players,	  
but	  rather	  that	  the	  role	  of	  stake	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  structural	  and	  situational	  
characteristics	  related	  to	  EGM	  gambling.	  	  Similar	  to	  recommendations	  related	  to	  lack	  of	  effect	  of	  
stake	  on	  response	  inhibition,	  it	  may	  be	  important	  to	  consider	  stake	  size	  as	  it	  interacts	  with	  event	  
frequency,	  represented	  as	  gambling	  intensity	  (Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013).	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  tonic	  
arousal	  level	  should	  be	  framed	  as	  being	  determined	  by	  monetary	  amounts	  either	  won	  or	  lost	  
accumulated	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  that	  have	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  individual	  
(either	  positive	  or	  negative).	  	  Put	  simply,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  maximum	  stake	  limits	  in	  isolation	  
impacting	  on	  player	  arousal,	  stake	  size	  should	  be	  combined	  with	  speed	  of	  play	  to	  observe	  the	  effect	  
of	  potential	  rate	  of	  loss	  on	  player	  arousal.	  	  	  
11.3.2	  Limitations	  and	  Caveats	  of	  SCL	  Findings	  
The	  limitations	  of	  the	  design	  discussed	  in	  sections	  11.1.2	  and	  11.2.2	  are	  of	  course	  also	  applicable	  to	  
interpreting	  the	  findings	  relating	  to	  SCL	  change.	  	  To	  summarise,	  although	  losing	  bets	  created	  
monetary	  loss	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  study,	  the	  monetary	  losses	  were	  not	  likely	  to	  have	  created	  
significant	  harm,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  change	  in	  arousal	  the	  participants	  experienced	  in	  
response	  to	  winning	  and	  losing	  larger	  sums	  of	  money.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  lack	  of	  other	  structural	  and	  
situational	  characteristics,	  which	  may	  be	  conditioned	  as	  cues	  to	  stimulate	  arousal	  responses	  in	  the	  
individual	  (Dickerson,	  1979),	  could	  have	  limited	  the	  stimulation	  available	  and	  experienced	  within	  the	  
experiment.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  experimental	  control	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  
enable	  the	  participant	  to	  re-­‐bet	  consecutively	  and	  therefore	  possibly	  accumulate	  substantial	  wins	  or	  
losses,	  as	  is	  possible	  in	  live	  EGM	  gambling.	  	  	  
11.3.3	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  to	  SCL	  Findings	  
Conclusions	  	  
• Gambling	  at	  larger	  stakes	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation,	  independent	  of	  other	  variables,	  
does	  not	  significantly	  increase	  arousal	  change	  between	  pre-­‐betting	  and	  post-­‐betting	  levels.	  	  
• It	  is	  probable	  that	  any	  significant	  increases	  in	  arousal	  experienced	  when	  gambling	  on	  EGMs	  
is	  a	  consequence	  of	  multiple	  interacting	  environmental	  and	  structural	  factors	  rather	  than	  




• With	  respect	  to	  understanding	  the	  experience	  of	  arousal	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  in	  loss	  of	  
control	  when	  gambling,	  it	  is	  recommended	  in	  future	  research	  designs	  to	  explore	  the	  impact	  
of	  stake	  size	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  features	  rather	  than	  in	  
isolation.	  
11.3.4	  Discussion	  of	  Self-­‐Report	  Arousal	  Findings	  
When	  dealing	  with	  self-­‐report	  data	  one	  must	  be	  conscious	  of	  the	  participant’s	  ability	  to	  be	  
introspective	  enough	  to	  gauge	  and	  report	  how	  they	  feel	  during	  the	  experiment.	  	  In	  the	  current	  study	  
participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  their	  level	  of	  arousal	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  individual	  betting	  event.	  	  The	  
findings	  demonstrate	  that	  participants	  found	  the	  experience	  of	  betting	  at	  higher	  stakes	  significantly	  
more	  arousing	  than	  betting	  at	  low	  stakes	  or	  the	  control	  condition	  where	  no	  money	  could	  be	  won	  or	  
lost.	  	  Furthermore,	  participants	  found	  the	  winning	  experience	  significantly	  more	  arousing	  than	  both	  
losing	  and	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  In	  addition,	  losing	  was	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  significantly	  more	  
arousing	  than	  not	  risking	  money	  in	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  This	  supports	  the	  argument	  that	  betting	  
can	  be	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  arousal	  experiences,	  independent	  of	  whether	  the	  participant	  is	  
winning	  or	  losing	  (Anderson	  &	  Brown,	  1984).	  
Exploring	  the	  effect	  of	  winning	  and	  losing	  at	  specific	  levels	  of	  stake,	  it	  was	  also	  observed	  that	  
participants	  find	  winning	  at	  £20	  stakes	  significantly	  more	  arousing	  than	  winning	  at	  £2	  stakes.	  	  This	  
suggests	  the	  pleasurable	  arousal	  of	  winning	  is	  enhanced	  at	  higher	  stakes.	  	  When	  applying	  this	  to	  the	  
argument	  that	  gamblers	  are	  motivated	  to	  commence	  and	  persist	  in	  gambling	  to	  experience	  
heightened	  states	  of	  arousal	  (Anderson	  &	  Brown,	  1984),	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  being	  able	  to	  risk	  
more	  money	  to	  enhance	  the	  experience	  of	  arousal	  may	  increase	  motivation	  to	  continue	  gambling,	  in	  
spite	  of	  the	  potential	  risks	  involved.	  
Conversely,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  arousal	  experienced	  when	  
losing	  £20	  bets	  in	  comparison	  to	  losing	  £2	  bets.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  loss	  for	  the	  
participants	  in	  both	  conditions	  was	  relatively	  similar	  in	  terms	  of	  stimulation	  and	  intensity.	  	  One	  must	  
be	  cautious	  in	  inferring	  extensively	  from	  self-­‐report	  data;	  however	  observing	  both	  that	  magnitude	  of	  
loss	  does	  not	  affect	  experience	  of	  arousal,	  and	  that	  losing	  is	  not	  as	  stimulating	  as	  winning,	  it	  could	  be	  
argued	  that	  gamblers	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  winning	  experience	  in	  comparison	  to	  losing.	  	  Put	  
simply,	  participants	  are	  more	  affected	  by	  winning	  than	  losing,	  and	  the	  pleasurable	  experience	  of	  
winning	  increases	  as	  monetary	  sums	  increase.	  	  In	  general,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  if	  losing	  creates	  a	  
more	  limited	  arousal	  experience	  in	  contrast	  to	  winning,	  when	  determining	  whether	  to	  begin	  or	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persist	  in	  gambling	  decisions	  may	  be	  therefore	  biased	  towards	  potential	  rewards	  versus	  potential	  
negative	  outcomes.	  
When	  contrasting	  the	  lack	  of	  short-­‐term	  change	  in	  arousal	  between	  baseline	  and	  betting	  outcomes	  
with	  the	  large	  significant	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  betting	  outcome	  on	  self-­‐report	  arousal,	  this	  may	  
initially	  seem	  contradictory.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  tonic	  arousal	  
focused	  on	  short-­‐term	  change	  within	  each	  betting	  event,	  whereas	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  was	  compared	  
across	  significant	  time	  periods	  (i.e.	  separate	  experimental	  conditions).	  	  This	  supports	  the	  argument	  
that	  change	  in	  experience	  of	  arousal	  is	  a	  relatively	  unhurried	  response	  to	  an	  accumulation	  of	  events	  
rather	  than	  a	  rapid	  response	  to	  singular	  events.	  	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  proposition	  is	  that	  rather	  
than	  focusing	  on	  maximum	  stake	  size	  permitted	  as	  a	  risk	  factor	  for	  loss	  of	  control	  when	  gambling	  on	  
EGMs,	  attention	  should	  be	  directed	  to	  potential	  average	  monetary	  sums	  that	  can	  be	  won	  and	  lost	  
over	  longer-­‐term	  timeframes.	  	  This	  interpretation	  highlights	  the	  danger	  of	  considering	  individual	  
structural	  characteristics	  without	  further	  consideration	  of	  how	  such	  features	  interact	  with	  other	  
variables	  within	  the	  game	  or	  the	  gambling	  environment.	  	  The	  risk	  of	  changing	  a	  singular	  
characteristic,	  such	  as	  size	  of	  stake,	  without	  considering	  how	  it	  interacts	  with	  other	  features	  of	  the	  
activity,	  is	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  make	  informed	  predictions	  about	  the	  probable	  effect.	  
11.3.5	  Limitations	  and	  Caveats	  of	  Self-­‐Report	  Arousal	  Findings	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  design	  discussed	  in	  preceding	  sections,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  emphasise	  
the	  risks	  of	  over-­‐interpreting	  from	  self-­‐report	  data.	  	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  when	  participants	  were	  trying	  
to	  gauge	  their	  level	  of	  arousal	  that	  it	  was	  challenging	  for	  them	  to	  distinguish	  between	  emotion	  and	  
arousal	  in	  isolation.	  	  Of	  course,	  arousal	  is	  a	  key	  dimension	  of	  emotion;	  however,	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  
any	  self-­‐evaluation	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  other	  dimension	  of	  emotion,	  i.e.	  valence.	  	  In	  summary,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  determine	  with	  confidence	  the	  participants’	  capacity	  to	  immediately	  evaluate	  and	  report	  
their	  internal	  state	  in	  terms	  of	  arousal,	  meaning	  any	  conclusions	  must	  be	  made	  cautiously	  
11.3.5	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  to	  Self-­‐Report	  Arousal	  Findings	  
Conclusions	  	  
• Gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation	  creates	  an	  experience	  to	  the	  
individual	  that	  is	  significantly	  more	  arousing	  than	  gambling	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  
• Winning	  at	  higher	  stakes	  when	  gambling	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation	  creates	  a	  
heightened	  arousal	  experience	  in	  comparison	  to	  winning	  at	  lower	  stakes.	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• From	  analysis	  of	  these	  findings	  it	  is	  concluded	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  arousal	  does	  not	  
increase	  when	  losing	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  lower	  stakes	  when	  gambling	  on	  
virtual	  roulette.	  
• It	  can	  tentatively	  be	  inferred	  from	  these	  findings	  that	  participants	  are	  more	  sensitive,	  in	  
terms	  of	  arousal	  created,	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  winning	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  sums	  when	  
winning,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  losing	  and	  size	  of	  loss.	  	  This	  may	  cause	  individuals	  to	  
bias	  decision-­‐making	  towards	  previous	  and	  potential	  wins	  when	  determining	  whether	  to	  
continue	  or	  cease	  gambling.	  
Recommendations	  	  
• Given	  the	  observed	  arousal	  experience,	  individuals	  may	  disproportionately	  value	  winning	  
monetary	  sums	  in	  contrast	  to	  potentially	  losing,	  and	  this	  may	  help	  account	  for	  loss	  of	  control	  
and	  persistent	  gambling	  that	  leads	  to	  gambling	  related	  harm.	  	  Before	  accepting	  this	  finding	  
with	  any	  confidence	  it	  is	  important	  to	  replicate	  this	  finding	  in	  EGM	  gambling	  environments	  
to	  determine	  whether	  structural	  and	  situational	  characteristics	  other	  than	  stake	  size	  affect	  
the	  losing	  experience	  in	  EGM	  gambling.	  
• Self-­‐reported	  arousal	  levels	  appear	  to	  change	  significantly	  when	  winning	  and	  losing,	  and	  also	  
when	  winning	  at	  different	  stakes.	  	  As	  arousal	  is	  one	  of	  two	  component	  dimensions	  of	  
emotion,	  it	  is	  probable	  emotional	  experience	  may	  also	  change	  significantly	  when	  winning	  at	  
different	  stake	  sizes.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  recommended	  that	  further	  research	  is	  conducted	  to	  
explore	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  and	  gambling	  outcome	  on	  valence,	  the	  second	  dimension	  of	  
emotion.	  	  Developing	  a	  more	  global	  understanding	  of	  affective	  changes	  with	  the	  machine	  
betting	  environment	  to	  specific	  outcomes	  in	  EGM	  gambling,	  may	  help	  account	  for	  within-­‐
session	  loss	  of	  control.	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11.4 Effect	  of	  Stake	  Size	  on	  Arousal	  as	  a	  Somatic	  Marker	  
11.4.1	  Discussion	  of	  Arousal	  as	  Somatic	  Marker	  Findings	  
It	  was	  observed	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  skin	  conductance	  response	  (SCR:	  a	  
somatic	  marker)	  after	  observing	  outcomes	  of	  bets	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  comparison	  to	  lower	  stakes.	  	  
Moreover,	  winning	  at	  higher	  stakes	  produced	  significantly	  more	  SCRs	  than	  winning	  at	  lower	  stakes.	  	  
Although	  at	  face	  value	  it	  may	  appear	  that	  a	  sharp	  deviation	  in	  arousal	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  detrimental	  
impact	  on	  decision-­‐making,	  this	  spike	  in	  arousal	  dissipates	  within	  a	  few	  seconds.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  argued	  
that	  this	  sharp	  deflection	  in	  arousal	  acts	  a	  physiological	  marker.	  	  This	  marker	  enables	  one	  to	  encode	  
the	  event	  as	  being	  either	  positive	  or	  negative,	  and	  if	  the	  event	  and	  marker	  are	  paired	  frequently	  
enough	  the	  marker	  will	  eventually	  automatically	  be	  evoked	  when	  faced	  with	  the	  event	  in	  future	  
situations	  (Damasio,	  1999).	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  production	  of	  a	  somatic	  response	  in	  anticipation	  of	  
an	  event	  assists	  the	  individual	  in	  their	  cognitive	  processing	  and	  decision-­‐making,	  by	  providing	  
affective	  context	  (Tranel,	  2000).	  
Fundamentally,	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  this	  experiment	  had	  the	  consequence	  of	  producing	  
larger	  monetary	  wins	  and	  larger	  monetary	  losses.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  observed	  increase	  in	  SCRs	  
produced	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  stakes	  may	  potentially	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  adaptive.	  	  In	  other	  
words,	  it	  is	  adaptive	  and	  beneficial	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  encode	  this	  association,	  because	  it	  will	  
enable	  the	  individual	  to	  learn	  from	  past	  experiences,	  with	  decision-­‐making	  in	  gambling	  being	  
appropriately	  biased	  based	  on	  whether	  the	  experience	  of	  high	  stake	  gambling	  was	  positive	  or	  
negative.	  
When	  looking	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  the	  production	  of	  somatic	  markers	  more	  closely,	  it	  was	  
observed	  that	  participants	  had	  more	  SCRs	  in	  response	  to	  winning	  bets	  than	  losing	  bets.	  	  
Furthermore,	  participants	  did	  not	  produce	  significantly	  more	  SCRs	  when	  losing	  higher	  amounts	  of	  
money	  in	  comparison	  to	  losing	  lower	  amounts	  of	  money.	  	  Collectively,	  this	  suggests	  that	  the	  
participants	  in	  this	  experiment	  were	  more	  effective	  in	  creating	  somatic	  markers	  in	  relation	  to	  
potential	  reward,	  but	  they	  demonstrated	  deficits	  in	  response	  to	  trying	  to	  mark	  negative	  outcomes.	  	  
This	  is	  supportive	  of	  the	  emergent	  findings	  from	  the	  self-­‐report	  data,	  which	  also	  demonstrated	  an	  
increased	  sensitivity	  towards	  potential	  rewards.	  	  This	  may	  be	  maladaptive	  in	  terms	  of	  decision-­‐
making	  in	  gambling,	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  somatic	  markers	  indicating	  potential	  threat	  means	  that	  the	  
affective	  nudge	  evoked	  to	  assist	  rational	  decision-­‐making	  will	  be	  biased	  towards	  potential	  rewards.	  	  
In	  simple	  terms,	  when	  playing	  a	  simulation	  of	  virtual	  roulette,	  participant	  arousal	  and	  physiological	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responses	  were	  weighted	  towards	  the	  positive	  rewards	  of	  gambling,	  and	  participants	  were	  less	  
effective	  in	  responding	  adaptively	  to	  negative	  gambling	  outcomes.	  
11.4.2	  Limitations	  and	  Caveats	  Specific	  to	  Arousal	  as	  Somatic	  Marker	  Findings	  
As	  previously	  discussed	  in	  section	  11.2.2,	  although	  there	  was	  a	  real	  monetary	  loss	  for	  participants	  
when	  they	  lost	  bets,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  loss	  may	  have	  been	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  money	  lost	  was	  
provided	  by	  the	  experimenter	  during	  the	  session;	  whereas	  in	  real	  gambling	  environments,	  the	  
money	  risked	  and	  lost	  is	  money	  that	  has	  been	  personally	  acquired	  by	  the	  individual	  and	  thus	  may	  
hold	  more	  significance	  for	  the	  individual	  in	  comparison	  to	  money	  provided	  to	  them.	  	  Therefore,	  
given	  that	  the	  participants	  lost	  money	  that	  they	  were	  not	  dependent	  on,	  this	  may	  have	  reduced	  the	  
threat	  of	  the	  loss,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  somatic	  markers	  recording	  during	  loss	  
conditions	  in	  the	  experiment.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  conclusions	  made	  in	  section	  11.4	  as	  being	  the	  most	  tentative.	  	  
Fundamentally,	  this	  is	  because	  despite	  demonstrating	  substantial	  promise,	  the	  somatic	  marker	  
hypothesis	  and	  its	  role	  in	  decision-­‐making	  performance	  is	  the	  least	  developed	  area	  of	  research	  
discussed	  in	  the	  report	  (Colombetti,	  2008;	  Dunn	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  The	  somatic	  marker	  hypothesis	  
requires	  substantial	  development	  before	  the	  role	  of	  somatic	  markers	  in	  adaptively	  assisting	  decision-­‐
making	  and	  judgement	  can	  be	  universally	  accepted.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  somatic	  marker	  hypothesis	  in	  its	  
current	  format	  is	  too	  general,	  and	  the	  model	  requires	  refinement	  by	  more	  specifically	  identifying	  
what	  components	  of	  decision-­‐making	  are	  influenced	  by	  somatic	  markers	  (i.e.	  attention,	  working	  
memory,	  etc.)	  (Colombetti,	  2008).	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  given	  that	  there	  are	  
multiple	  forms	  of	  somatic	  markers	  available	  to	  the	  individual,	  an	  absence	  of	  an	  SCR	  in	  response	  to	  
losing	  does	  not	  definitively	  state	  that	  no	  somatic	  marker	  was	  present.	  	  Ultimately,	  although	  the	  
somatic	  marker	  hypothesis	  is	  under-­‐developed,	  the	  current	  study	  does	  demonstrate	  that	  betting	  
outcomes	  and	  magnitude	  of	  win	  do	  impact	  somatic	  response,	  and	  therefore	  indicates	  that	  this	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  a	  productive	  direction	  for	  future	  research.	  
11.4.3	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  to	  Arousal	  as	  Somatic	  Marker	  Findings	  
Conclusions	  	  
• In	  general,	  participants	  seemed	  to	  show	  deficits	  in	  somatic	  responding	  to	  negative	  gambling	  
outcomes	  when	  gambling	  on	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  simulation,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  a	  negative	  
effect	  on	  future	  gambling	  decision-­‐making.	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• When	  winning,	  participants	  produced	  more	  somatic	  markers	  when	  gambling	  at	  higher	  
stakes.	  	  This	  is	  interpreted	  to	  be	  an	  adaptive	  response	  as	  it	  is	  of	  benefit	  to	  the	  individual	  to	  
signal	  larger	  rewards	  in	  comparison	  to	  smaller	  rewards.	  	  However,	  this	  strong	  somatic	  
response	  to	  rewards	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  more	  muted	  response	  to	  punishment	  may	  bias	  
decision-­‐making	  and	  create	  a	  preference	  for	  risk.	  
Recommendations	  	  
• The	  potential	  maladaptive	  physiological	  response	  to	  losing	  in	  a	  virtual	  roulette	  gambling	  
simulation	  as	  observed	  here	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  self-­‐report	  arousal	  data	  
previously	  discussed.	  	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  rationale	  for	  studying	  the	  differential	  
physiological	  and	  somatic	  responses	  of	  individuals	  in	  EGM	  gambling	  when	  losing	  and	  
winning	  at	  higher	  and	  lower	  stakes.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  monetary	  loss	  when	  gambling	  
may	  assist	  in	  understanding	  decision-­‐making	  deficits	  and	  loss	  of	  control	  in	  within-­‐session	  
EGM	  gambling.	  
• When	  replicating	  and	  developing	  this	  research	  area	  further,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  
that	  SCRs	  are	  only	  one	  variation	  of	  somatic	  marker,	  therefore	  other	  somatic	  markers	  such	  as	  














12 Concluding	  Statement	  
12.1 Key	  Finding:	  Gambling	  at	  Higher	  Stakes	  Can	  Reduce	  Quality	  of	  Decision-­‐Making	  
As	  identified	  previously	  by	  Parke	  and	  Parke	  (2013),	  higher	  stakes,	  along	  with	  the	  variables	  of	  Return	  
to	  Player	  and	  Game	  Speed,	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  loss;	  and	  rate	  of	  loss	  is	  a	  key	  
component	  of	  gambling	  related	  harm.	  	  However,	  this	  study	  finds	  initial	  support	  for	  a	  new	  stake-­‐
related	  risk	  factor	  for	  gambling	  related	  harm,	  as	  it	  was	  demonstrated	  that	  gambling	  on	  a	  virtual	  
roulette	  simulation	  at	  higher	  stakes	  impairs	  decision-­‐making	  quality,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  reduce	  self-­‐
control	  when	  gambling.	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  questions	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  addressed	  is	  how	  the	  impact	  of	  event	  frequency	  (i.e.	  
opportunity	  to	  re-­‐bet)	  affects	  players’	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  
experience	  when	  gambling.	  	  More	  specifically,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  observed	  
impacts	  of	  stake	  size	  on	  player	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  inhibition	  and	  arousal	  experience	  are	  
affected	  by	  differing	  event	  frequency	  levels.	  	  It	  is	  already	  understood	  that	  higher	  event	  frequency	  
will	  lead	  to	  an	  increased	  rate	  of	  loss	  (Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013);	  however,	  the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effect	  of	  
event	  frequency	  on	  executive	  control	  is	  an	  important	  new	  research	  objective	  on	  which	  to	  focus.	  	  
Ultimately,	  by	  introducing	  the	  structural	  characteristic	  of	  event	  frequency,	  the	  observed	  reduction	  in	  
reflection	  impulsivity	  at	  higher	  stakes	  in	  the	  current	  study	  may	  change	  (either	  positively	  or	  
negatively).	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  also	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  faster	  game	  may	  affect	  response	  
inhibition	  performance	  when	  gambling,	  as	  stake	  size	  in	  isolation	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  a	  player’s	  ability	  
to	  withhold	  urges.	  
Of	  all	  the	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  EGMs,	  it	  is	  most	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  interaction	  of	  
stake	  size	  and	  event	  frequency	  on	  gambling	  cognition	  and	  behaviour,	  because	  in	  Great	  Britain	  
gambling	  machines	  are	  categorised	  to	  an	  extent	  across	  these	  two	  dimensions.	  	  For	  example,	  
category	  B2	  game	  content	  has	  a	  maximum	  stake	  size	  of	  £100	  with	  each	  event	  lasting	  around	  20	  
seconds,	  whereas	  B3	  game	  content	  has	  a	  much	  lower	  maximum	  stake	  size	  of	  £2	  but	  a	  much	  higher	  
event	  frequency,	  with	  each	  spin	  lasting	  approximately	  three	  seconds.	  	  Although	  B2	  content	  has	  a	  
higher	  theoretical	  loss	  per	  hour	  in	  comparison	  with	  B3	  content	  (Parke	  &	  Parke,	  2013),	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  the	  faster	  rate	  of	  play	  on	  B3	  content	  may	  also	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  executive	  control	  in	  
machine	  gambling	  beyond	  rate	  of	  loss.	  	  Fundamentally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  how	  maximum	  
stake	  size	  interacts	  with	  speed	  of	  play	  to	  affect	  a	  player’s	  ability	  to	  gamble	  in	  a	  controlled,	  
responsible	  manner,	  in	  terms	  of	  impairing	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	  ability	  to	  suppress	  urges	  to	  




The	  gambling	  task	  used	  in	  this	  experimental	  design	  was	  developed	  to	  represent	  a	  simplified	  version	  
of	  virtual	  roulette,	  where	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  make	  a	  simple	  ‘outside	  bet’	  (a	  bet	  with	  a	  
probability	  of	  approximately	  0.5).	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  determine	  how	  stake	  size	  may	  interact	  
specifically	  with	  other	  electronic	  gambling	  formats	  such	  as	  blackjack	  and	  slot	  content	  also	  available	  
on	  EGMs.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  differences	  in	  game	  structure	  of	  content	  other	  than	  virtual	  roulette,	  or	  
even	  a	  fully	  expanded	  version	  of	  virtual	  roulette,	  may	  also	  affect	  a	  player’s	  executive	  control,	  either	  
directly	  or	  indirectly.	  
12.2 Replication	  of	  Findings	  in	  Natural	  Setting	  
Given	  the	  need	  to	  repeat	  the	  experiment	  in	  real	  gambling	  environments	  such	  as	  betting	  shops	  and	  
casinos	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  structural	  and	  environmental	  characteristics	  in	  
combination	  with	  stake	  size,	  one	  must	  consider	  why	  the	  research	  team	  did	  not	  choose	  to	  do	  this	  
initially	  rather	  than	  conduct	  the	  study	  in	  a	  laboratory.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  conducting	  this	  explorative	  
study	  in	  a	  laboratory	  setting	  was	  that	  it	  enabled	  the	  research	  team	  to	  standardise	  the	  gambling	  
experience	  in	  terms	  of	  type	  and	  size	  of	  bet,	  and	  also	  the	  outcome	  of	  such	  bets	  in	  terms	  of	  wins	  and	  
losses,	  and	  the	  sequence	  of	  such	  outcomes.	  	  Such	  a	  high	  level	  of	  experimental	  control	  is	  
fundamental	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  researchers	  can	  conclude	  confidently	  that	  observed	  change	  in	  the	  
dependent	  variables	  (in	  this	  case	  executive	  functions	  and	  arousal	  response)	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  
independent	  variable	  (stake	  size).	  	  Comparing	  an	  individual’s	  reflection	  impulsivity,	  response	  
inhibition	  and	  arousal	  response	  across	  five	  experimental	  conditions	  within	  a	  repeated	  measures	  
design	  in	  a	  laboratory	  setting	  is	  an	  effective	  method	  to	  control	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  individual	  
differences	  on	  the	  dependent	  variables.	  	  By	  controlling	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  individual	  differences	  on	  
arousal	  response	  and	  executive	  control,	  the	  experiment	  could	  be	  conducted	  with	  a	  relatively	  small	  
sample	  size	  while	  maintaining	  a	  high	  level	  of	  experimental	  rigour.	  	  
Put	  simply,	  if	  the	  data	  was	  collected	  with	  a	  live	  EGM,	  each	  participant	  would	  experience	  a	  different	  
outcome	  in	  each	  condition,	  and	  therefore	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  stake	  size	  
without	  observing	  hundreds	  of	  participants	  over	  a	  substantially	  longer	  period	  of	  time	  than	  the	  
current	  study.	  	  	  Experimental	  designs	  should	  not	  be	  determined	  by	  expected	  length,	  and	  therefore	  
budget	  size;	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  and	  reasonable	  to	  precede	  more	  extensive	  studies	  with	  
explorative	  work	  to	  determine	  feasibility,	  design	  and	  probable	  utility	  of	  such	  research.	  	  
Beyond	  being	  able	  to	  measure	  how	  stake	  size	  interacts	  with	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  gambling	  activity	  
and	  environment,	  conducting	  research	  in	  a	  natural	  setting	  will	  also	  minimise	  a	  prominent	  limitation	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of	  the	  current	  study.	  	  Essentially,	  in	  the	  real	  gambling	  environment	  players	  will	  be	  risking	  money	  that	  
they	  have	  personally	  acquired	  and	  may	  depend	  on,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  enhance	  the	  experience	  of	  
monetary	  loss	  in	  comparison	  to	  monetary	  loss	  in	  the	  current	  study.	  	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  
monetary	  loss	  in	  the	  current	  study	  had	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  participants;	  however,	  
because	  the	  money	  lost	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  experimenter,	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	  losing	  that	  
money	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  muted	  in	  contrast	  to	  real	  gambling.	  	  It	  is	  important	  in	  future,	  more	  expansive	  
research	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  experience	  of	  losing	  previously	  acquired	  personal	  money	  is	  
qualitatively	  different	  than	  observed	  in	  the	  current	  study,	  and	  whether	  this	  affects	  physiological	  
response	  and	  performance	  in	  executive	  functioning	  in	  gamblers.	  
12.3	  Further	  Understanding	  of	  Relationship	  between	  Stake	  Size	  and	  Reflection	  Impulsivity	  
In	  the	  current	  study,	  for	  practical	  and	  ethical	  reasons,	  it	  was	  only	  possible	  to	  observe	  the	  effect	  of	  
stake	  size	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  at	  three	  levels:	  £20	  per	  spin,	  £2	  per	  spin	  and	  a	  control	  condition	  
where	  no	  money	  could	  be	  won	  or	  lost.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  determine	  whether	  higher	  stake	  
gambling	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  reflection	  impulsivity	  in	  participants	  in	  contrast	  to	  lower	  stake	  
gambling,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  fully	  understand	  and	  explain	  the	  precise	  relationship	  between	  stake	  
size	  and	  reflection	  impulsivity	  deficits.	  	  It	  is	  important	  for	  future	  research	  to	  employ	  a	  design	  to	  
measure	  the	  impact	  on	  reflection	  impulsivity	  when	  participants	  are	  winning	  and	  losing	  at	  a	  wide	  
variety	  of	  stake	  sizes,	  ranging	  across	  the	  full	  spectrum	  from	  micro-­‐limits	  to	  £100.	  	  The	  relationship	  
between	  stake	  size	  and	  reflection	  impulsivity	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  linear	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  
deterioration	  of	  decision	  making-­‐performance	  may	  plateau	  at	  a	  specific	  threshold.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  
is	  not	  currently	  possible	  to	  state	  categorically	  that	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  reduces	  proportionally	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